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Abstract
Cambodia is one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia. The United 
Nations Human Development Index ranks Cambodia as 137 out of 182 
countries in terms of quality of life. Cambodia is also an aid dependent 
country, with nearly half its annual budget coming from aid. Since the Paris 
Peace Accords in 1991 and subsequent United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) period, OECD-DAC (Development 
Assistance Committee) (or 'traditional') donors have entered Cambodia in 
large numbers. These traditional donors allocate aid according to the OECD- 
DAC consensus. This consensus is based around international agreements 
such as the Millennium Development Goals, The Pahs Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and the Monterrey Consensus o f the International Conference on 
Financing fo r  Development. The traditional donors have, since the early 
1990s, created and dominated the aid 'culture' in Cambodia.
Recently, however, another donor has come to the fore in Cambodia, and 
that is China. China has strong historical, social and economic links with 
Cambodia that go back to ancient times. China has been disbursing aid to 
Cambodia since the 1950s. However, it has only been since 2006 that China 
has come to the fore as an aid donor, due in part to the large amount of aid it 
is currently pledging to Cambodia but also to the growing role China is 
playing on the wider global stage. China is now one of the largest donors to 
(as well as investors in) Cambodia. China, however, is often considered a 
'rogue' donor by the traditional donors both at the global scale and within 
Cambodia, as China does not conform with DAC policy on aid and 
development. This leads to certain representations of China that do not 
always accord with the 'realities' of China's aid program.
This thesis explores aid cultures in Cambodia, in particular the encounter 
between Chinese aid and western aid. Theoretically this thesis situates itself 
at the intersection between (post)development geography and cultural 
geography, drawing on ideas such as representation and encounter to 
understand how Chinese and western aid come together in the context of 
Cambodia. By doing so, this thesis fills a gap in the existing literature by 
looking at aid as a culture, and exploring China's aid from a 
[post]development/cultural geography viewpoint, rather than an economic 
or international relations stance. Arising from this theoretical stance come 
three primary research questions: How do those with different cultural sets 
come together in certain contexts, namely aid; what cultural encounters do 
we see in this mix between traditional donors and new donors; how do 
discourses around 'the other' play into aid dialogues in Cambodia?
This thesis investigates these research questions through qualitative 
methods, including interviews, discourse analysis and participant 
observation. Analysis is undertaken of western aid to Cambodia, with a 
focus on the history and statistics of aid, aid coordination, development 
policy and critiques of traditional aid in order to highlight the existing aid 
culture in Cambodia. An analysis is then undertaken of China's aid to
Cambodia, looking at the aid figures and aid structure before investigating 
representations of China's aid and looking at an indicative case study of one 
Chinese aid project in Cambodia. Finally the encounter between western aid 
and Chinese aid is analysed with particular reference to three types of 
western aid actors in Cambodia and how they encounter and represent 
China and its aid program.
Through the above investigation, three main findings are arrived at: a) that a 
particularly western aid culture has been created in Cambodia, one which 
can be seen as a 'site of knowledge' for western aid; b] that Chinese aid is 
deliberately constructed and represented in certain ways by the West for its 
own purposes much as Said (1995] outlined in his work Orientalism 
regarding the relationship between the West and 'the other'; and c) whilst 
global aid discourses influence the encounter between China and the West 
in Cambodia, Cambodia itself is not a passive player in this encounter, using 
it for its own advantage by playing off China and the western donors against 
one another.
Acknowledgements
This thesis would not have been completed without the supervision, 
inspiration, cooperation and friendship of the following people and 
organisations:
Phil Hirsch, John Connell, Bob Fisher, Nathan Wales, Anne Semple, AusAID, 
Cambodian Development Resource Institute (CDRI), Dan Montoya, Daravy 
Khiev, Dee Hickey, DFID, Fiona McKenzie, Gareth Edwards, JICA, Jo Gillespie, 
Lada Phadungkiati, Laurence Troy, Kevin Davies, Mattijs Smits, Ministry of 
Economic and Finance Cambodia, Natalia Scurrah, NGO Forum, Huy Nguyen 
Tuong, Olivia Dun, Oulavanh Keovilignavong, Oxfam, Paula Brown, Phalla 
Chem, People of Ou Touch and Tvi Khang Cheung villages, Raewyn Graham, 
Renee Fulton, Rotha Ken Serey, Senthil Kasiannan, SIDA, Soimart 
Rungmanee, Somatra Kim Sean, Sopheak Chann, Sophia Maalsen, Royal 
University of Phnom Penh (RUPP], Surin Onprom, Tubtim Tubtim, UNDP, 
USAID, Viliam Phraxayavong, Wora Sukraroek, WWF, Yayoi Lagerqvist, Zoe 
Wang, Paul Griffiths, Margot Edwards, Sue Tronser.
Kate Griffiths 
25 March 2011
Statement of originality
The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, 
original except as acknowledged in the text. I have not submitted this thesis, 
either in full or in part, for a degree at this, or any other institution.
Kate Griffiths 
25 March 2011
Table of contents
Abstract
Acknowledgements iii
Statement of originality iv
Table of contents V
List of acronyms viii
Notes to reader X
Chapter One: Introduction 1
B a c k g ro u n d 1
T h e o ry  a n d  o b je c t ive s 3
M e th o d o lo g y  a n d  m e th o d s 4
T h e sis  s tru c tu re 5
Chapter Two: Theorising Development and Culture 8
D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  p o s t-d e v e lo p m e n t 8
A id 11
R e p re s e n ta t io n  a n d  E n c o u n te r 16
Cultural G eography 16
Critical geop o litics 17
Representation 19
Encou n ters 21
Chapter 3: Chinese Aid and Development 24
C h in a 's  d e v e lo p m e n t  d isco u rse 24
C h in a 's  a id 2 9
R e p re s e n ta t io n s  o f  C h in a 3 5
S u m m a ry 4 0
Chapter Four: Cambodia, China and the World 41
H is to ry 41
Early Cam bodia-Ch ina re lationship 41
European contact 43
Independence, Isolation and 1991 44
G o v e rn m e n t, g o v e rn a n ce  a n d  p o lit ic s 4 6
E co n o m y , tra d e  a n d  in v e stm e n t 5 0
S u m m a ry 5 4
Chapter Five: Western Aid to Cambodia 55
A id  H is to ry 55
French co lonisation: 1863-1953 55
The 'go lden age': 1953-1975 56
The U N TAC period: 1992-1993 58
A id  a s a cu ltu re 6 0
Aid coord ination 63
D evelo pm en t policy 67
Critiq u es 69
S u m m a ry 72
Chapter Six: Chinese aid to Cambodia 74
History 74
Chinese aid post-1991 78
Aid figures: fact and fiction 79
Aid structure: Is China's aid different? 84
Case study: Kamchay Dam 87
China and the existing aid culture 93
Summary 94
Chapter Seven: Aid, Cambodia and the Cultural Encounter 96
The Aid Encounter in Cambodia 96
What is the encounter? 96
Bilateral donors 97
Multilateral donors 100
Non-government organisations 101
Why this encounter? 103
Theoretical insights - Development, Aid, Representation and Encounter 106
Development 106
Aid 108
Representation 110
Encounter 112
Summary 114
Chapter Eight: Conclusion 115
Summary of findings 115
Theoretical implications: China, representation and 'the other' 116
Limitations: Chinese voice, timeframe and gender 118
Further research 118
References 120
List of Figures/Tables
Table 3.1: The Eight Principles for China's Aid to Third World Countries 30 
Table 3.2: China in the western media 37
Figure 5.1: Total DAC aid disbursements to Cambodia 1991-2009 62
Figure 5.2: Overview of DAC aid to Cambodia 2006-2008 62
Table 5.3: Donor/Government meetings 64
Table 5.4: Technical Working Groups, Cambodia 66
Figure 6.1: Aid disbursements to Cambodia 1992-2010 81
Figure 6.2: China and DAC aid disbursements to Cambodia 2004-2010 81
Table 6.3: Chinese aid projects in Cambodia 2002-2010 82
Figure 6.4: Map of Kamchay Dam, Cambodia 88
Figure 6.5: Kamchay hydropower dam -  Entrance sign 91
vii
List of acronyms
ADB
AsDF
ASEAN
AusAID
BOT
BRIC
CBNRM-LI
CCC
CDC
CDCF
CEPA
CIB
CIDA
CIVETS
CMDG
COMECON
CPP
CRDB
DAC
DFID
DK
EIS
EU
EXIM
FAO
FDI
GATT
GDCC
GDP
GMS
GNI
GRUNK
ICORC
IFI
IMF
IPRCC
IRN
JICA
MCRRC
MDG
MIME
MRC
NGO
Asian Development Bank
Asian Development Fund
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Australian Agency for International Development
Build Operate Transfer
Brazil, Russia, India, China
Community Based Natural Resource Management Learning 
Institute
Cooperation Committee for Cambodia
Council for the Development of Cambodia
Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum
Culture and Environment Preservation Society
Cambodia Investment Board
Canadian International Development Agency
Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa
Cambodian Millennium Development Goals
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
Cambodian People’s Party
Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board
Development Assistance Committee
UK Department for International Development
Democratic Kampuchea
Environmental Impact Statement
European Union
Export-Import Bank
Food and Agriculture Organization
Foreign Direct Investment
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Government Donor Coordination Committee
Gross Domestic Product
Greater Mekong Strategy
Gross National Income
Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea
International Committee of Reconstruction of Cambodia
International Financial Institution
International Monetary Fund
International Poverty Reduction Centre in China
International Rivers Network
Japanese Agency for International Development
Ministerial Conference on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of
Cambodia
Millennium Development Goals 
Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy 
Mekong River Commission 
Non Government Organisation
viii
ODA
OECD
OECD-DAC
PDOE
PDOWRAM
PMIME
PRK
RGC
SIDA
TWG
UN
UNBRO
UNDP
UNESCO
UNHCR
UNICEF
UNTAC
WB
WBI
WFP
WTO
Official Development Assistance
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development-
Development Assistance Committee
Provincial Department of Environment
Provincial Department of Water Resources Management and
Meteorology
Provincial Department of Industry, Mines and Energy 
People's Republic of Kampuchea 
Royal Government of Cambodia
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
Technical Working Group 
United Nations
United Nations Border Relief Operation 
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
United Nations Refugee Agency
United Nations Children's Fund
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
World Bank
World Bank Institute
World Food Programme
World Trade Organisation
ix
Notes to reader
Definitions
Throughout this thesis, the term 'the West' has been used to denote the 
countries of Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand in 
line with conventional usage of the term. Where the thesis refers to the 
'western aid model' the term includes countries such as Japan and Korea 
both of which are seen to follow the broad approach associated with the 
'western' countries. The term 'the South' has been used to refer to countries 
which do not make up the 'the West’ and which are often otherwise known 
as 'developing' countries.
The term 'traditional' donors is used in this thesis to denote donors who 
form part of the OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC). This term 
is used interchangeably with the term 'western donors’. Donors outside this 
grouping are variously referred to as 'new' or 'non-DAC/non-traditional' 
donors.
The term 'aid' has been used throughout this thesis, according to 
conventional usage, to refer to both western 'aid' (also known as Official 
Development Assistance [ODA]) and Chinese 'aid' (also known as 
'development cooperation’). However, it is noted that the use of the all 
encompassing term 'aid' is somewhat problematic in that Chinese and 
Western 'aid' are not necessarily directly comparable and that this is a term 
not always used by China or western donors themselves. An explanation of 
why the term aid has been used, and the associated connotations with doing 
as such, are addressed in more detail in the body of the thesis (see Chapter 
Three in particular).
All monetary values are in US dollars, unless otherwise stated.
Khmer names
Khmer names are traditionally written [surname] [first name] in contrast to 
the English language convention of [first name] [surname]. When Khmer 
authors are cited in this thesis, the surname has been used as the citation 
(irrespective of the written order of the name).
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Chapter One: Introduction
This thesis explores aid cultures in the context of Cambodia. In particular it 
looks at the aid encounter between western (or traditional) donors and 
China in Cambodia. This chapter begins by giving a background to this 
thesis. It then moves onto the research objectives, the methodology and 
methods, before giving an outline of the thesis structure.
My initial interest for this thesis was sparked by a series of high profile 
media articles in the western media in 2006 that claimed that China had 
pledged $600 million in 'aid' to Cambodia, almost matching the entire 
traditional donor pledge of $601 million for that year. Many of these media 
reports expressed concern at China's large aid pledge, presenting the pledge 
as a threat to western interests in Cambodia. In 2006 I was employed as a 
Research Assistant on an AusAID funded Cambodia Development Resource 
Institute (CDRI)/University of Sydney project that was looking at water 
governance in Cambodia. This project instigated my initial interest in 
Cambodia. The media articles and their representations of aid and China 
furthered this interest.
Initial investigations of the research around Chinese aid showed that there 
were several gaps in the literature. Prior to 2006, there had been very little 
research conducted at all on China as an aid donor, despite the fact that 
China had been a donor since the 1950s. The literature, when it did exist, 
focussed on China as an aid recipient rather than an aid donor. Since 2006, 
nonetheless, as China has begun to play a more significant role globally, 
research on China as an aid donor has expanded significantly (e.g. Chin and 
Frolic, 2007; Lancaster, 2007; Rowlands, 2008), particularly in regard to 
Africa (e.g. Brautigam, 2009; McCormick, 2008; Davies, 2007). However, 
despite the fact there has been so much recent research on China as an aid 
donor, most of this research comes from a fairly narrow international 
relations/economics perspective. This thesis attempts to fill the empirical 
gap by focussing not on Africa, but rather Asia; and it departs theoretically 
from existing work by approaching the subject not from an international 
relations perspective, but a (post)development/cultural geography 
viewpoint.
Background
Cambodia, along with Laos, is one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia. 
The United Nations Development Programme Human Development Index 
ranks Cambodia as 137 out of 182 countries in terms of quality of life 
(UNDP, 2009). It is a also a corrupt country, with Transparency
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International in 2010 rating Cambodia 154 out of 178 countries in terms of 
levels of transparency. Most pertinent to this thesis, however, is the fact that 
Cambodia is also an aid dependent country, with nearly half its annual 
government budget coming from aid, making the question of aid in 
Cambodia particularly important, and the role of large non-traditional 
donors, such as China, particularly significant.
Most western bilateral donors are represented in Cambodia, as are the big 
multilateral agencies including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) and United Nations (UN). Added to this, there are also several 
hundred local and international NGOs represented in Cambodia. Japan has 
been the largest bilateral aid donor to Cambodia for many years, followed by 
the United States and the European Community. The traditional donors 
have, until recently, had a monopoly over aid in Cambodia creating a 
particularly western-dominated aid culture. Particular foci of the traditional 
donors include decentralisation and de-concentration, good governance, 
democracy reforms, governance, judicial reform, and agricultural 
development. These development goals are all pursued within the 
framework of international agreements such as the Millennium Development 
Goals, The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Monterrey Consensus 
o f  the International Conference on Financing fo r  Development. Traditional aid 
in Cambodia has been criticised, however, for its donor-driven nature, the 
fragmentation of aid, the reliance on technical assistance (specifically the 
hiring of foreign consultants) and the lack of aid effectiveness in areas such 
as good governance and anti-corruption measures.
Today, however, the aid landscape within Cambodia is rapidly changing with 
'new' donors appearing, including Thailand, the Gulf States and China. This 
is in line with changes on the global aid landscape -  Brazil, India and China 
being just three of the 'new' donors disbursing aid in regions as diverse as 
the South Pacific, Latin America and Africa. In Cambodia's case, the most 
significant of these new donors is China. China and Cambodia have a long 
historical relationship -  the two were trading with each other as far back as 
the Angkorian period and beyond. China has also been giving aid to 
Cambodia for much the same length of time as the traditional donors, with 
Cambodia receiving its first instalment of Chinese aid in 1956. Nonetheless, 
it was not until 2006 that the traditional donors and western media began to 
really take note of China as an aid donor in Cambodia. In 2006, China 
pledged a reported $600 million worth of aid to Cambodia. This aid came 
without the usual governance, social and environmental conditions that 
come with traditional aid. The media and the Cambodian government 
reported that the $600 million China pledged was to be aimed primarily at 
large infrastructure projects such as dams and transportation infrastructure. 
Significantly, this figure of $600 million almost matched the $601 million 
pledged that year by the traditional donors combined. Whilst the figure of 
$600 million has subsequently been questioned, it is not disputed that since 
2006 China has become one of the largest donors to Cambodia.
Introduction | 3
This thesis explores the existing aid culture in Cambodia and the encounter 
between traditional donors and China. The concept of the cultural encounter 
is used to look at how those with different cultural sets (i.e. China and the 
West) come together in an aid context; and what cultural encounters occur 
within this context between traditional and new donors. That is, it looks at 
development with reference to place and the construction of that place and 
space through representation and encounter to analyse aid cultures and, in 
particular, how the West constructs and encounters both its own aid and 
that of Chinese aid within the context of Cambodia.
Theory and objectives
The research on which this thesis is based draws on two key bodies of 
geographical literature: development geography and cultural geography.
Development geography is concerned with understanding the notion of 
'development' within a spatial context. Within the development geography 
paradigm, this thesis uses concepts drawn from critical development and 
post-development theory as well as ideas around aid and aid effectiveness. 
Theoretical ideas central to the thesis include the notion that development is 
essentially a western discourse; that the West has a monopoly over aid and 
the rules and definitions that come with aid; and that more critical analysis, 
particularly that arising from the South, is needed regarding the discourse of 
development. Cultural geography looks at the meanings, interpretations and 
re-interpretations people use to construct place and space. Within the 
cultural geography paradigm, this thesis draws on notions of representation, 
particularly discourse analysis, and postcolonial encounters. As such it 
considers how representations can construct a 'reality'; what and how 'the 
other' is created; and the effect of discourse and representation on the aid 
encounter.
Key literature which this thesis draws on includes Said's Orientalism (1995), 
Escobar's (1995) work on (post)development theory, Mohan and Power on 
Chinese engagement in Africa (e.g. Mohan & Power, 2008; Mohan & Power, 
2010) and Mawdsley's work on 'new' donors and representation (e.g. 
Mawdsley 2008, 2010).
Arising out of the theoretical context come the central research questions:
• How do those with different cultural sets come together in certain 
contexts, namely aid?
• What cultural encounters do we see in this mix between traditional 
donors and 'new' donors?
• How do discourses around 'the other' play into aid dialogues in 
Cambodia?
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This thesis therefore looks at aid as an 'encounter' between western donors 
and 'new' donors. Thus it looks not so much at the arguments for or against 
Chinese aid itself, but rather at the cultural encounters between Chinese and 
western aid in Cambodia and the role representation plays in these 
encounters.
Methodology and methods
The methodology used in this thesis is that of the qualitative tradition, in 
keeping with predominant research methodologies in cultural and 
development geographies. Qualitative research methodologies allow for the 
study of human experiences and human environments through the use of 
non-quantitative methods such as interviews, participant observation, 
discourse analysis and focus groups:
Qualitative research is used in many areas of human geography. In a 
broad sense, qualitative research is concerned with elucidating 
human environments and human experiences within a variety of 
conceptual frameworks (Winchester, 2005:4).
Crucial to qualitative methodologies, particularly those used in cultural and 
development geographies, is the place of the researcher in the research, or 
the notion of 'critical reflexivity'. The researcher must be aware of, and 
acknowledge, the position they themselves occupy in the research: 'The 
researcher is an instrument of the research and accordingly we suggest they 
should acknowledge their position' (Mansvelt and Berg, 2005: 257).
Within the qualitative methodology, various methods can be used. 
Winchester (2005) breaks these methods down into three broad categories: 
oral (e.g. interviews), textual (e.g. discourse analysis) and observational (e.g. 
participant observation). All three methods have been used to varying 
degrees in this thesis. For example, one of the primary methods relied on 
throughout this thesis is discourse analysis -  specifically discourse analysis 
of written text (as opposed to images, landscapes or other 'texts'). Discourse 
analysis arises from the post-structuralist tradition advocated by 
proponents such as Foucault (1979). According to Waitt (2005:166)
The priority in discourse analysis is upon the effects of a particular 
cultural text on what an individual may do or think by unravelling its 
production, social context and intended audience. The 
methodological strength of discourse analysis lies in its ability to 
move beyond the text, the subtext, and representation to uncover 
issues of power relationships that inform what people do and think.
Throughout this thesis official (e.g. government agencies, public authorities) 
and unofficial (e.g. media, academic, civil society literature) data has been 
used (Cloke et al, 2004) as sources of information. Flowever, in using official 
and unofficial data as sources of information, this information has not been 
taken merely as is, but rather it has been interpreted to take into account
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how this data has been constructed, for whom and the voice that is used. 
This data has then been used variously throughout the thesis to both 
represent positions and/or to support the argument. For example, a 
newspaper article may be used to highlight how China is represented by the 
media, or it may be used to support an argument this thesis is making 
regarding Chinese aid.
In addition to discourse analysis, interviews with key informants form 
another key part of the research method. Interviews with a range of aid 
actors in Cambodia, such as bilateral donors, multilateral donors and local 
and international non-government organisations (NGOs) took place in two 
primary fieldwork phases in January/February 2009 and August/September 
2009. Nineteen semi-structured and unstructured interviews were 
conducted primarily in Phnom Penh, with each interview lasting between 45 
and 90 minutes. The data from these interviews were analysed to inform the 
thesis conclusions.
Finally participant observation was used to gain an understanding of the aid 
landscape in Cambodia. For the duration of this thesis, I have been employed 
as the Sydney coordinator for an AusAID funded project looking at water 
governance in Cambodia. By working on this project I gained insight into the 
aid culture in Cambodia. In addition to this work, I also attended aid-related 
workshops, conferences and meetings in both Cambodia and Australia to 
gain a broad overview of the aid culture in Cambodia, including the people 
and organisations involved, the policies as disseminated and put in place, 
and the representations of aid and development in Cambodia.
Thesis structure
This thesis is divided into eight chapters, including the introduction and 
conclusion chapters.
The second chapter provides a theoretical insight into (post)development, 
aid, representation and encounter. It analyses the discourse of western 
development and looks at how notions of aid are intertwined with that of 
development. It then goes on to explore representation and encounter 
through the lens of cultural geography, critical geopolitics and postcolonial 
studies. The idea of this chapter is to provide a theoretical background to the 
rest of the thesis by highlighting where this thesis posits itself within the 
existing literature, where the gaps exist in the literature and how this thesis 
may go some way towards filling these gaps.
The next chapter (Chapter Three] moves from the theoretical context of 
western aid and development, to a study of Chinese discourses around aid 
and development. It analyses Chinese notions of development, Chinese 'aid' 
(including how much, where it is going and what it is used for] and how 
Chinese aid is represented and encountered by the West. The aim of this 
chapter is to highlight what Chinese 'aid' is and to provide a link between
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Chinese theory, discourse and development and to present the context for 
contemporary Chinese aid to Cambodia.
Chapter Four moves away from theory and development discourses, to 
explore the case study for this thesis - Cambodia. In order to understand the 
aid encounter in Cambodia it is important to first understand the context in 
which this encounter takes place and the local conditions which may affect 
this encounter. This chapter focuses in particular on Cambodia's place in the 
world and its relationship to China and the West. It begins with a historical 
overview of foreign relations between Cambodia, China and the West from 
ancient times until the present. It then moves on to look at government, 
governance and politics in Cambodia, and economy trade and investment as 
an indicator of the local context into which aid is disbursed.
Chapters Five and Six turn to a discussion of first western aid and then 
Chinese aid to Cambodia. In order to understand the aid encounter between 
China and the West in Cambodia it is necessary to not only understand the 
context within which the encounter is taking place, but also to understand 
the background to both China and the West's aid to Cambodia. This 
background is provided through an exploration of the history of aid to 
Cambodia and the current aid culture in Cambodia.
Chapter Five begins with an historical overview of western aid, starting with 
the French colonial period which, it is argued, laid the foundations for the 
current western-dominated aid culture in Cambodia. The chapter then 
moves on to discussing the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) period and subsequent formation of a western aid 
culture. This culture is explored through looking at aid figures, aid 
coordination and development policy in Cambodia. The final part of the 
chapter turns to an exploration of critiques of aid to Cambodia.
Chapter Six, like Chapter Five, begins with an historical overview of Chinese 
aid to Cambodia starting from the 1950s until the present day. It then goes 
on to question some of the western assumptions regarding Chinese aid to 
Cambodia, including an analysis of the reported and actual aid figures and 
aid structure of Chinese aid. The chapter goes on to look at a case study of 
one Chinese 'aid' project in Cambodia - that of the Kamchay Dam - and the 
assumptions and representations regarding this project. The chapter 
concludes with a brief analysis of China's role in the existing aid culture in 
Cambodia.
Chapter Seven brings together the previous chapters to analyse the 
encounter between Chinese and western aid in Cambodia. The chapter 
begins by describing the encounter between traditional donors and China 
based on fieldwork findings. This section is broken down by actor, and 
analyses the encounter between bilateral donors and China, multilateral 
donors and China, and NGOs and China. An analysis is then provided as to 
why these particular encounters occur. The third part of the chapter goes on 
to relate the encounter back to the theory, looking at the aid culture in
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Cambodia through the lenses of (post]development, aid, representation and 
encounter.
Finally, the thesis concludes with a brief chapter that outlines the summary 
of findings, the theoretical implications of the thesis, the limitations and 
opportunities for further research.
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Chapter Two: Theorising 
Development and Culture
This thesis is broadly based within the theoretical nexus of 
(post)development geography and cultural geography. That is, it looks at 
development discursively with reference to place and the construction of 
that place and space through representation and encounter. Within the 
development discourse aid plays a leading role, aid being a means by which 
'development' can, in principle, be attained. This thesis draws on theoretical 
concepts in critical geopolitics and cultural geography to analyse aid 
narratives and, in particular, how the West constructs and encounters both 
its own aid and that of Chinese aid within the context of Cambodia. This 
chapter looks at the theory behind development, aid, representation and 
encounter.
Development and post-development
Development means different things to different people. Broadly speaking, 
development could refer to progress, advancement of human quality of life 
or perhaps even 'making things better'. However, in the context of this 
thesis, development refers to the discourse of international development. 
This section outlines how the development discourse arose; it considers 
different theories of development and the institutionalisation of 
development; and examines critiques of development, including post­
development.
Development as a discourse relating to the South was 'invented' (to use 
Escobar's1 language] by the West after World War II at a time when the 
world was looking to leave war behind and move onwards. This period was 
characterised by the end of colonisation, the need for reconstruction of war 
torn economies and the beginning of the Cold War. Whilst initially 
development focused on European countries devastated by war (i.e. the 
Marshall Plan], the term quickly came to refer to the development of the 
South. It was, in fact, US president Truman who is often attributed with first 
using the concept of development to assist 'underdeveloped' countries when 
he said in 1949:
1 Arturo Escobar is a Colombian anthropologist interested in non-Eurocentric and alternative approaches to 
development. He is considered one of the leading figures in post-development theory. This thesis draws on many 
of his ideas (see Escobar, 1995).
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We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of 
our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas ...
... The old imperialism - exploitation for foreign profit - has no place 
in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based 
on the concept of democratic fair dealing (Truman, 1949)
There have been several prevailing theories in development studies since 
the 1950s. These theories have included modernisation theory, dependency 
theory and neoliberal theory.
Modernisation (1950s-1960s) is the idea that developed societies can be 
distinguished from 'traditional' societies based on their economic, social, 
cultural and political modernity. In development circles, this led to a belief 
that all those in the South (who tend to be grouped together without 
reference to local differences) should follow the same linear path towards 
development by becoming modernised in the way that the West had become 
modernised (de Haan, 2009a). Rostow was a key proponent of these ideas 
with his 'stages of growth’ economic model which emphasised growth 
occurring in five basic stages from 'the traditional society' (e.g. Cambodia or 
other 'undeveloped' nations) to the 'age of high mass consumption’ (e.g. USA 
and other 'developed' nations) (Rostow, 1960).
In the 1960s, a counter theory to modernisation arose. The dependency 
theorists, as they were known, critiqued the traditional development 
discourse to argue that poorer states were not merely 'backwards' versions 
of wealthy nations. Dependency theorists, arguing from a neo-Marxist 
viewpoint, claimed that resources in fact flowed from the periphery (third 
world) to the core (first world) as a result of development and that therefore 
development served mainly the West, not poorer nations. Thus 
underdevelopment was a result of development elsewhere. One of the key 
founders of dependency theory was the economic historian and sociologist 
Andre Gunder Frank who, drawing on Latin American models, argued that 
the relationship between developed and underdeveloped countries was a 
result of exploitation of peripheral third world countries by core first world 
nations (Frank, 1978). De Haan (2009a:71) states, however, that:
Dependency theory made little impact on mainstream thinking 
within the aid industry, but its ideas are reflected in the movements 
and writings that see the World Bank and IMF as instruments used to 
maintain global capitalism and injustice.
Today, conventional development theory is dominated by neoliberalism. 
Neoliberalism based on neoclassical theory, emphasises that development is 
achieved through a focus on the market and lack of government interference 
(Hodder, 2000; Willis, 2005). This capitalist ideology has been the default 
position of development since the end of the Cold War when debate about 
what development is and how to achieve it (i.e. the ideology of
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development) dissipated in light of the dominance of a de-politicised 
development agenda:
Critical theory within development studies became increasingly 
sidelined specifically from the beginning of the 1990s onwards as a 
result of the quickly growing hegemony of a depoliticised, post-cold 
war globalisation discourse and a depoliticisation of the development 
debate in general (Schuurman, 2009:834).
Current thinking around development tends to be informed by practice, 
rather than theory: 'the strength and weakness of development thinking is 
its policy-oriented character ... it is problem driven rather than theory- 
driven' (Pieterse, 2010:4). For example, models of'good development’ such 
as the Asian tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong), the 
BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) or the newly anointed CIVETS (Colombia, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa) inform the practice of 
development in the South as 'models' to follow. Alternative discourses based 
on the theory of development do, of course, exist. For example, the idea of 
participatory development which has, at least in rhetoric, been adopted to 
some extent in mainstream development thinking. However, it is still 
predominately the practice of development that informs development 
thinking today.
Development, in an international development sense, can be seen therefore 
as a notion that arose out of western ideas and values. It is based on notions 
of capitalism and democracy and arises out of a belief that the West can help 
the 'undeveloped' to 'develop' along the same paths that the West did 
through industrial growth and capitalist expansion. The language of 
development itself, for example 'developed' to refer to the West and 
'developing' to refer to the South, implies a linear progression towards a 
certain standard of living and success, usually that seen in the West. As 
Escobar (1995:26) says: 'A type of development was promoted which 
conformed to the ideas and expectations of the affluent West, to what the 
Western countries judged to be a normal course of evolution and progress.'
Simultaneously, over the last sixty years, development has become 
increasingly institutionalised. This is seen through the growth of 
organisations, institutions and structures concerned with development. 
Development institutions include the World Bank (formerly the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), the International 
Monetary Foundation (IMF), the United Nations (UN), bilateral 
organisations such as AusAID and DFID, and various local and international 
Non Government Organisations (NGOs). These organisations 'implement' 
development via in-country agencies; hold meetings and conferences such 
as the UN Millennium Summit and the International Conference on Financing 
fo r Development to determine the path of development; and measure and 
assess the progress of development through quantitative means such as the 
Human Development Index, Gross National Product (GNP) per capita and 
the Human Poverty Index. It is these western-dominated structures that are
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today producing the language of development and therefore shaping the 
broader discourse of development.
Development practice and the current neo-liberal development ideology 
has, however, always had their critics. One particular school of critique that 
has arisen since the 1990s, are the post-development theorists (e.g. Escobar, 
1995; McGregor, 2009). The post-development theorists argue that the 
current development discourse is based on eurocentric assumptions and 
that, following on from Foucault's post-structuralist analysis of discourse 
per se, the discourse of development has to be critically analysed in order to 
understand development and its faults. As Gibson-Graham (2005:6) state: 
The challenge [of postdevelopment thinking] is to imagine and practice 
development differently.' That is, development needs to also be considered 
from the viewpoint of the South, and from the (often) competing interests in 
the South (such as the elites and poor, or the mainstream and indigenous), 
rather than only from its existing Eurocentric standpoint. It is within this 
critical view of development discourse that this thesis sits.
Aid
This thesis takes development, and particularly post-development, as one of 
its broader platforms for analysis, however it is more specifically concerned 
with one of the components of development, namely aid. Development and 
aid are inextricably linked. As Pronk (2004:1) says 'international 
development assistance -  'aid' -  has long occupied a prominent place in 
debates on development. However, perceptions of its role and significance 
have changed dramatically over the years.' This section goes on to look at 
the history of modern aid; the definitions, statistics and assumptions of 
western aid; differences between different DAC aid donors; and critiques of 
aid.
Aid was formalised as an intrinsic part of 'development' in 1960, with the 
formation of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The transfer of aid from 
the West to the South was initially a response to modernisation theory that 
stated that poorer countries were lagging behind wealthier countries in 
terms of economic development. Poorer countries needed money to assist 
with investment and economic growth, and this would then lead to 
economic development. Of course informal aid did exist between the West 
and the South prior to the 1960s, for example aid was disbursed in the 
1950s to assist war-torn countries; and during the days of colonisation 
when France and Britain gave non-administrative aid to their colonies (de 
Haan, 2009a). However, this thesis is most concerned with the modern aid 
narratives embedded within the international development framework.
It was after the formation of DAC, that ‘rules' began to be written as to what 
constituted aid, how it was given and what the aid agenda would be. The 
initial DAC member countries included the US, UK, France, Germany and 
Canada. Today, DAC consists of 24 member countries, including Japan and
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South Korea. South Korea is the most recent DAC member nation, joining in 
2009. DAC was originally formed in order to collect and maintain data on aid 
flows. Today, DAC, according to its website, defines and monitors global 
standards in development and is a forum for sharing and exchanging views 
and lessons on development (OECD-DCD/DAC, nd). DAC works in 
collaboration with multilateral donors such as the United Nations (UN], 
World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ABD). With the World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) participating as permanent observers. 
DAC member countries are estimated to provide 90-92%  of total global aid 
(Hammad and Norton, 2009), although this figure is hard to quantify with 
any clarity as not all non-DAC donors provide aid figures.
The principle underpinning aid, at its most basic, could be as simple as 
'those who can, should help those who are in extreme need' (Riddell 2007). 
However, in reality the giving and receiving of aid, and its relationship to 
development is much more complicated than this. Aid (or 'Overseas 
Development Assistance’ as DAC refers to it) has been defined by the OECD 
(2008a:l) as:
Official Development Assistance is defined as those flows to countries 
and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral 
development institutions which are:
(i) provided by official agencies, including state and local 
governments, or by their executive agencies; and
(ii) each transaction of which:
a) is administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as its 
main objective; and
b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant 
element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of 
discount of 10 per cent).
Covered by this definition, are bilateral aid flows from country to country 
and multilateral aid flows from multilateral development organisations such 
as the World Bank and United Nations. Not covered by this definition are, 
theoretically, military assistance, cultural aid, and lending with the pure 
purpose of export promotion -  although in practice aid often encompasses 
these forms of aid, just under different names. For example, aid to 
Afghanistan or Iraq may not be called military aid but often it serves a 
military purpose.
DAC has kept in-depth statistics of all aid pledges, disbursements, recipients 
and various other quantitative aid statistics since its inception. Thus it is 
known that total net ODA in 2008 from DAC donors was US$119.8 billion. 
This was an increase, in real terms, of 10.2% from the previous year. The 
five top donor countries (by volume) were the United States, United 
Kingdom, France, Japan and Germany; and the top five recipients of aid were
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Nigeria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sudan. By sector, the largest area for 
OECD aid the 'social' sector, which covers health; education; population 
programmes; water supply and sanitation; and government and civil society. 
The social sector made up 39% of ODA commitments in 2006 (OECD 
2008b).
As various ideologies have permeated development since the 1960s (see 
previous section), so too have they influenced the aid agenda. In the 1960s, 
when modernisation was the prevailing development discourse, aid was 
prefaced on the idea that less developed countries (or 'traditional' societies) 
should be assisted to progress towards 'developed' (i.e. western) states. In 
the 1970s the basic needs agenda was foremost in aid circles. This agenda 
was concerned with providing 'basic needs' such as upgrading of literacy, or 
health maintenance skills to those in the South (Hunt, 2004). This shift in aid 
thinking occurred against a background of global change: the 1970s 'was a 
period of adjustment, and a process of global liberalization began with the 
collapse of the economic regulation that had dominated since the end of 
World War II' (de Haan, 2009a:72). In the 1980s neo-liberalism came to 
dominate aid. Deregulated markets and economic liberty became the 
accepted norm to achieve 'development'. This new world era saw the rise of 
the Washington Consensus. The Washington Consensus was based on the 
shared policy themes of Washington Based institutions -  namely free 
market policies: 'The so-called consensus highlighted the need for policies of 
fiscal discipline, market-determined exchange and interest rates, protection 
of property rights, liberalization, privitization, and openness to trade' (de 
Haan, 2009a:75). This thinking saw the rise of the controversial, yet 
widespread, structural adjustment programs of the IMF and World Bank 
(Hunt 2004).
Today 'the Washington Consensus continues to be criticized, even though 
many of its basic principles have never been abandoned' (de Haan, 
2009a:78). Nonetheless, the Consensus has changed somewhat since the 
1980s. Whilst the basic tenets may have been retained, 'add on' policies have 
also been added that allow for a greater focus on poverty reduction and the 
role of institutions and governance. This newer aid agenda is often referred 
to as the 'post-Washington consensus':
The new approaches take into account many of the earlier critiques, 
concluding that the policy prescriptions were not wrong - certainly 
not regarding the need for macro-economic stability - but that they 
were insufficient. The new approaches stress the complementary 
role of the state with regard to the market and hope that the 
processes of democratization will support a vibrant market economy 
(de Haan, 2009a:80).
Today the Washington and post-Washington consensus can be seen to be 
encapsulated in key strategic aid documents and milestones such as the 
Millennium Declaration (2000) which led to the Millennium Development 
Goals, the Monterrey Consensus on Financing fo r  Development (2002) and the
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Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness [2005] (see Table 2.1). This western- 
led aid agenda based on the principles of neo-liberalism, has gone on to 
become the accepted 'norm' of global aid practice today as espoused by the 
OECD-DAC.
Within this DAC consensus on aid, different countries have varying 
approaches to aid. However, this thesis argues that whilst different 
countries may have different approaches to aid, these differences are largely 
subsumed within the overarching development discourse: members of DAC 
are 'expected to have certain common objectives concerning the conduct of 
their aid programmes. To this end, guidelines have been prepared for 
development practitioners in capitals and in the field' (OECD, 2003).
Table 2.1: Key international aid agreements
N a m e D ate S u m m a r y
M i l le n n iu m  D e v e l o p m e n t  
Goa ls
2 0 0 0 • E igh t  in t e rn a t io n a l  d e v e l o p m e n t / a n t i -  
p o v e r t y  g o a ls  a g r e e d  u p o n  b y  a l l  U N  m e m b e r  
s tates .  T o  b e  a c h i e v e d  b y  2 0 1 5 .
• Goa ls:  e n d  p o v e r t y  an d  h u n g e r ,  u n ive r sa l  
ed u c a t io n ,  g e n d e r  e q u a l i t y ,  c h i ld  health , 
m a te rn a l  hea lth ,  c o m b a t  HIV/A1DS, 
e n v i r o n m e n ta l  su s ta in ab i l i t y ,  g lo b a l  
p a r tn e r sh ip .
M o n t e r r e y  C on sen su s  o n  
F in an c in g  fo r  D e v e l o p m e n t
2 0 0 2 • K e y  a g r e e m e n t  o n  f in a n c in g  f o r  d e v e l o p m e n t
• K e y  a r ea s  o f  f in a n c e  f o r  d e v e l o p m e n t  
a d o p t e d  a t  th e  c o n fe r e n c e :
1. M o b i l i s in g  d o m e s t i c  f in a n c ia l  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  
d e v e l o p m e n t .
2. M o b i l i s in g  in t e rn a t io n a l  r e s o u r c e s  fo r  
d e v e l o p m e n t :  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  in v e s t m e n t  an d  
o t h e r  p r i v a t e  f lo w s .
3. In te rn a t io n a l  t r a d e  as an  e n g in e  fo r  
d e v e l o p m e n t .
4. In c r e a s in g  in t e rn a t io n a l  f in a n c ia l  and  
te c h n ica l  c o o p e r a t i o n  f o r  d e v e l o p m e n t .
5. E x te rn a l  Debt.
6. A d d r e s s in g  s y s t e m ic  issues: e n h a n c in g  th e  
c o h e r e n c e  an d  c o n s is t e n c y  o f  th e  
in t e rn a t io n a l  m o n e ta r y ,  f in an c ia l
an d  t r a d in g  s y s t e m s  in s u p p o r t  o f  
d e v e l o p m e n t .
P a r is  D e c la ra t io n  o f  A id  
E f fe c t iv e n e s s
2 0 0 5 • In te rn a t io n a l  a g r e e m e n t  to  in c r e a s e  e f fo r t s  in 
h a rm o n is a t io n ,  a l i g n m e n t  a n d  m a n a g in g  a id  
f o r  resu lts .
• A id  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  goa ls :
O w n e r s h ip ,  a l ig n m e n t ,  h a rm o n is a t io n ,  
resu lts ,  m u tu a l  a c c o u n ta b i l i t y .
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Perhaps the country that stands out as having the most 'alternate' approach 
to aid within the DAC member countries is Japan. Japan has been critiqued, 
particularly in the past, by the West for its approach to aid which has not 
always been seen to fulfil the general aid consensus. Critiques of Japanese 
aid from the West include Japan's focus on infrastructure that benefits 
Japanese investment, and aid allocation only to countries that will support 
Japan politically or economically (Kondo, 2007). Other DAC nations also 
have differing emphases in their aid programs. For example, European aid, 
particularly that from the Scandinavian countries, tends to emphasise 
poverty reduction and social and humanitarian outcomes whereas American 
aid usually has a stronger geopolitical and foreign policy focus. As Riddell 
(2007: 55) says: 'The core purpose of United States aid today is neither 
poverty eradication nor even the promotion of economic growth in poor 
countries. Rather, it is to "protect America" using bilateral aid programmes 
to foster democracy and freedom.'
There have been many critiques over the years of DAC aid and whether this 
aid does, indeed, assist in achieving development (e.g. Bauer, 1971; Easterly, 
2006; Moyo 2009). One long-standing critique of DAC aid, is that it 
perpetuates a neo-colonialist system whereby the West retains power and 
control over the South. This critique arises out of the dependency critique of 
development. For example, Hayter (1971:9) in one of her critical texts about 
aid says that:
I believe, now, that the existence of aid can be explained only in terms 
of an attempt to preserve the capitalist system of the Third World.
Aid is not a particularly effective instrument for achieving this; hence 
its current decline. But, in so far as it is effective, its contribution to 
the well being of the peoples of the Third World is negative, since it is 
not in their interest that exploitation should continue.
The theme that aid 'does not work' is continued by Hancock (1989:xiii) 
although he argues not from a neo-colonial/dependency theory perspective, 
but rather claims that the aid industry has 'highjacked our kindness' in order 
to cover up corruption, greed and failure. Numerous other critiques have 
gone on to question aid in terms of its commitment to poverty reduction 
(e.g. Randel et al., 1995; Greenhill & Watt, 2005); the gap between rhetoric 
and reality in the programs of donors (e.g. Rowlands, 2008); and the need 
for radical reform of aid if it is to achieve its objectives (Greenhill, 2006)
Today, however, the aid landscape is changing. The dominance of the DAC 
donors is being challenged. Many so called 'new' donors are entering the aid 
landscape. These non-traditional donors include countries such as China, 
India, Saudi Arabia, Brazil and Thailand. These donors have the potential to 
bring with them their own ideas and philosophies on what aid is, how it 
should be used and what aid should achieve. This presents an implicit 
challenge to the traditional DAC donors and their current monopoly on aid:
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By quietly offering alternatives to aid-receiving countries, emerging 
donors are introducing competitive pressures into the existing 
system. They are weakening the bargaining position of western 
donors in respect of aid-receiving countries, exposing standards and 
processes that are out of date and ineffectual. The result is a serious 
challenge to the existing multilateral development assistance regime 
(Woods, 2008:224).
Representation and Encounter
This section draws upon theoretical insights in cultural geography and 
critical geopolitics to look at encounter and representation in aid and 
development.
Cultural Geography
Culture in itself can be seen in various ways. A dictionary definition may 
define culture as 'customs, institutions, and achievements of a particular 
nation, people, or group’ for example African culture or youth culture; or 
alternatively, culture can be defined as synonymous with 'high culture' 
which tends to refer to a refined understanding of the arts or other 
manifestations of human achievement (Oxford English Dictionary, 2008). 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) is an example of a development organisation which uses 'culture' 
according to such a dictionary definition. According to the UNESCO website, 
UNESCO places '... culture at the heart of development policy [which] 
constitutes an essential investment in the world's future and a pre-condition 
to successful globalization processes that take into account the principles of 
cultural diversity' (UNESCO, 2008). However, it is also possible to go beyond 
these rather narrow viewpoints to consider culture as much broader than 
this. According to Shurmer-Smith and Hannam (1994:216): 'The economy is 
cultural, politics is cultural, artefacts are cultural and nature is cultural'. It is 
this idea that culture imbues, and is relevant to, all aspects of understanding 
that cultural geography has to come to adopt in recent years.
Cultural geography is a sub-discipline of geography that looks at the 
meanings, interpretations and re-interpretations people use to construct 
place and space. As cultural geographers Anderson and Gale (1999:4) state: 
'if culture can be defined at all, then it refers to those shared codes of 
understanding, communication and practice that set one of many contexts 
for human thought and action.' That is, people construct spaces, places, 
landscapes, regions and environments and it is these constructions that 
cultural geography recognises and studies:
Culture is a process in which people are actively engaged ... a 
dynamic mix of symbols, beliefs, languages and practices that people 
create, not a fixed thing or entity governing humans ... People grasp, 
interpret and re-present their worlds with the use of symbols and
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vocabularies through which they construct cultures and geographies 
(Anderson and Gale, 1999:4)
Cultural geography as a discipline has not always, however, considered 
culture in this way. Early cultural geographers such as Carl Sauer considered 
culture as much more material than today's cultural geographers. They were 
inclined to study culture as a way of life. For example, attempting to 
understand how cultures developed out of, and influenced their landscapes: 
'Cultural geography is therefore concerned with those works of man that are 
inscribed into the earth’s surface and give to it characteristic expression’ 
(Sauer, 1931:622). However, in the early 1990s, following on from Marxist 
and post-structuralist ideas, cultural geography began to reject meta­
narratives and the narrow definitions of culture as merely a 'thing', but 
rather to see culture as a process by which people interpret and reinterpret 
their worlds. In the context of this thesis, cultural geography is useful as it 
provides the theoretical underpinnings for considering how space and place 
are represented, perceived and encountered and how we create these 
meanings and interactions through discourses, scripts and narratives. For 
example:
The meanings attached to the term development are produced within 
and by a particular cultural context, that of the so-called West-or, 
more precisely, the political, economic, and social institutions of 
Euro-American societies, generating a particular discourse of, or way 
of talking about, development. Seen in this way, it becomes clear that 
development is a cultural artefact, rather than a natural process 
which can be accelerated and guided by development planning 
(Schech and Haggis, 2000:1).
However, before a detailed analysis of cultural geography is undertaken and 
its relationship to representation and encounter in aid and development 
further explored, it is important to make mention of another theory that this 
thesis draws on: that is critical geopolitics. Cultural geography and critical 
geopolitics are intrinsically linked in their ability to add layers of 
understanding to geography and geopolitics respectively.
Critical geopolitics
Geopolitics is a term that was first coined in 1899 by conservative Swedish 
political scientist Rudolph Kjellen. He originally used the term to describe 
the 'science which conceives of the state as a geographical organism or as a 
phenomenon in space' (Braden and Shelley, 2000:15). Today the term, at its 
broadest, refers to the intersection between geography and politics and how 
this plays out in international relations, or to put it another way, the study of 
inter(national) politics, foreign policy and geography. Geopolitics is, 
therefore, about how states exert power both within and beyond their 
boundaries.
Theorising development and culturel 18
Critical geopolitics arose in the late 1990s as an alternative means by which 
to analyse geopolitics. It draws on concepts in postmodernism and post­
colonialism to understand the world. A problem with conventional 
geopolitics, as seen by scholars such as O'Tuathail (1996) and Agnew 
(2003), is that critical geopolitics tends to assume that 'the world is 
independent of our beliefs and understandings about it' (O'Tuathail 2006:6). 
Critical geopolitics, therefore, seeks to uncover the meaning, practices and 
representations inherent within geopolitics. Like cultural geography, it 
draws on discourse analysis and other poststructuralist concepts to rethink 
and redefine geopolitics:
rather than defining geopolitics as an unproblematic description of 
the world political map, it treats geopolitics as a discourse, as a 
culturally and politically varied way of describing, representing and 
writing about geography and international politics (O’Tuathail, 2006: 
3).
In other words, critical geopolitics recognises that there is 'no such thing as 
a value-free political decision and all political decisions have spatial 
consequences' (Blacksell, 2006:148)
In order to relate geopolitics and critical geopolitics to this thesis in a more 
concrete way, it might be useful to take a look at Agnew's (2003) outline of 
the modern stages of geopolitical imaginations from its beginnings in 
imperialism, through the Cold War to today’s 'new world order'. This outline 
highlights not only the different geopolitics that have influenced the world 
in contemporary times, but also indicates ways in which geopolitical spaces 
are 'written' using specific scripts and narratives.
Geopolitics as a field of study was born in the nineteenth century in the era 
of imperialism. This was when the British Empire was in its ascendency and 
its main rivals were France, Germany and Russia. The geopolitical script of 
the day was one of empires and colonies; supremacy of European over non- 
European; and expansionism and empire building. The European world was 
expanding out of its known territory and colonising 'free space' to further its 
own aims. It was also during this time that the United States began its rise 
towards becoming one of the most powerful nations in the world. The West 
was ‘carving up' the world and at the same time furthering the spread of its 
ideas, theories and philosophies (Dodds, 2007).
After the World Wars, global geopolitics became dominated by a new script 
- that of the Cold War and the rivalry between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Ideology and geography become intertwined. The world came 
to be represented as first world (i.e. the non-communist world), second 
world (i.e. communist states) and the third world (i.e. the poor and 
developing non-aligned states). It was within this third world that the battle 
for ideological supremacy took place between the US and the Soviet Union. 
This produced the 'domino theory', which 'marked the apothesis of Cold War 
geopolitics as a type of power/knowledge that completely ignored the
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specific geographical characteristics of places, peoples and regions' 
(O'Tuathail et al, 1998:6).
After the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, globalisation and neo-liberalism 
came to dominate the 'new world order'. Neo-liberalism, as discussed 
earlier, argued for deregulated markets and economic liberty. Its ideologies 
were expressed through global organisations such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The United States has positioned 
itself as the sole super power in this 'new world order'. However, with the 
recent global financial crisis and the concurrent rise of China on the 
economic and political stage, this 'new order' may rapidly be changing. It is 
within this changing 'new world order' that this thesis is situated, by looking 
at the aid encounter between China and the West in Cambodia.
The next sections go on to look more specifically at two aspects of cultural 
geography and critical geopolitics; namely representation and encounter. 
What do these terms mean in the context of this thesis; how do 
representation and encounter relate to aid and development; and how can 
representation and encounter be used as a framework for understanding the 
aid culture and the changing nature of aid in Cambodia?
Representation
Representation is a term used by cultural geographers and those engaged 
with critical geopolitics to refer to 'a set of practices by which meanings are 
constituted and communicated' (Johnston et al, 2000:703). If we take this 
definition, representations become not only reflective of reality, as would be 
a conventional definition of representation, but they also construct reality. 
This construction of reality can occur through numerous means, including 
via texts, words, pictures and landscape. For example, Australia is often 
constructed in the United Kingdom as a place of sand, sun and relaxation, as 
a result of television soapies such as Home and Away, alternatively, place 
and space can also be constructed through discourse, such as via the 
discourse of development or geopolitical scripts.
It is representation via discourse that this thesis is most concerned with. 
Discourse, as used by cultural geographers, refers to: 'a specific series of 
representations, practices and performances through which meanings are 
produced, connected into networks and legitimised' (Johnston et al, 
2000:180). For example, the 'discourse' of aid and development, can be seen 
as the institutionalised way of thinking, writing and discussing aid and 
development as promoted by the West and put into practice by associated 
aid and development institutions such as the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank or AusAID. It is also the way in which 'the other' is 
represented. The 'other' is used in this sense to represent Said's (1995) 
notion of 'them and us' to refer to the West and the Orient, as being an 'us 
and them' dichotomy: for example, the ways in which China may be 
constructed by the West both geopolitically, and in terms of aid and 
development.
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Associated with the idea of discourse, as used in this sense, is also of course 
the notion of power. The discourses of aid and development are almost 
exclusively those that have been produced by the wealthy, powerful West. 
Alternative visions of development, particularly those emanating from the 
South are rarely heard. Thus a discourse can be seen as not merely a neutral 
entity, but rather something infused with meaning and power. Therefore, if 
we take development as a discourse, rather than being neutral, it becomes a 
system of knowledge inseparable from related regimes of practice (Forsyth, 
2005:560). The notion of discourse, as used in this sense, arose from 
Foucault's work on power and the relationship between power, knowledge 
and discourse. As Anderson and Gale (1999:8) say in their text on cultural 
geographies: 'The discourses that organisations articulate to interpret 
themselves to each other and the world at large can clearly uphold unequal 
relations between people and places.'
One of the key proponents of using discourse to analyse how power, culture 
and knowledge are connected through representations of place is Edward 
Said. Said, in his seminal text Orientalism outlined how the East is 
constructed by the West for its own purposes. Said undertook an analysis of 
western discourses on the East, including reading novels, poems, scientific 
texts and academic texts to look at how the East is represented and re­
presented by the West. He concluded that the construction of the East by the 
West is undertaken by, and in relation to, the West in order to maintain the 
West's position of superiority and power over the east, or the 'other'. He 
labelled this image or construction of the Orient by the west as 'Orientalism'. 
In Said's (1995:7) own words: ‘Orientalism depends for its strategy on this 
flexible positional superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of 
possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative 
upper hand.'
This construction of'the other’ and the re-presentation of certain narratives 
for the purposes of maintaining power relations can also be seen occurring 
throughout modern geopolitical scripts. For example, it could be said that 
‘colonialism was ... legitimised through the (mis)representation of other 
cultures and places as primitive, savage and uneducated, in need of western 
civilisation and enlightenment’ (O'Tuathail et al., 1998:246). In a more 
contemporary example, we can consider George Bush's 'axis of evil', a term 
coined by President Bush in 2002 to describe Iran, Iraq and North Korea and 
thus justify his 'war on terror’. This narrative placed the West as the 
'civilising' force that could 'save' the world from the evil 'other'. As McGregor 
says: 'these scripts reflect the spatially and temporally embedded cultures 
and politics of the scripting parties' (McGregor, 2005:193). This thesis 
considers the scripts that the West creates about China and how this plays 
into aid cultures in Cambodia.
However, it is not only the West that creates representations of the East. The 
East also manipulates its own image, as seen, for example, through the 
discussion on Asian values that gained brief attention in the 1990s. 'Asian
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values' was a concept put forward primarily by the Prime Ministers of 
Singapore and Malaysia, based on the ancient philosophy of Confucianism, 
to argue that there are Asian traits, ideas and values to which all Asian 
nations subscribe and which leads to a particularly Asian way of successfully 
pursuing development. These Asian values such as valuing community over 
the individual, emphasis on hard work, and primacy of family were used to 
highlight the supposed differences between Asian values and western 
values. However, the notion of Asian values was criticised both within and 
without Asia, as being a means by which to justify the authoritarian regimes 
common in Asia; and as being a misnomer, as Asia is made up of numerous 
cultures with various values and ideas, not one culture with one set of values 
(McGregor, 2008). As Schech and Haggis (2000:80) say: 'the Singaporean 
government explicitly inverted modernization theory to argue that Asian 
traditional values were superior to those of the modern West.'
Encounters
Encounter, according to the dictionary, can be defined as 'an unexpected or 
casual meeting’ or 'a confrontation or difficult struggle' (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2009), both of which may be apt when speaking of aid in 
Cambodia, but how do we define encounter in relation to cultural 
geography, and what does it mean in the context of this thesis? Geographies 
of encounter in a cultural geography context, are usually conceptualised in 
the sense of geographies of conquest, colonisation and settlement. For 
example, studies of indigeneity, imperial networks of knowledge and power, 
and geographies of home, nation and empire (Blunt, 2005) are all studies of 
encounters in one form or another.
When thinking about the cultural encounter in Cambodia between the West 
and 'the other' in the context of aid, it is perhaps useful to consider some 
forms of encounter between the West and the South, such as colonialism and 
postcolonialism, in order to provide a theoretical background for how 
encounters are conceptualised and how they can play out in a development 
context.
An early form of encounter between the West and 'the other' was, of course, 
colonialism. Colonialism began in the fifteenth century when Europe 
expanded its territories into Africa, Asia and the New World. Prior to 
colonialism, there had been contact between the West and the 'other' but it 
was spasmodic and without structure or organisation. By contrast, from the 
fifteenth century, European nations were in the process of systematically 
colonizing the world through the settlement of people in remote or 'alien' 
outposts. According to Fanon (1963) the colonial encounter was one of 
subordination and domination of new territories and people by the imperial 
powers, political and legal domination, dependency and exploitation, and 
institutionalised racial and cultural inequalities.
Colonisation officially ended in the twentieth century, however the colonial 
encounter can still be seen to be taking place today, just by a different name
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or type. For example, the 'weaker' nations in the South, could still be seen as 
being controlled and used by the more powerful western nations for their 
own means. Thinking along these lines, the encounter between West and 
South in terms of development could be seen as merely a newer form of 
traditional colonial encounter. For example, the choice to grant or not grant 
loans by international financial institutions such as the World Bank, is often 
portrayed as a form of neo-colonialism, or 'control' by the West over the 
South. In the 1980s, further thinking began to emerge about the colonial 
encounter: this new thinking was termed postcolonialism.
Postcolonialism is closely aligned to cultural geography and critical 
geopolitics, with representation being one of its main paradigms. The main 
proponents of postcolonialism include Edward Said and Arturo Escobar. 
These theorists fundamentally changed critical studies of colonialism and 
the colonial encounter, by inserting culture into thinking around 
colonialism. Postcolonial studies emphasise the importance of 'the other' 
and the de-centralising of the West when looking at postcolonial encounters. 
As Shurmer-Smith points (2002:68) out: 'the main thrust of postcolonial 
studies is to make Eurocentric views of the world problematic.' Escobar's 
work, in particular his 1995 text titled Encountering Development: The 
making and unmaking of the third world, is a seminal text which looks at the 
postcolonial encounter. In this text, Escobar criticises the whole western-led 
development discourse; he discusses the systematic production of 
knowledge and then goes on to imagine a postdevelopment regime of 
representation. Slater (Slater 2003:427) furthers this theme of de-centering 
the West and questioning existing development discourses in the 
postcolonial encounter when he says
a post-colonial perspective would underscore the particularity and 
limits of western visions which purport to have universal relevance, 
and which are frequently employed in discussions on aid and 
development as a kind of gold standard for what are seen as aspiring 
democracies in the global south
Not only does postcolonialism 'de-centre' the West, it also highlights the 
importance of representation to the encounter. For example, Escobar talks 
of using 'regimes of representation [which] can be analysed as places of 
encounter where identities are constructed ...' (Escobar, 1995:10). Shurmer- 
Smith (2002:131) also talks of the importance of considering representation 
in regard to cultural encounters: 'Representation is never just cold 
reporting; it influences the ways in which people encounter spaces and 
places.' Thus ideas put forward by postcolonialist theorists turns the 
encounter into one in which representation becomes crucial.
In the context of this thesis, the concept of the cultural encounter is used to 
look at how those with different cultural sets (i.e. China and the West) come 
together in an aid context; and what cultural encounters we see within this 
context between traditional and new donors. This is undertaken keeping in 
mind postcolonial notions around encounter and the importance of
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representation to uncover layers of meaning within the encounter. In the 
context of this thesis, however, we deviate from the usual type of cultural 
encounter envisaged by a colonial or postcolonial paradigm, by not looking 
at a traditional encounter between coloniser and colonised or North and 
South, but rather instead considering how the West and what could be 
considered 'the other' (in this case China], encounter each other in a third 
context, i.e. that of Cambodia.
Chinese aid and development! 24
Chapter 3: Chinese Aid 
and Development
Whilst much has been written about China as an aid recipient, until recently 
there was little formal or informal study undertaken on China as an aid 
donor. In the last few years, however, China's role as an aid donor has come 
to the fore with academics, policymakers and the media taking an interest in 
China as a 'new' donor. This is particularly the case in regard to Chinese aid 
to Africa. This chapter looks at Chinese notions of development, Chinese 'aid' 
(including how much, where it is going and what it is used for), and how 
China and Chinese aid is imagined and encountered by the West.
China's development discourse
Chinese development discourses are poorly understood in the West. This is 
partly because Chinese aid strategies are often not transparent, with even 
the amount of aid disbursed a state secret (Bräutigam, 2009). However, 
development studies also often places a western 'lens' on the study of 
development, which has the effect of excluding alternative understandings 
such as that of Chinese development discourses (Schmitz, 2007). Cook 
(2009a:2) identifies this gap in Western knowledge on Chinese development 
discourse:
An account of China's own “discourse" around development, how 
policies are made and different agendas pursued, and which 
development ideas are adopted and adapted in China's own 
development plans would provide a valuable perspective to inform 
western development debates, while helping to build mutual 
understanding of respective approaches.
Mohan and Power (2009:27) also state:
... we need a much closer reading of Chinese literatures on 
development theory and international relations, and more 
importantly an ongoing analysis of China's actual development 
trajectories and their realization in foreign policy
to come to any real conclusions about a Chinese 'development' discourse as 
such.
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Harcourt (2007:2) furthers Cook and Mohan and Power's stance by saying 
that 'the entry of China into development poses some interesting questions 
for the transformation of the development discourse itself.' What can the 
West learn from China and what can China learn from critical thinking 
around development? 'While there is an enormous amount of research on 
China - inside and outside the country - this knowledge has barely been 
reflected in the international development debate and community' (Clyde, 
2008). This section attempts to look at what we can say about the 
development discourse in China and how this relates to China's overseas aid 
program.
There are two development discourses to consider when thinking of China. 
There is the discourse of development within the country, and then there is 
the discourse of development outside the country - the later being the 
discourse into which overseas aid might fall. This thesis is primarily 
interested in the second discourse of development. However, this section 
will first briefly look at the internal discourse of development. This internal 
discourse is important as 'there has been growing interest in drawing out 
the lessons from China for other countries’ (de Haan, 2009b:12), particularly 
when it comes to China as a 'new' source of aid or even as a new 
development model for the South (Cook, 2009b:l). An understanding of 
internal development discourses may also provide an idea of how China will 
develop its foreign aid strategies.
Over the last 70 years, China has implemented a number of internal 
development paths. Historically these development discourses have differed 
quite substantially, both in ideology and practice, to those espoused by the 
West. For example, during the 1950s to 1970s development in China was 
based around ideas of socialism, and particularly 'Maoism'. This 
development path was often seen by those critical of the western 
development approach as an 'alternative' to the free-market neoliberal 
approach favoured by the West (e.g. Buchanan, 1970). Today, however, 
China's internal development discourse can be seen to be much more similar 
to that of the West, being based more on market-oriented capitalism than 
the old socialist/Mao principles.
China's 'alternative' internal development path began with the 'Great Leap 
Forward' led by Chairman Mao Zedong from 1958 to 1962. The aim of the 
Great Leap Forward was to turn China from an agrarian economy to a 
modern communist state based on socialist principles of development: 'this 
was a highly ambitious plan to use the power of socialist economics to 
increase Chinese production of steel, coal and electricity' (Mitter, 2008:57). 
The 'modern state' was to be achieved through collectivization, 
industrialization and agriculturalization. However, the Great Leap Forward 
turned out to be an economic failure and caused the deaths of at least 20 
million people largely through famine (Mitter, 2008).
The Great Leap Forward was followed by 'The Cultural Revolution'. During 
this time religion was banned, connections with both the West and the
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Soviets were frowned upon, and 'non-communists' were sought out and 
persecuted:
The "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" that broke out in 1966 
was many things, but at bottom it was a struggle over development 
strategies by then perceived not as mere alternatives, but as 
contraries' (Maxwell, 1979:2).
The Cultural Revolution officially lasted until Mao's death in 1976.
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping came to power and commenced opening up China 
onto the global stage. The 'alternative' path to development based on 
socialist ideals began to be abandoned in favour of a more market-oriented 
approach. This change in approach resulted in subsequent rapid economic 
growth and poverty reduction: 'Since 1979, with the introduction of 
reforms, China's GDP has grown at an average of 9.8 percent per annum, per 
capita income has increased fifty-fold and some 500 million people have 
been lifted out of poverty' (UNDP 2010:i). Whilst 16% of China's population 
still lives in poverty and a quarter lack access to clean drinking water 
(House of Commons & IDC, 2009), 'China's rapid economic development in 
the past two decades has generated the most rapid decline in absolute 
poverty ever witnessed' (UNDP, 2005a).
China’s rapid development has generated much discussion in the media and 
amongst academics. Whilst China has today moved away from radically 
alternative models of development towards a more market-based approach, 
it is still represented by some in the West as having a unique development 
model, one which has allowed for rapid economic growth and poverty 
reduction. One model that is often put forward by those in the West to 
explain China’s rapid growth is the 'Beijing Consensus' or 'China model’ 
(Ramo 2004; Halper, 2010; Kurlantzick, 2007; Zhao 2010). The Beijing 
Consensus was a term coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo, former editor of Time 
magazine, in 2004. The Beijing Consensus is a counterpoint to the 
Washington Consensus, and suggests that China has achieved its remarkable 
development through an alternative development path to that of the West. 
The basic tenets of the Beijing Consensus are that China’s development path 
has been based on innovation and knowledge led growth; that there has 
been a focus on the quality of life rather than economic performance; and 
that there has been self-determination (Ramo, 2004). Encompassed within 
this definition is the notion of a regimented society which provides cheap 
labour in order to fuel economic growth.
Whilst some have accepted the Beijing Consensus as a convenient way to 
explain China's rapid development, many others have chosen to critique it. 
For example, Nordtveit (2009:160) points out that:
Chinese scholars underline that there is not one Chinese model, but 
several, tried out with various success and drawbacks. Some 
academics have pointed to the unclear nature of the Beijing
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Consensus, while others again deny its very existence ... China's 
government officially denies the existence of a Beijing Consensus'
(see also Suzuki, 2009; The Economist, 2010).
Kennedy (2010:476) goes on to state that:
Whereas the BC and China Model may have some lasting resonance 
on matters political, given the problems of these terms and the 
flexibility of standard economic theory, it should be clear that the 
economic significance of these ideas should not be overstated. There 
are individual elements of the China's experience that deserve study 
and perhaps adoption by others, but they do not add up to a 
distinctive model.
According to Nordtveit (2009), the official Chinese path of development is 
not the western-coined Beijing Consensus, but rather that of Xiaokang or a 
'well-off society which is people-centred and embraces poverty alleviation, 
education, health and environmental protection (China Daily, 2005). The 
rhetoric of Xiaokang is very similar to that espoused by western 
development discourses. It is so similar, in fact, that the concept of Xiaokang 
has been adopted not only by the Chinese government2, but also the United 
Nations Development Program in China as the path towards development 
and modernization in China. The UNDP highlights the similarities by aligning 
Xiaokang with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs):
China is forging ahead to achieve Xiaokang in an all around way by 
adoption of a "new development concept" incorporating more 
reforms and innovations, emphasizing the vision again of "five 
balances," and putting people's interests first. The government is 
facing a lot of challenges to address emerging issues in the process of 
Xiaokang/MDGs attainment, namely, rural issues, integrated public 
security, transformation of government and administration reform, 
rural-urban & regional balanced development, environmental 
protection, way of economic growth, etc (UNDP, 2005b).
Xiaokang forms part of the overall current Chinese socio-economic ideology 
of the 'scientific development concept': 'This [scientific development 
concept] emphasizes that people should be the ultimate end of development, 
in order to balance economic and social development and build a 
harmonious society' (UNDP, 2008:27). Indeed the current Five Year Plan fo r  
Economic and Social Development fo r  the People's Republic o f  China (National 
Development and Reform Commission, nd) points out that:
Based on scientific approaches to development, we should focus on 
independent innovation, improve institutions and mechanisms, 
promote social harmony and enhance China's overall national
Deng Xiaoping re-introduced the term xiaokang in 1979 (Nordtveit, 2009)
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strength, international competiveness, and risk -handling capacity in 
an all-round way.
According to He (2009], China has many slogans, rhetoric and statements 
referring to development, many of which are similar to the West's 
development discourse. The challenge in China, as in the West, is how to put 
development theory into practice.
It is also important to recognise the degree to which China's internal 
development discourse has, in fact, been influenced by the western practice 
of development (contrary to popular belief, or that espoused by the Beijing 
Consensus]. The degree of international influence on development in China 
is perhaps not surprising considering China has been one of the world's 
largest recipients of aid to date (Nordtveit, 2009]. Aid disbursements to 
China are certainly decreasing as China's economy grows, however, in 2008 
China still received $1,489 million in net ODA. The largest donors to China in 
2008 were Japan, Germany and France and the largest sector for aid was 
education (OECD nd[a]]. China is also party, as an aid recipient, to 
international aid agreements such as the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and the Millennium Development Goals. As Wang (2007:41] 
says:
International influences have been an important force shaping 
China's new approach to development. The influence comes from 
international organizations, foreign governments, the international 
NGO network and business corporations ... in the area of sustainable 
development [in particular], China seems to have been remarkably 
ready to embrace foreign input.
China’s overseas aid program, by contrast, appears to fit not so much into 
what would be recognised in the West as a development discourse per se, 
but rather seems to sit within China's overall foreign policy discourse. The 
discourse of international development is one that has, to date, been 
western dominated: 'Development studies and the idea of "international 
development" originated in "developed” countries and for many in China it 
is still viewed as being very euro-, or Western-centric’ (Institute of 
Development Studies, 2009], therefore it is understandable that China 
would not necessarily frame its aid program in a western type 
'development' discourse. Certainly China prefers to use different language to 
the West when talking of 'development', referring not to aid, for example, 
but rather 'economic cooperation’ and rather than talking of aid recipients, 
talking of 'development partners’ (for example, see Xinhua 2010a; Xinhua 
2010b; Xinhua 2010c].
China's foreign policy discourse is based on the Five Principles o f  Peaceful 
Coexistence. This policy was formulated by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1954 and 
is still in use today, highlighting a continuity in China's foreign aid discourse 
over the last sixty years. The central tenets of this policy are mutual respect 
for sovereignty, mutual non-aggression and non-interference, equality and
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mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. These principles are the 
fundamental principles China purportedly adheres to in fostering and 
developing friendly relations with all the countries in the world (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2000). More recently, 
China has also adopted another defining discourse around foreign policy -  
this is the idea of a 'Harmonious World' as set out by President Hu Jintao. 
This replaces the previous foreign policy discourse of 'peaceful 
rise/development'. Harmonious World is a Confucian concept that President 
Hu Jintao has brought into foreign policy discourse to refer to the 
relationship between the countries of the world: 'We maintain that the 
people of all countries should join hands and strive to build a harmonious 
world of lasting peace and common prosperity' (Hu Jintao, quoted in Xinhua, 
2007a). In relation to development, a harmonious world implies that:
Developed countries should shoulder a greater responsibility for a 
universal, coordinated and balanced development in the world while 
developing countries should make fuller use of their own advantages 
to develop themselves (Hu Jintao, quoted in Xinhua, 2007b).
Whilst both the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and Harmonious 
World can be seen to play into China's foreign policy discourse, perhaps the 
policy most closely related to aid and development within the Chinese 
foreign policy discourse is that of the principle of South-South cooperation. 
South-South cooperation is based on notions of mutual support and non­
interference, but also refers to countries from the South working together to 
achieve solutions to common development challenges. According to Yi 
Xiaozhun (cited in Xinhua, 2010a), the Chinese Vice-Minister of Commerce:
Promoting South-South Cooperation and help each other among the 
developing countries’ [sic] is the centerpiece of development 
cooperation. 'As the developing countries are at similar levels of 
development and facing similar economic and social development 
problems, they can better appreciate the development needs of each 
other.
The UNDP in China has worked alongside China to assist develop a strategy 
of South-South cooperation. China is also a key donor to the UNDP Voluntary 
Trust Fund for the Promotion of South-South Cooperation which aims to 
promote a South-South dialogue (UNDP, 2005b); and the FAO Food Security 
South-South Cooperation Program (Brautigam, 2010a).
China's aid
China has, perhaps surprisingly, one of the oldest articulations of foreign aid 
principles in the world. In 1964 during a visit to ten African countries, 
Chinese premier Zhou Enlai set out the Eight Principles fo r  China's Aid to 
Foreign Countries (Table 3.1). These principles emphasised equality, mutual 
benefit, and respect for the recipient's sovereignty and are still in use today 
(Cotterrell and Harmer, 2005). The eight principles of aid are in line with the
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Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which, at least in theory, govern 
China's foreign policy today. The eight principles set out the theoretical 
basis on which China's aid rests and incorporate ideas such as non­
interference and a lack of conditionalities. However, these aid principles 
have not been translated into direct policies as such, with no formal aid or 
development assistance policy having been published by the Chinese 
government to date (Chin and Frolic, 2007; Cook 2009b; Bailey, 1975). The 
one exception is the 'One China policy' whereby China will only grant aid to 
those countries which formally recognise the People's Republic of China as 
the sole government of both China and Taiwan.
Table 3.1: The Eight Principles for China's Aid to Third World Countries
P r in c ip le
1. E m p h a s iz e  e q u a l i t y  a n d  m u tu a l b e n e f i t
2 . R e s p e c t  s o v e r e ig n t y  a n d  n e v e r  a t ta c h  c o n d it io n s
3. P r o v id e  in t e r e s t - f r e e  o r  lo w - in t e r e s t  lo a n s
4 . H e lp  r e c ip ie n t  c o u n t r ie s  d e v e lo p  in d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  s e l f -r e l ia n c e
5. B u ild  p r o je c t s  th a t  r e q u ir e  l it t le  in v e s t m e n t  a n d  c a n  b e  a c c o m p l is h e d  q u ic k ly
6. P r o v id e  q u a lity  e q u ip m e n t  a n d  m a te r ia l  a t  m a r k e t  p r ic e s
7 . E n su r e  e f f e c t iv e  t e c h n ic a l  a s s i s t a n c e
8 . P a y  e x p e r t s  a c c o r d in g  to  lo c a l s ta n d a r d s
Source: Chin and Frolic, 2007
Cooper (1976) suggests that China's present aid system may have arisen out 
of China's traditional style of foreign relations - that of the tribute system 
'whereby foreign countries brought gifts to the Chinese emperor and 
received more valuable gifts or trade concessions in return' (1976:4). 
Brautigam (2009:24) continues this theme:
As an empire, China evolved a tribute system: a long tradition of 
exchanges with smaller nations in its sphere of influence. Visiting 
missions from the kingdom of Siam or Malacca would affirm the 
dominance of the emperor by ritual kowtowing. They would pay 
nominal tribute to him, and be rewarded with generous gifts and the 
right to trade. These diplomatic gifts foreshadow the practices today. 
For most recipients, Chinese aid is institutionalised through a 
bureaucratic planning process. But 'gifts' of aid packages are 
frequently announced along with other agreements during the visits 
of high-level Chinese dignitaries to developing countries, or the visits 
of those leaders to Beijing.
Chin and Frolic (2007) and Brautigam (2009:13) also point to the fact that 
China's aid has also been influenced by China's role as an aid recipient: 'the 
content of their [China's] aid reflects what they believe worked for their own 
development. And, surprisingly, much about the way they give aid reflects 
what they learned from all of us [the West].' For example, 'China's 
engagement in Africa often simply repeats patterns established by the West,
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and especially Japan, in China.' However, this does not mean that China 
follows existing international aid norms when it comes to aid policy. As 
Glosny points out [2006:16]:
... as is the case in many other areas, China is reluctant to completely 
accept and adopt western foreign aid norms, given that it had no role 
in establishing them. A more subtle expression of this discontent is 
that given that western norms represent the history, culture and 
situation of those countries, and because China differs from them in 
all of these areas, it will have to diverge from these norms and chart 
its own path. Still others even question whether or not these norms 
are good for the developing countries themselves
China is often referred to as a 'new' or 'emerging' aid donor. However China 
has been giving aid since the mid-1950s, much the same length of time as 
the traditional donors (Bartke, 1975; Cooper, 1976; Law, 1984]. China's 
official aid program began in 1953 with a large grant to the socialist North 
Korea at the end of the Korean War. Aid then quickly followed first to the 
rest of Asia and then globally [including Africa, the Middle East, Latin 
America and even Malta [Bartke, 1975]]. According to Brautigam [1998], by 
1975, China had aid programs in more African nations than the United 
States. This early aid was based on Maoist principles and reflected the 
development agenda within China at the time:
China's development assistance was designed to help post-colonial 
regimes modernize and become self-reliant, and focused on 
agricultural aid, technical assistance, and projects that could be 
completed quickly. The central aim of this assistance was to help 
developing countries feed and clothe their people. Loans to support 
local projects were usually provided interest-free. The Chinese 
referred—and continue to refer—to their development assistance as 
'poor helping the poor' [Chin and Frolic, 2007:4].
From the 1970s, however, China's aid agenda began to change focus 
somewhat, once again reflecting changes occurring within China, namely the 
policy shift towards reform and opening up. It was also at this time that 
China became a recipient of foreign aid [Glosny, 2006]. According to Chin 
and Frolic [2007:4]:
During this period, China also became interested in competing with 
other nations for natural resources in the developing world. As a 
result of these debates, by the mid-1980s, Chinese authorities shifted 
official policy toward development assistance projects that provided 
economic benefits both to China and recipient countries.
Perhaps the most well known of China's aid projects from this period, was 
the Tanzam railway. The railway connected landlocked Zambia to the ports 
of Tanzania and was built between 1970 and 1975 at a cost of $500 million -  
the largest ever Chinese aid project at the time. The project was funded by
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an interest free loan. The Tanzanian and Zambian governments had 
previously approached several western bilateral and multilateral donors to 
fund the project but all had refused (Bailey, 1975]. During this time, Chinese 
aid was often seen as an alternative to western and Soviet aid:
The last decade [1965-1975] has witnessed a growing 
disillusionment with Western and Soviet aid, both among the 
recipients and the donors. This has aroused a great deal of interest in 
Chinese assistance as an important alternative for the Third World 
(Bailey, 1975: 587).
Despite China's established role as an aid donor, however, from the end of 
the Cold War to the end of the 1990s, little attention was paid by the West to 
Chinese aid, instead the focus of western attention was on development 
within China. Nonetheless, China has continued to give aid - and since about 
2000, this aid has once again come to the fore as the amount and breadth 
once again increases and China's place on the global stage becomes 
increasingly important:
China is the most dynamic country in the world with growth and 
change occurring at an absolutely dizzying pace. The excitement and 
stresses of rapid change are palpable in Beijing, in Shanghai, in 'small' 
cities like Kunming (population: only 5 million). They are also 
increasingly evident in China's aid program, the structure and 
management of which we are just beginning to get a picture 
(Lancaster, 2007:6).
According to the Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2005 (National Bureau of 
Statistics), Chinese aid was $731.2 million in 2004 (although both Glosny 
(2006) and Lancaster (2007) state that this figure is too low and Chinese aid 
today is likely to be in the region of US$1.5 billion per year). The highest 
proportion of Chinese aid today goes to Asia (Woods, 2008; Chin and Frolic, 
2007). According to Chin and Frolic (2007:12) 40% of Chinese aid goes to 
Asia, 25% to Africa, 13% for Latin and Central America and 10% for other 
countries (including the South Pacific). The largest recipients of Chinese aid 
are Iran, Pakistan and North Korea (Rowlands 2008). However, when 
looking at these aid figures, it is important to keep in mind that the actual 
volume and spatial distribution of Chinese aid today are still a state secret 
(Brautigam, 2009). The figures above are based on those figures which the 
Chinese government has released and/or reports from recipient countries 
themselves. Brautigam also points out that the media often over-inflate 
China's aid, particularly as a result of confusing loans (which are often at a 
market-rate line of credit and are thus actually investment) with aid.
It is also important to keep in mind the fact that China does not define its aid 
the same way that the OECD-DAC countries define their aid. China, in fact, 
has no official definition of its aid. Brautigam (2010a) states that China does 
not always include debt relief or scholarships as official aid (unlike the DAC 
countries) but it does count military aid and loans for foreign-aided joint
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ventures and cooperative projects in its official aid. Indeed Brautigam goes 
so far as to say: 'that the lion's share of China's officially supported finance is 
not actually official development assistance (ODA)' (Brautigam, 2011: 752).
This raises the question of whether Chinese 'aid' can be considered aid at all, 
particularly in the context of aid and development debates? Certainly China 
itself does not refer to 'aid' but rather 'development cooperation' (much as 
the West refers to 'aid' as Overseas Development Assistance). And there is 
no denying that Chinese aid does not necessarily meet the criteria of 'aid' as 
defined by the West. However, it could also be argued that whether China's 
'aid' meets the definition of ODA or not, it is still aid in terms of assisting the 
South meet development objectives (whether these be western defined 
poverty reduction and democracy goals, or Chinese defined infrastructure 
goals). Even Brautigam does not deny this link saying that despite the fact 
China's aid is not primarily based on ODA, it still may be 'developmental' 
(Brautigam, 2011:752).
China itself may not call aid, 'aid', but it is increasingly paying attention to, 
and participating in, western aid circles, thereby indicating that China itself 
sees its 'development cooperation' as being somewhat similar in principle to 
western aid:
The Chinese government has also begun to engage directly with 
foreign aid agencies to learn from their arrangements and processes 
and tentatively, to collaborate with them. They have sent teams to 
visit London and Stockholm to learn how these governments manage 
their aid. The have developed a considerable dialogue with the 
British Department for International Development on international 
aid and development issues. They have begun to collaborate with the 
Canadian government on technical assistance activities in developing 
countries. They have signed a memorandum of understanding with 
the International Finance Corporation about collaboration on 
environmentally sustainable projects in emerging markets. And they 
have joined or expressed interest in joining donor coordination 
groups in a number of African countries (Lancaster, 2007:6).
This thesis, whilst noting the differences between Chinese and western aid - 
uses the term 'aid' for both western ODA and Chinese development 
cooperation in line with media, policy makers and other researchers. This is 
in order, predominantly, to come to a clearer understanding of how the 
broader concept of aid has come to be and is (mis)represented both in 
relation to Chinese and western aid.
Aid is administered within China by the Department of Aid to Foreign 
Countries within the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) with some strategic 
oversight played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rowlands, 2008; 
Brautigam, 2009). China's Export-Import Bank (EXIM) extends concessional 
loans for loan-based aid (Chin and Frolic, 2007). The structure of Chinese 
aid is somewhat different to that of OECD-DAC member countries. China
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does not have its own aid agency such as AusAID or the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) rather its aid comes through the Chinese 
Embassy in each nation:
The Chinese Economic and Commercial Counselor's office attached to 
China's Embassy will designate one or more staff to oversee the aid 
program, trouble-shooting, monitoring, and checking up at their 
completion. These officials are not expected to be experts in 
development (Brautigam, 2009:109).
China disburses both grants and concessional loans as part of its aid 
program. A majority of Chinese aid goes towards infrastructure 
development, although it is estimated that 10-14% of total aid from China 
also goes towards humanitarian assistance (Cotterrell and Harmer, 
2005:18). China has also provided US$2.13 billion in debt relief to 44 
recipient countries (Woods, 2008). There are various types of aid according 
to Brautigam (2009:105):
China has at least nine types of aid: medical teams, training and 
scholarships, humanitarian aid, youth volunteers, debt relief, budget 
support, turn-key or 'complete plant' projects (infrastructure, 
factories), aid-in-kind, and technical assistance. Some of these are 
new, but others have been in place for a very long time.
According to Chin and Frolic (2007), China's aid responds to requests from 
recipient countries, rather than being an initiative of the donor.
Most of China’s aid is bilateral, although increasingly China has also been 
disbursing aid through multilateral channels (Brautigam, 2009). China is a 
member of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and has pledged aid to the Asian Development Bank 
for both the Greater Mekong Strategy and the Indochina Regional Poverty 
Reduction Centre (Glosny, 2006). China has also contributed $120 million to 
the replenishment of the African Development Fund (House of Commons & 
IDC, 2009). Since 2005, China has been disbursing aid to the World Food 
Program (WFP); it has also distributed aid via the UNHCR after various 
natural disasters, most notably after the Asian tsunami in 2005 and the 
Haitian earthquake in 2010. China does not, generally, disburse aid through 
non-government organisations (NGOs), although aid is sometimes disbursed 
through the Red Cross Society of China (e.g. $1 million in aid to Haiti) and 
the China Charity Federation (Cotterrell and Harmer, 2005).
China is not a member of the traditional aid grouping of the OECD-DAC. 
However, there is evidence China is increasingly cooperating in existing aid 
structures. For example, the China-DAC study group was formed in 2009 by 
the OECD and the International Poverty Reduction Centre in China (IPRCC) 
in order to share experiences and promote learning on growth and poverty 
reduction (OECD, nd[b]). The IPRCC itself is also an example of a partnership 
between OECD and China. The IPRCC was initiated and established by the
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Chinese government, UNDP and other international organisations in 2004. It 
is based in Beijing and its main aim is related to training, exchange and 
research related to poverty reduction (IPRCC, nd). The previously 
mentioned South-South cooperation with the FAO and UNDP and the 
multilateral aid mentioned above are also examples of China's cooperation 
with other donors.
Representations of China
There have been many critiques of China's 'aid' in the western literature. 
These include that Chinese aid: does not prioritise poverty reduction but 
that rather China is merely seeking natural resources to fuel its own growth; 
that Chinese aid bypasses environmental and good governance standards as 
a result of its lack of conditionality; that it supports corrupt regimes through 
its non-interference policy; that only Chinese companies and labourers 
benefit from Chinese aid as Chinese aid is generally tied; and that there is a 
lack of transparency around Chinese aid meaning that it is not clear what is 
aid or investment, that the disbursement process is not known and that the 
volume or distribution of Chinese aid is unclear. However, many of these 
critiques have also been questioned (e.g. Brautigam, 2009; Woods, 2008):
Indeed, there is now some evidence that countries with intensified 
aid and trade links with China are enjoying higher growth rates, 
better terms of trade, increased export volumes and higher public 
revenues (Woods, 2008: 4).
China has been traditionally cast as the 'other' in its relationship to the West. 
To use Said's notion of Orientalism, China fits into the Orient, which the 
West constructs and reconstructs for its own purposes. Over time, Western 
images of China have varied, from positive to negative:
At certain times, particular dominant groups have designated China 
in a range of ways, as worthy of admiration, sympathy, curiosity, fear, 
ridicule, hostility, conversion to Christianity, or as a means to profit. 
Western images of China are both interesting and an active part of a 
series of power relationships (Mackerras, 1999: 8).
As Mackerras points out in the quote above, and following on from the ideas 
of Foucault (1979) and Said (1995), the construction of an image is often 
about power relations. This is also a central theme in critical geopolitics, 
which 'draws our attention to the constitutive role of discourse in 
establishing and maintaining hegemonic regimes of representation' 
(Mawdsley, 2008:510). In the case of China, the image emanating from the 
West is best described as one which always places the West in the superior 
position:
It appears to this writer that the dominant images [of China]... have 
tended to accord with, rather than oppose, the interests of the main 
Western authorities or governments of the day. There has indeed
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been a 'regime of truth' concerning China, which has affected and 
raised 'the status of those who are charged with saying what counts 
as true' about that country (Mackerras, 1999:178].
These images do not necessarily reflect 'realities' within China, but, rather 
these representations reflect the ideas of those in the West: 'The main 
determinant of Western images of China is the West itself (Mackerras, 
1999:183].
According to de Haan (2009b:9]
The way China has been described in recent years has been marked 
by great controversy, between, put simply, those who see China's rise 
as a threat, and those who stress the positive aspect of China's 
development and its increasing role in Africa and elsewhere.
The threat discourse has been particularly strong since the 1990s 
(Mackerras, 1999]. For example, fears that China is going to challenge 
America’s hegemony and 'take over the world’ can be seen through the titles 
of recently released books on China: When China Rules the World: The End o f  
the Western World and the Birth o f  a New Global Order (Jacques, 2009); 
China Shakes the World: A Titan's Rise and Troubled Future - and the 
Challenge fo r  America (Kynge, 2007); China, Inc: How the Rise o f  the Next 
Superpower Challenges America and the World (Fishman, 2006).
The western media, in their representations of China are almost 
overwhelmingly negative (Liss, 2003; Mawdsley, 2008), not only having a 
tendency to describe China as a threat, but also representing China as 
somewhat 'behind' the West: 'Ethnocentrism usually results in negative 
images, because anyone who judges China with the standards and value 
systems of the West will find it deficient and backward' (Mackerras, 1999: 
184). China, according to the media, becomes a nation with a poor human 
rights record; a country which prioritises economic development at the 
expense of the environment; and is secretive and has non-democratic 
institutions. Examples of just a few headlines gathered from the western 
media are outlined on the following page:
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Table 3.2: China in the western media
T o p ic H e a d lin e
H u m an  r igh ts S k ep tic ism  g re e ts  C h in a 's  p la n  to  a d d re s s  h u m an  r igh ts  [ L A  T i m e s ,  
7 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 8 ]
C h ina  a c cu sed  o f  h u m an  r ig h ts  ab u ses  in  s e c r e t  'b la c k  ja ils ' [ D a i l y  
M a i l ,  1 2 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 9 ]
C h ina  r igh ts  'w o r s e n  w ith  G a m es ' [ B B C ,  2 9 / 7 / 2 0 0 8 ]
E n v ir o n m e n t C h in a 's  B o o m  Is B u st fo r  G lob a l E n v ir o n m e n t ,  S tu d y  W a rn s  
[ N a t i o n a l  G e o q r a p h i c  N e w s ,  1 6 / 5 / 2 0 0 5 ]
W i l l  A n y th in g  C urb  C h in a 's  A p p e t i t e  fo r  R a re  W ild l i fe ?  [ N e w  Y o r k  
T i m e s ,  1 3 / 6 / 2 0 1 0 ]
C h in a 's  'c a n c e r  v i l la g e s ' r e v e a l d a rk  s id e  o f  e c o n o m ic  b o o m  [ T h e  
G u a r d i a n ,  7 / 6 / 2 0 1 0 ]
N on - C h ina  s e ek s  to  h a lt b o o k  th a t fau lts  its  P r im e  M in is te r  [ N e w  Y o r k
d e m o c r a t ic / s e c r e t iv e T i m e s ,  7 / 7 / 2 0 1 0 ]
N o  m o r e  a p p e a s e m e n t, W e s t  m u s t push  C h ina  to  d e m o c ra c y  
[ S y d n e y  M o r n i n q  H e r a l d ,  2 0 / 5 / 2 0 0 8 ]
C h in a 's  s e c r e t  in te r n e t  p o l ic e  ta r g e t  c r it ic s  w ith  w e b  o f  
p ro p a g a n d a  [ T h e  G u a r d i a n ,  1 4 / 6 / 2 0 0 5 ].
Source: Author
Nonetheless, there is also a discourse within the West that sees China as an 
opportunity, notably as an economic opportunity - that is, that there is 
money to be made from China and as such China, from a business viewpoint, 
can be seen as presenting opportunities (Liss, 2003; Mackerras, 1999). For 
example, Doing Business In China: How to Profit in the World's Fastest 
Growing Market (Plafker, 2008) or the book China Now: Doing Business in the 
World's Most Dynamic Market (Lam and Graham 2006) which boasts that 
'The opportunities are as big as China itself. With this book as your personal 
tour guide, you'll be able to reach a whole new world of clients and 
consumers.'
These western representations of China itself, also extend to 
representations of China's aid and development programs. Books, research 
reports, policy papers and newspaper articles on China and its aid and 
development program have proliferated since the 2000s when the West 
began to (re)notice China as an aid donor, particularly in regard to Africa. It 
was around this time, that Moisés Naim famously named China as a 'rogue 
donor', suggesting that China's aid program was non-democratic, non­
transparent and stifling progress (Chahoud, 2007). However he was only 
one of many to represent China as a threat. As Mohan and Power (2008:24) 
point out, China's presence in Africa has been described as everything from 
a 'scramble', 'mad dash', resource grab' to a 'rape'.
A common western interpretation of China’s aid program is to incorporate it 
within the foreign policy framework of 'soft power', thereby implying that 
China is using its aid program in order to gain influence over the rest of the 
world. All donors use aid for their own geopolitical purposes, but in China’s 
case, this association is usually emphasised and negatively critiqued:
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... we are beginning to observe a new layer of criticism, which is 
centered around the relatively novel concept of Chinese soft power. 
Put simply, the main thrust of this argument states that Beijing is 
propagating its authoritarian model of economic growth as a source 
of attraction to create a sphere of influence among non-democratic 
states (Suzuki, 2009:780].
Kurlantzick in his 2007 book on China's soft power, goes so far as to call this 
soft power a 'charm offensive' whereby China is 'charming' the rest of the 
world to its side: 'In the worst-case scenario, China eventually will use soft 
power to push countries to choose between closer ties to Washington and 
closer ties to Beijing’ (xii). However, as Suzuki (2009:786] points out, 'this 
lopsided view of Chinese soft power seems to stem from the fact that the 
vast majority of the works on China are written by western-based scholars 
or analysts for a Western policy audience.'
Other critiques of China’s aid program emanating from the West, focus on 
the fact that China's aid is somehow less worthy or altruistic than western 
aid as China's aid focuses on economic growth rather than poverty reduction 
(unlike, by implicit comparison, western aid]:
China's approach to supporting development in third countries, 
whether in Africa, or in neighbouring poor states such as Cambodia, 
clearly differs from the 'western' model of development pursued by 
OECD DAC donors such as the UK, who seek to address the basic 
human needs of the poor ... (House of Commons & IDC 2009:34].
Brautigam (2009] and Woods (2008] amongst others have pointed out, 
however, that many of these western representations of China's aid program 
have been exaggerated and/or pay little heed to reality. For example, 
Brautigam goes through each of the specific criticisms aimed at China's aid 
in Africa, such as the accusations that China is making corruption worse, or 
that China ignores environmental and social standards, and comes to the 
conclusion that:
China's rise in Africa is cause for some concern, but it need not evoke 
the level of fear and alarm raised by some who have condemned 
China's aid and engagement as destabilizing, bad for governance, and 
unlikely to help Africa to end poverty. Many of the fears about 
Chinese aid and engagement are misinformed, the alarm out of 
proportion (Brautigam, 2009:307].
Other authors such as Guerrero and Manji (2008], state that there are many 
perspectives on China other than those perpetuated by the West, and that 
these perspectives are worth considering. For example, Fu Tao (2008] 
argues in relation to civil society cooperation in Africa, that China's aid may 
have a positive affect:
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the circumstances of civil society in China today are very different 
from what they were ten years ago. The similar interests of African 
and Chinese civil society in ensuring the equitable distribution of the 
benefits and opportunities arising from economic development are a 
strong foundation for future cooperation (Guerrero and Manji, 
2008:6).
Other research has pointed out that the West deliberately criticises China's 
aid program, 'to enhance the legitimacy of western approaches to 
democracy and development aid' (Mohan and Power, 2008:36). That is, to 
take the focus away from the controversies surrounding western aid and its 
lack of effectiveness. Along these lines Mawdsley (2008:521) points out one 
of the main narratives of British newspapers when looking at China's aid to 
Africa is '... a benign West being undermined by a ruthless and unscrupulous 
China.' She goes on to say that:
Above all, the dominant, if by no means universal narrative that runs 
through many of the articles is that the mistakes of the past have 
been addressed, and the West is now the architect and energiser of a 
new drive towards good governance and development, with aid now 
accompanied by ethical conditionalities, while reformed commercial 
practices promise investment and trade that will enhance 
development rather than line the pockets of kleptocratic elites (2008: 
520).
This representation of western aid implies that China now has to 'catch up' 
to the West which has learnt from its mistakes the best way forward. Indeed 
Chin and Frolic (2007), in their research report for the Canadian 
International Development Research Centre, state that China's aid is 
'evolving' as China is increasing its focus on western development goals such 
as capacity building and social development and is partnering with western 
multilateral donors such as ADB and UNDP.
Nonetheless, China's aid program is not always represented as a threat or as 
a lesser version of western aid: this is particularly the case when listening to 
voices from the South. As Mohan and Power (2008:31) say 'from an African 
perspective for the first time since the end of the cold war African countries 
have more choices about who to turn to for aid and investment and can play 
donors off against one another.' The 'Chinese path of development' is being 
viewed once again as a possible alternative for countries in the South:
This interest was manifest at the 2006 forum on China-Africa 
cooperation, during which many African leaders expressed interest 
in the development path of China as an alternative to the western 
development discourse and aid (Nordtveit, 2009: 162).
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For example:
A number of Cameroonian politicians and administrators find the aid 
and cooperation from China "better" than the aid from traditional 
donors, because a colonial past does not hamper it. Also, China's own 
development is seen as a model for development (Nordtveit, 
2010:106}.
Summary
This chapter has summarised development discourses within and outside 
China; it has looked at China’s overseas aid program, including whether 
China's 'aid' is aid at all, and it has considered representation and how this 
plays into discourses around aid and development. Highlighted by this 
chapter is the fact that China's internal development discourse is not that 
dissimilar to that espoused by the West, at least in theory, although this has 
historically not always been the case. When it comes to China's external 
development discourse, the rhetoric used by China usually falls within that 
of foreign policy discourses - which appear to have changed little since 
China began giving aid in the 1950s. However, no matter what the 
discourses espoused by China, the West also creates its own discourse 
around China and its aid and development program. Thus China's aid comes 
to be represented in particular ways by the West which may pay little heed 
paid to the actual 'reality' of China's aid.
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Chapter Four: Cambodia, 
China and the World
The previous two chapters have provided an insight into both western and 
Chinese development discourses and how these play out globally. This 
chapter now comes to the case study that this thesis uses for its exploration 
of aid encounters - that of Cambodia. Cambodia is a small country of 14 
million people located in Southeast Asia in between the much more 
powerful nations of Vietnam and Thailand; and Laos to the north. Cambodia 
has a long history of linkages with China in terms of foreign relations, trade 
and migration. By contrast, Cambodia's relationship with the West goes back 
only two hundred years or so and is based on a relationship of colonialism, 
aid and development. This chapter explores the foreign relations, economy, 
society and politics of Cambodia with particular reference to the ongoing 
relationship with China and the rest of the world, as a precursor to 
understanding both China and the West's aid relationship with Cambodia.
History
Early Cambodia-China relationship
China and Cambodia have a long history of trade, tribute and cooperation. 
The first recordings of a civilisation on Cambodian soil go back to the first 
century AD, with an ancient civilisation called Funan. The Funanese were 
seafarers who traded with both China and India. Trade between the 
Funanese and China was 'intense' according to Chandler (1983), with 
Buddhist religious objects being among the main items traded. From the 
third century tribute was also sent to China from Funan. According to 
Chinese sources, the ancient Funan empire 'was able to send more than 25 
diplomatic missions to China between the third and seventh centuries, with 
tribute. The gifts included gold, silver, ivory, elephants and rhinoceros, and 
the plumage of kingfishers' (Freeman 2004:36). The tribute relationship 
with China continued with the Chenla empire, the successor of Funan. 
Chenla sent ambassadors to China from the seventh century (Mabbett and 
Chandler, 1995). The close relationship between China and Funan and 
Chenla is highlighted by the fact that most of the information regarding both 
these ancient empires comes from Chinese texts (Chandler, 1983).
Following on from the ancient kingdoms of Funan and Chenla, in the ninth 
century arose the new kingdom of Angkor, which was, for the next seven 
centuries or so, one of the most successful powers in the region. By the time 
Angkor Wat itself was built in the twelfth century, the Khmer empire of
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Angkor covered most of what is now Thailand, the south of Vietnam, 
southern Laos and part of the Malay peninsula. Trade routes had been 
established with lands as far apart as India and China (Freeman, 2004). It 
was an extremely powerful empire, so successful it was known to the 
Chinese as 'Cambodia the Rich’ (Mabbett and Chandler, 1995:175).
During this time, and continuing until the fifteenth century Cambodia 
maintained a strong relationship with China based on trade, tribute and 
migration from China to Cambodia. More than a dozen tributary missions 
were sent to China between 1371 and 1419 (Chandler 1983). The aim of 
tribute missions to China during these years was to ensure that China 
recognised Cambodia and as such afforded it sovereignty and trading rights 
(Fairbank, 1942). According to Osborne (2008:19), 'the Cambodian court at 
Angkor increasingly looked to trade with China as a way to maintain its 
prosperity.' There was also a well-established Chinese community at 
Angkor. For example, Chinese diplomat Zhou Dabuan lived at Angkor 
between 1296 and 1297 in the court of the King Srindravarman. He has 
provided much of the current knowledge about Angkor (Mabbett and 
Chandler 1995).
By the sixteenth century the Chinese had also come to dominate the city of 
Phnom Penh which was by then Cambodia's most important trading port 
(Willmott, 1967). Chinese merchants in Phnom Penh married and 
established lives in Cambodia going on to form the Chinese ethnic minority 
which still exists in Cambodia today3. The importance and dominance of 
Chinese traders in Cambodia’s early history is highlighted by the number of 
business words in the Khmer language that have been borrowed from 
Chinese. For example, the Khmer word haang (shop) has been borrowed 
from Chinese, as have the numbers from thirty to ninety [samsap, saesap 
etc) (Willmott, 1967; Edwards, 2009). Edwards (2009) says that 
traditionally the Chinese and Khmer economic roles complemented each 
other. Khmer men have traditionally been more interested in politics than 
commerce, whilst Khmer women act as market traders. Thus Chinese men 
married Khmer women to facilitate trade and commerce networks, whilst 
the political ambitions of Khmer men were not thwarted by the Chinese:
From early Cambodian history until the dawn of the twentieth 
century, virtually all Chinese immigrants to Cambodia were male, and 
mostly settled permanently in Cambodia, marrying Khmer women 
and establishing families (Edwards, 2009:191).
Edwards (2009:174) goes on to say that the Chinese have been part of 
Cambodia for so long that 'ethnic Chinese are an integral part of the 
geography and genealogy of Cambodia' today.
3 Estimates put the population o f Chinese in Cambodia today at around 300,000 -  340,000, with at least 90% of 
these Chinese being born in Cambodia (Edwards, 2009).
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European contact
In contrast to China's early and dominant role in Cambodia's trade, foreign 
affairs and migration, Europeans were completely unaware of Cambodia 
until the sixteenth century (Osborne, 2008). It was not until 1563 that 
Cambodia was shown on a European map (Osborne, 2008). The earliest 
European contacts with Cambodia were the Portuguese missionaries who 
attempted (generally unsuccessfully) to convert the Buddhist Cambodians 
to Catholicism. They arrived in the sixteenth century on the back of the 
seaborne expansion of the Spanish and Portuguese empires (Osborne, 
2008). By the end of the sixteenth century, European traders knew of 
Cambodia and Phnom Penh, at least, housed traders from Portugal and 
Spain, although in much smaller numbers than their Chinese counterparts 
(Osborne, 2008). These early European traders were joined briefly in the 
seventeenth century by traders from Holland and Britain as these nations 
expanded their territories and trade routes (Chandler, 1983:85).
However, it was the French colonisation of Cambodia (1863-1953) that 
truly established the relationship between Cambodia and the West. France 
was seeking to expand its empire during the nineteenth century and had 
turned to Asia as one place in which to do this. Between the sixteenth and 
nineteenth centuries after the Angkor Empire had declined and eventually 
disappeared, Cambodia gradually lost its remaining independence and 
power to Thailand and Vietnam (Freeman, 2004). This paved the way for 
French colonisation of Cambodia - as Cambodia looked for a way to protect 
their territory from Vietnam and Thailand. The French, for their part, 
initially thought Cambodia could become an important trade route to China 
via the Mekong; they also wanted to halt the expansion of the British Empire 
in Asia (Osborne, 2008; Aldrich, 1996). In 1863, Cambodia became a French 
protectorate and in 1887, Cambodia became part of French Indochine -  
made up of Vietnam and Cambodia, and later Laos. The French encouraged 
the export of raw goods from Cambodia -  for example rubber and rice, and 
imposed taxes on the local citizens (Tully, 2005). According to Osborne 
(2008:84) whilst the French colonisation of Cambodia halted incursions by 
Thailand or Vietnam, it also saw the interests of Cambodia somewhat 
subsumed beneath those of the French: 'the inherent inequality of a colonial 
system in which the interests of the colonizing power overrode all other 
considerations.' For example, the French gave preference to building the 
economy through cash crops rather than focussing on health, education or 
equality which may have been of more use to everyday Cambodians.
In contrast to the Chinese who migrated to and settled in Cambodia, the 
French settled in Cambodia in relatively small numbers and tended to return 
eventually to France. Osborne (2008) cites a figure of 6,000 French in 
Cambodia, as compared to perhaps 300,000 Chinese living in Cambodia at 
this time (Edwards, 2009). During the period of French colonisation, there 
were many Chinese living in Cambodia as a result of the close historical 
trade links between Cambodia and China. Willmott (1967:40), however, 
says the French disliked the Chinese, 'because they were diligent, clever and
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quick', and according to Edwards (2009:181) 'Chinese were increasingly 
cursed in French colonial reports as greedy traders or vice-ridden workers 
whose greatest pleasures in life were opium, gambling and extortion.' 
Nonetheless, despite this apparent discrimination, the number of Chinese in 
Cambodia increased during the period of French colonisation, probably due 
to the convention China signed with France and Britain in 1860, which 
recognised the rights of Chinese subjects to emigrate and to receive 
recognition and protection for their labour (Edwards, 2009).
Independence, Isolation and 1991
In 1956, Cambodia gained independence from France. For the first time in 
almost one hundred years Cambodia could set its own path towards growth 
and development. However, after years of French colonisation and centuries 
of Chinese domination of commerce, it was still foreigners who controlled 
large parts of the Cambodian economy and who influenced politics and 
foreign affairs. The period from independence until 1991 is expanded upon 
in Chapters Five and Six where the geopolitics of both western aid and 
Chinese aid is outlined, however a brief summary is given below of the level 
of involvement of both France and China in Cambodian society from 
independence until the Paris Peace Accords in 1991.
In terms of the Cambodian economy, after independence the Chinese 
dominated the rice, pepper and salt trades, as well as being involved in most 
commercial enterprises, including transport. The French, by contrast, 
dominated the rubber trade, and the French and British dominated the 
banking industry (Osborne, 2008). France, the US and China were also 
disbursing large amounts of aid to Cambodia during the period immediately 
following independence which assisted in propping up the Cambodian 
economy. The French had a strong presence in the country as a result of 
their recent colonial role: the French trained the Cambodian military, they 
educated the Cambodian elite, they presided over the large rubber 
plantations and they dominated Cambodia's cultural institutions (Osborne, 
2008). By the 1960s, however, it was the Chinese who were Cambodia's 
largest ethnic minority. Most Chinese were involved in commerce, including 
roles as shopkeepers, moneylenders, and rural processors for industries 
such as fishing (Willmott, 1967). By 1967, there were 170 Chinese schools in 
Cambodia. The Chinese press in Cambodia had also expanded after 
independence: 'by the 1960s, Chinese newspapers greatly outnumbered the 
Khmer and French language papers, and were the most widely distributed in 
Cambodia' (Edwards, 2009: 199).
Politically, the Cambodian government had adopted a 'neutral' stance in 
relation to the Cold War politics of the time (i.e. Cambodia had not aligned 
with either the Soviet or Western bloc), and was courting both the West and 
China. In 1958 the Chinese offered to protect Cambodia from Vietnam, 
whilst Cambodia agreed to the 'one China' policy, closing the Taiwanese 
embassy in Phnom Penh (Richardson, 2010). Cambodian Prime Minister 
Sihanouk met many times with both Mao Zedong, Chairman of the
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Communist Party of China, and Zhou Enlai, the Premier of China: 
'cultivating] a profound, friendly relationship with different generations of 
Chinese leaders' (Long, 2009:5). Richardson (2010:39) says that until 1965, 
'the leaders on both sides of the relationship appear to have looked for every 
opportunity to meet, exchange telephone calls, or otherwise publicly praise 
one another.' At this time, Cambodia was also courting the West. The US was 
giving large amounts of aid to Cambodia as a means to ensure Cambodia did 
not side with the Communists, and whilst Sihanouk 'criticized the Americans 
... they aided his economy and his army’ (Osborne, 2008:125). The French 
were also disbursing aid to Cambodia during this time with Sihanouk under 
the misguided belief that France could prove protector for Cambodia in the 
face of the Vietnam War (Osborne, 1984).
However, the relationship with both China and the West was to change 
dramatically from 1970 as Cambodia was thrown into political turmoil and 
eventually civil war. In 1970, Lon Nol overthrew Prime Minister (and former 
King) Sihanouk in an American backed coup, and established himself as 
leader of Cambodia. The Americans were backing Lon Nol in an attempt to 
stop the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. This move drew Cambodia 
inextricably into the Vietnam War as the US bombed both the communist 
Viet Cong and Khmer Rouge Cambodian hideouts. Between 1969 and 1973, 
550,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Cambodia by the US, and nearly 
half the population were uprooted becoming refugees (Mysliwiec, 1988). 
The Lon Nol coup caused, in turn, China to pull out of Cambodia entirely. 
However, China continued to support Sihanouk and recognise the Royal 
National Union Government of Kampuchea who were in exile in China. 
Sihanouk was given a residence in Beijing from which to continue 
diplomatic relations with China as the head of Cambodia's government 
(Richardson, 2010). The Royal National Union Government of Kampuchea 
included not just Sihanouk, but also Pol Pot, who was to go on to lead the 
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Pol Pot considered himself a student of Mao and 
was greatly influenced by the Cultural Revolution and 'Great Leap Forward' 
that Mao was implementing during the 1960s in China.
In 1975, the Khmer Rouge seized Phnom Penh and forced the evacuation of 
all its citizens. The Khmer Rouge were to be in power in Cambodia for the 
next four years. When the Khmer Rouge seized Phnom Penh, the US, French 
and other foreign embassies, including that of the Soviet Union, were shut 
down and all expatriates (other than Chinese expatriates) were forced to 
leave the country as Cambodia closed its doors to the international 
community. They were not to return until the early 1990s. China, however, 
continued to provide support to Cambodia throughout the Khmer Rouge 
period:
... the Chinese government in Beijing was to be Democratic 
Kampuchea’s most important supporter, sending hundreds of 
advisors to Cambodia. China maintained its support for the Khmer 
Rouge both throughout the entire period of the Pol Pot regime, and 
afterwards through the 1980s as its remnants fought a guerrilla war
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against the new Vietnamese-supported regime in Phnom Penh 
(Osborne, 2008:145].
During the Khmer Rouge period the country was devastated - with between 
one and two million Khmers dying from disease, hunger, hard labour or 
execution as Pol Pot attempted to implement his vision of an agrarian utopia 
(Kiernan, 1996; Mysliwiec, 1988]]:
The country, by 1979, had no currency, no markets, no financial 
institutions and virtually no industry. There was no public transport 
system; no trains ran and the roads were damaged and unrepaired. 
There was no postal system, no telephones and virtually no 
electricity, clean water, sanitation or education' (Mysliwiec,
1988:11].
It is estimated that during this time, the numbers of Chinese in Cambodia fell 
from 400,000 to 200,000 as Chinese migrants, along with native Khmers, 
were persecuted for being urban merchants (Edwards, 2009].
In 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and installed a pro- 
Vietnamese/communist government. As a result China withdrew its support 
from Cambodia. The US and ASEAN also refused to recognise the new 
government in Cambodia and/or lend support to Cambodia due to the 
communist nature of the Vietnamese government. Cambodia became 
isolated from the rest of the world and was forced to rely almost entirely on 
Vietnamese and Soviet support for its massive reconstruction effort. During 
this period China continued its support of the Khmer Rouge. The US also 
supported the Khmer Rouge alliance at this time, in a bid to halt Vietnamese 
and Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia. The Khmer Rouge were even given a 
place at the UN as a result of support from China and the West: 'Vietnam and 
the PRK were shunned as international pariah's while Pol Pot's sinister 
entourage basked in the sun of international recognition (Tully, 2005:217]. 
In 1989, the Vietnamese withdrew from Cambodia. This left Cambodia 
economically unstable and led to the subsequent Paris Peace Accords (1991] 
and UNTAC period (1992-1993] which saw both the West and China re­
establish their relationship with Cambodia (which is discussed in more 
detail in the following chapters].
Government, governance and politics
Since the UNTAC period of 1992-1993 and the UN sponsored elections of 
1993, Cambodia has officially been a democracy. It is a multi-party state 
operating within the framework of a constitutional monarchy, meaning the 
King still reigns but does not have the power to govern (Slocomb, 2006]. In 
1985, whilst the nation was still under Vietnamese control, Hun Sen was 
confirmed as the nation's Prime Minister. Hun Sen is leader of the 
Cambodian People's Party (CPP] and is still Prime Minister today. He has 
consolidated his power over time, and today it could be said: 'Hun Sen 
presides in a regal manner over everything that happens in Cambodia; like
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many kings, he has no respect for pluralism, an independent judiciary or the 
separation of powers' (Chandler, 2010:229].
Hun Sen's government has had changing policies towards both China and 
the West. In a 1988 essay, Hun Sen named China the 'root of all that was evil 
in Cambodia' (Marks, 2000). However, by the mid-2000’s, Hun Sen had done 
an about-turn and in 2006 publically named China as 'Cambodia's most 
trustworthy friend' (BBC News, 2006). Cambodia has subsequently 
publically thanked China for maintaining neutrality and not interfering in 
Cambodia's internal affairs (Long, 2009). This change in attitude has 
corresponded with increased aid and investment from China. Evidence of 
the Hun Sen government's attitude towards China is also reflected in the 
increasing freedom ethnic Chinese in Cambodia have today to express their 
views and culture. Today there are at least two Chinese language 
newspapers in Cambodia, a proliferation of Chinese schools and numerous 
Chinese associations:
The past five years has seen a massive renaissance of Chinese 
cultural identity across Cambodia. The Association of Chinese 
Nationals in Cambodia (ACNC) now has branches in every province, 
whilst numerous districts and some villages have formed their own 
Chinese Association (Edwards, 2009: 211).
Van and Sokmady (2009:269) go on to say 'Chinese people have integrated 
easily into Cambodian society, even customising some Khmer cultural 
practices into Chinese rituals, yet they are still working to keep alive their 
identity, language and traditions.'
The West, in contrast to China, is often criticised by Hun Sen. This criticism 
of the West appears to have increased as China's aid and investment also 
increases. (Chandler 2010:230). For example, in 2006, Hun Sen was quick to 
point out that aid from the traditional donors was only $1 million more than 
China’s aid but that China's aid did not come 'laden with conditions' like 
traditional aid (Perlez, 2006). In 2008, Hun Sen criticised the UNATC period 
for bringing only AIDS to Cambodia: 'The most UNTAC left in Cambodia was 
the AIDS disease. They spent $2 billion, but when they left, the Cambodian 
factions were still fighting each other' (KI media, 2008). And in 2009, Hun 
Sen criticised western donors for the conditions attached to their aid: 'On 
several occasions [in 2009], Hun Sen attacked Western donors for their 
unsolicited advice about governance, impunity, corruption, and human 
rights' (Chandler, 2010:230). Nonetheless, the Cambodian government is 
careful not to go too far with its criticisms and still pays at least lip service to 
the West, projecting a semblance of liberal democracy tailored to western 
donors: 'senior ministers ... are fluent in the jargon of good governance and 
sustainable development' (Global Witness, 2007:10).
These changing attitudes towards both China and the West by Hun Sen and 
the CPP can be seen to be a function of the political culture in Cambodia. 
Cambodian politics is based on a patronage network, where deference is
Cambodia, China and the World | 48
paid to those most likely to provide security. In the past it was the West who 
provided security to Cambodia, but increasingly this role is falling to China 
(Weggal, 2007). Hun Sen nominally adheres to western development 
discourse and notions of democracy, good governance and strong civil 
society. However, in practice the political culture in Cambodia remains 
based on a patron-client system. In general, Cambodian political culture 
could, in fact, be seen to be more in line with Chinese political culture than 
western political culture. For example, the close ties between the judicial 
system and the government which exist in both Cambodia and China; the 
control of the government largely by a single party which is mandated by 
law in China, and the practice in Cambodia; and the tight control of civil 
society which is expressed in both China and Cambodia through regulation 
of NGO activity and other such measures: 'Various studies of China's political 
culture have identified a number of features that are not conducive to 
collective action and civil society activism. These include elitism, fatalism, 
and lack of cooperative spirit and group solidarity' (Lu, 2005:6).
Patronage is important to Cambodia (and indeed Southeast Asia generally) 
and has a long history. At one level, patronage might mean poor rural 
villagers pledging their loyalty to wealthy or powerful local people (or 
patrons). These patrons, in turn, use their influence and resources to help 
clients protect their security. However, in Cambodia the patronage system is 
not restricted just to the local level, but occurs throughout all levels of 
relationships in Cambodia. For example, within government, Ear (2009a) 
points out that intra-elite patronage systems run both vertically and 
horizontally across and within ministries. This patronage system also occurs 
between business and government:
Alongside the concentration of personal power in the hands of this 
narrow group of formal office-holders, in recent years larger 
numbers of Cambodian businessmen have been establishing 
connections with the government. Known as ‘khnorng' (literally,
'back' in Khmer and indicating backing from powerful patrons), 
government officials see such connections as a mechanism for 
eliciting gifts from businessmen, both for personal enrichment and 
from which to make party contributions during election periods (Ear, 
2009b:2).
This strong patronage network and historic ties to the patron-client system, 
are often cited as one explanation for the relatively weak democracy in 
Cambodia:
The 1993 United Nations-sponsored elections were intended to 
create a new state in Cambodia following the installation of a 
framework for constitutional democracy. However, given the deep- 
rooted existence of patron-client networks, a new state characterised 
by independent institutions has never taken root (Un, 2006:229).
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Un goes on to talk of the 'hybrid democracy’ that has arisen in Cambodia as a 
result:
a 'hybrid' democracy has evolved in Cambodia in which elections are 
regularly held and internationally endorsed. However, there are 
inherent defects beneath the façade of free and fair elections that 
result from the domination of the electoral arena by a single political 
party -  the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) (Un, 2005:203).
Slocomb (2006:392) says that 'on more than one occasion CPP leaders have 
referred to the democratic process as a sports game', highlighting the ruling 
party disregard for the notion of democracy. As Ojendal and Lilja (2009) say, 
the problem with democracy in Cambodia is that it suffers legitimacy 
problems as a result of being an arrangement born of an external 
intervention. That is, the traditional form of government in Cambodia is not 
democratic and never has been -  this is indeed a western idea which has 
been imposed on Cambodia - thus the government tends to pay democracy 
lip service in order to keep western donors happy, rather than believing in 
its fundamental principles. China, in contrast to the West, is not interested in 
imposing democractic principles on Cambodia preferring to work within the 
existing political culture in Cambodia.
Intrinsic within this patronage system is corruption, as patronage networks 
are based on 'gifts' of money. Western donors in Cambodia are interested in 
promoting good governance and anti-corruption measures in Cambodia, 
however it is corruption that forms the backbone of much of Cambodia's 
political culture. According to Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index, Cambodia is particularly corrupt with levels of corruption 
on the increase. Cambodia's transparency rating has dropped from 130 out 
of 158 in 2005 -  the first year it was ranked -  to 158 out of 180 in 2009. 
Global Witness (2007; 2009) has also highlighted this corruption in two 
damning reports on Cambodia's logging and extractive industries. Patronage 
in Cambodia goes not only hand in hand with corruption, but has also meant 
one of the largest bureaucracies in the world:
These patronage systems have prompted continual expansion of the 
number of positions in government, from one election to the next - 
creating an entire Senate in 1999, and the largest cabinet in the 
world, comprising one Prime Minister, seven Deputy Prime Ministers, 
15 Senior Ministers, 28 Ministers, 135 Secretaries of State and at 
least 146 Under-Secretaries of State, in 2003 (Ear, 2009b:2).
According to Sjoberg and Sjoholm (2006), patronage and corruption sit 
alongside the lack of transparency and the silencing of political opponents. 
Again, this is much more similar to Chinese political culture than the West's. 
Hun Sen certainly seems preoccupied with the elimination of opposition or 
perceived threats to his power (Slocomb 2006), as can be seen by the fact 
that ordinary citizens are afraid to speak out: 'in the current political climate 
... those who speak out against abuses are threatened or attacked' (Global
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Witness, 2007:89). As a result of this fear of speaking out, civil society in 
Cambodia is still considered weak. This has been particularly so since the 
early 2000s, when the government's willingness to tolerate demonstrations 
and public protests lessened considerably (Hughes, 2007a). However, 
despite the weakness of civil society there are, in fact, hundreds of NGOs 
operating in Cambodia although this can be seen to be more the result of the 
influence of traditional donors in Cambodia rather than the strength of civil 
society. The majority of NGOs in Cambodia are sponsored by international 
donors and/or speak the language of international civil society:
... in Cambodian politics, it is international organizations promoting 
neo-liberal approaches to governance, rather than any potentially 
radical transnational 'civil society' networks, that have determined 
the new sites and modes of political participation in post-UNTAC 
Cambodia (Hughes, 2007b: 835).
The Cambodian government has in recent years, threatened to curtail the 
activities of these NGOs which tend to advocate for governance reforms, 
anti-corruption measures, and human rights. For example, since 2008, there 
has been a proposed law on the table in Cambodia that will regulate NGOs 
and restrict their activities.
Economy, trade and investment
Since the re-emergence of Cambodia onto the global stage in the early 
1990s, Cambodia's economy has shown remarkable growth. With the 
opening up of the economy in the 1990s came increased foreign investment 
including increased trade volumes (both exports and imports) to and from 
the country; and increased foreign direct investment, with the economy 
growing at around 10% per year between 2004 and 2007 alone (ADB, 
2009). This growth has occurred on the back of integration into the global 
economy, the encouragement of both local and foreign investment, and the 
privatisation of state assets (Chap, 2010).
Today both China and the West have significant economic interests in 
Cambodia. For example, many of the big cooperations such as woodchip 
factories and beer factories in Cambodia are owned and run by Chinese. 
According to a Chinese member of the Cambodian Chamber of Commerce, 
80% of the Cambodian economy is controlled by the Chinese (Edwards, 
2009). This point is expanded upon by Long (2009:9) who says 'Cambodians 
with Chinese ancestral connection enjoy substantial support from this 
overseas web in establishing their trading activities'4. Burgos and Ear 
(2010:638) conclude that 'economically, Cambodia and China will always 
maintain a symbiotic relationship, owing to the large number of Chinese-
4
Although it must be noted that not all Chinese in Cambodia have links back to China or to the ethnic Chinese 
tycoons in Phnom Penh. Edwards (2009:223) points out that both Cambodians themselves as well as international 
organisations in Cambodia such as the UN, often erroneously stereotype ethnic Chinese in Cambodia ‘as 
universally wealthy and powerful’ (Edwards, 2009:223).
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Cambodians.’ However, it is not just China that has an interest in the 
Cambodian economy, the West is also involved in the Cambodian economy. 
For example, the US is one of Cambodia's largest export markets, and third 
largest source of FDI to Cambodia. A further example of the current high 
level of western activity in the Cambodian economy is that fact that the 
economy is heavily dollarized: the dollar and riel can be used 
interchangeably and the dollar is used for almost all transactions over a 
certain value.
The growth of the Cambodian economy has largely been prefaced to date on 
three main industries - the garment industry, tourism and construction. The 
garment industry accounts for around 14% of Cambodia's GDP and is the 
number one source of investment funds to Cambodia (Ear, 2009b). The 
garment industry in Cambodia is dominated by Chinese. Burgos and Ear 
(2010) estimate that there are around 3,000 Chinese-registered companies 
operating in the garments and textiles field in Cambodia. Garments also 
form Cambodia's largest export market (90% of all exports), with the United 
States being Cambodia's largest importer, followed by Israel and Germany 
(ADB 2009). Imports to Cambodia, by contrast, come largely from the 
region, with the largest number of imports coming from Thailand, followed 
by China and Vietnam (ADB, 2009).
Another source of finance for the Cambodian economy is Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). Since 1994, Cambodia has encouraged Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) to the country, becoming a full member of the World 
Trade Organisation in 2004. In the 1990s, around 50% of FDI to Cambodia 
came from ASEAN nations, 20% from OECD and 25% northeast Asia (ADB, 
2006). Today, however, the majority of FDI to Cambodia comes from China 
followed by South Korea and the United States. Most FDI to Cambodia is 
concentrated in the garment sector. The country's largest foreign direct 
investment project to date, however, is the Chinese Koh Kong seacoast 
development project. This project was approved in 2008 at a cost of $3861 
million (Tong and Hem, 2010).
This surge of Chinese investment to Cambodia has been a cause of concern 
for the media, civil society and some academics, much in line with the 
concern expressed at Chinese aid to Cambodia -  as is discussed in depth in 
the next few chapters. Concerns raised in regard to Chinese investment 
include the fact that the numbers of Chinese migrants to Cambodia may 
increase sharply:
Accompanying the flood of Chinese trade and investment is a deluge 
of Chinese migrants, especially from Guangdong and Fujian 
provinces. Observers estimate the number of recent Chinese 
migrants to Cambodia to be anywhere from 50,000 to 300,000 - exact 
figures, they say, are impossible to get because of the inaccessibility 
of Cambodia's many remote provincial areas. With the recent 
development of roads linking the two countries through Laos, speedy
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bus trips between Yunnan and Cambodia open the way for Chinese 
laborers and hawkers to move south (Fullbrook, 2006:).
Other fears include that Chinese investment in Cambodia is simply a means 
by which to protect its own security interests (Burgos and Ear, 2010; 
Mydans, 2009); and that Chinese investment in Cambodia (particularly 
hydropower) threatens natural resources and local communities (e.g. see 
Ek, 2008; Middleton, 2008).
However, despite the fact that China is the largest investor in Cambodia, 
they are not the only large investor. South Korea and the United States are 
the second and third largest sources of approved FDI to Cambodia (Tong 
and Hem, 2010). The level of South Korean investment is so great that The 
Asia Times (Cain, 2008a) says: 'If South Korean investors actually complete 
all the projects they have announced and launched, the once colonial Phnom 
Penh will soon come to resemble a mini version of high-rise Seoul.' 
However, in contrast to Chinese investment, there has been little overt 
criticism of South Korea's investment, or investment from the West for that 
matter. For example, in the media, FDI from countries other than China 
tends to be buried in the business pages of international broadsheets and 
negative consequences of FDI tend to be blamed on the investment climate 
and/or the actions of the Cambodian government. For example, a report 
from The Guardian (Levy and Scott-Clark, 2008) named 'Country for Sale' 
talks about foreign investment and the buying up of all Cambodia's land - 
but rather than blame this on the countries buying the land, blame is laid at 
the feet of the Cambodian government for allowing it to occur. Alternatively, 
the investment conditions within Cambodia are blamed for any issues 
arising, rather than the source of FDI when it comes to non-Chinese 
investment:
Beyond the problems of attracting foreign capital, businesses here 
say they are confronted with numerous local barriers, the most 
frequently cited being the extremely limited access to domestic 
capital, and high transportation and electricity costs (Marks, 2010).
In 2005, oil and gas reserves were found off the Cambodian coast. This has 
also attracted foreign interest in the Cambodian economy and has the 
potential to greatly increase the amount and diversity of foreign investment 
in the country. Similarly, the prospect of mineral extraction in inland areas 
of Cambodia has recently attracted much investment attention both inside 
and outside Cambodia. The oil reserves alone could earn the government 
between $1 billion and $2 billion annually in revenue (Rutherford et al, 
2008). Potential revenue from mining is unclear due to a lack of 
transparency on behalf of the Cambodian government, but in 2006 alone, 
the government approved $403 million worth of investment in mining 
(Global Witness, 2009). Civil society, the media and international 
development agencies have pointed out the potential negative consequences 
to Cambodia of investment in these resources if they are mismanaged:
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Rather than using these millions to lift its people out of poverty, 
Cambodia’s government could instead continue to follow the example 
of neighbouring Burma, where an autocratic elite uses the money 
generated form the country's natural resource wealth to rule over an 
impoverished majority with little regard for their welfare or rights 
(Global Witness, 2009:11].
Nonetheless there has been widespread local and international interest in 
developing these resources. Interested foreign parties to the oil and gas 
reserves have included the US, South Korea, Thailand, China and Australia: 
'The prospect of oil riches has sparked off a 'black gold' rush involving 
American, Australian, Chinese, Indonesian, Japanese, and Korean companies, 
all battling for potentially lucrative rights' (Global Witness, 2009:11]. 
Currently Chevron (a US company] has done the most exploration of their 
block. Exploratory mining licences for gold, bauxite and other minerals have 
gone primarily to South Korean, Chinese and local firms (Rutherford et al, 
2008] but also to Australian, French and US companies (Um, 2008]. Each 
company pays $50,000 for a licence, although some companies appear to 
pay more (Global Witness, 2009].
However, despite the fact that many foreign countries are involved in oil, gas 
and mineral exploration most critiques towards the investing countries 
themselves tend to be reserved for China (e.g. see Rutherford et al, 2008; 
Lazarus, 2009]:
The rush of foreign countries whose oil companies have staked 
claims includes China, which controls one of the six potential fields in 
the gulf. China has become Cambodia's biggest commercial investor, 
its biggest aid donor and its hungriest consumer of raw materials, 
pushing ahead with major hydropower and road-building projects 
(Mydans, 2007].
Recently, the Australian owned BHP Billiton was accused of bribery in 
relation to bauxite exploration rights in Cambodia however, this was not 
reported in the media, as a blight against Australia's name, but rather a 
problem with BHP itself, or of the Cambodia government: '[this issue] 
underlined the caution needed in dealing in some developing countries' 
(Durie, 2010]. This is in contrast to the standard reaction when China is 
involved -  that is to blame China itself, rather than Chinese firms or the 
Cambodian government.
Nonetheless, irrespective of the level of foreign involvement in the 
Cambodian economy, it is important to note at this point that Cambodia 
remains one of the world's least developed countries, with an estimated GDP 
per capita in 2009 of US$775. Cambodia is still predominately an agrarian 
economy. Until recently, 80% of the labour force were farmers, although by 
2006 this figure had dropped to just under 60% as labourers moved into the 
manufacturing, construction and tourism industries (Tong and Hem, 2010]. 
Inequality is rife, with economic development being highly concentrated in a
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few metropolitan areas. Rapid economic growth is clearly evident in Phnom 
Penh:
In Phnom Penh, dramatic new skyscrapers are under construction, 
along with vast housing developments and shopping malls. The 
traffic at rush hour is regularly gridlocked as the new wealth 
spawned by increases in land values finds its way into Toyota and 
Lexus salesrooms (Hughes, 2009: 209].
However, this growth is not so evident in rural areas where most of the poor 
are located: 'What appeared as a bonanza for rich tycoons and for the 
moderately landed middle classes took the form of increased vulnerability 
and desperately high food prices for the poor' (Hughes, 2009a:209). 
According to Hughes (2009a], inflation rose 26% in the first half of 2008 
alone. It is also necessary to note at this point that the economy and the 
provision of social services are also still both heavily dependent on aid with 
at least half of the annual national budget funded from foreign sources 
(Slocomb, 2006]. This is discussed in more detail in Chapters Five and Six.
Summary
This chapter has set out to provide some background to the case study for 
this thesis -  that of Cambodia. It has analysed the history, politics and 
economy of Cambodia with specific reference to the links between 
Cambodia, China and the West. The main findings of this chapter are that 
Cambodia has had a long and varied history with China based on trade, 
tribute and migration. By contrast, Cambodia's relationship with the West is 
much more recent, beginning with the period of French colonisation and 
culminating in the UNTAC period and current presence of many western 
donors today in Cambodia. Politically, Cambodia can be seen to have more in 
common with China than the West especially in regard to the political 
culture of patronage, the dominance of one political party and the 
suppression of civil society; however nominally, Cambodia is a democracy 
with values based on western ideas such as good governance, sustainability 
and human rights. In terms of the economy, Cambodia is integrated into the 
global economy and relies on both China and the West for both trade and 
foreign direct investment.
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Chapter Five: Western Aid
to Cambodia
This chapter explores western, or 'traditional' aid to Cambodia by looking at 
the history of western aid and the culture of western aid in Cambodia. It 
explores western influence in Cambodia from the period of French 
colonisation and argues that the traditional aid donors, particularly since the 
UNTAC period, have come to dominate the aid landscape in Cambodia and 
consequently have created an aid culture in Cambodia dominated by the 
OECD-DAC consensus. Whilst traditional aid to Cambodia has certainly led 
to some positive outcomes - for example, increased life expectancy and 
economic growth - aid to Cambodia has also been critiqued for not 
achieving stated goals such as good governance and anti-corruption 
measures, poverty reduction and effective natural resource management.
Aid History
French colonisation: 1863-1953
Formal aid to Cambodia from the West did not begin until after 
independence in 1953. However, western influence over Cambodia began 
before this with the period of French colonisation: the first ever sustained 
western presence in Cambodia. The nineteenth century was the height of 
French colonialism and during this time, Cambodia became a French colony. 
The French were keen to stake a claim in Southeast Asia to both counter the 
British influence in Thailand and Burma; and to explore the opportunities 
the Mekong River might present for trade (Osborne, 2000). By 1859, France 
has seized Saigon and had Cambodia in its sights. During the mid-1800s, 
there was a struggle for power in Cambodia for the right to be King. It was 
during this period that Cambodian King Norodom signed a treaty with 
France, and thus in 1863 Cambodia became a French protectorate (Osborne, 
1984). By 1887 Cambodia had become a fully integrated part of French 
Indochina: an artificially constructed region made up of present day 
Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos.
The French colonisation of Cambodia is generally regarded as having had 
both positive and negative effects upon Cambodia. The French were 
responsible for imposing taxes, building transport infrastructure such as 
railways and roads, land reforms, building of provincial cities, and 
bureaucratic institutions (Ross, 1987). The colonial period in Cambodia also 
saw for the first time the export of agricultural commodities, principally rice 
and high quality rubber. Mabbett and Chandler (1995:233) claim that
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'French colonialism was a relatively painless affair. From a Cambodian 
perspective its advantages probably outweighed its defects.' Cambodia 
enjoyed continuous peace for the first time in centuries and its land was 
protected from more powerful neighbours. Others are more critical of this 
period. 'Cambodia was to be reformed irrespective of the wishes of its 
inhabitants, who were viewed as an inert background to events, not as 
participants in them' (Tully, 2005:vii). Implicit in this was the idea of mission 
civilisatrice or the 'civilising mission' whereby 'Europeans bore a 
responsibility to bring civilisation to the uncivilised' (Aldrich, 1996:92}. 
According to Osborne [1984], the French saw Cambodia as 'theirs', thus they 
were present as colonisers for 'their' own benefit. For example, the French 
saw nothing wrong with allowing Vietnamese immigration into Cambodia to 
staff the rubber plantations and form the civil service despite the effect this 
would have on Cambodian national identity.
Nonetheless, whether French colonisation was positive or negative for 
Cambodia, it did leave a lasting legacy which is still evident today. From a 
geopolitical viewpoint we can see that France was integrating Cambodia 
both into the regional and global economies through colonisation. It was 
also imposing European ideals and values upon Cambodia for the first time. 
Conversely France was also painting a picture of Cambodia and Cambodians 
to those outside it, as a nation to be 'civilised'. Today in Cambodia some of 
these lasting legacies remain, in the aid money France gives to Cambodia, in 
the French institutions that still exist in the country today, even in the 
architecture and layout of Phnom Penh today. Thus began Cambodia's 
substantive relationship with the West. This was a relationship of coloniser 
and colony, as opposed to donor and recipient, nonetheless, it is important 
to consider this period as it paved the way for western interest in Cambodia 
and part of today's western 'claim' on Cambodia.
The 'golden age': 1953-1975
Aid as we know it today, did not become a major part o f Cambodia's 
economy and development until after independence in 1953. Cambodia did 
receive small volumes of military aid in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
Chandler (2008) says that between 1948 and 1949 the French sought 
military aid from the US to counter communism in Indochina. In 1950, the 
US initiated a program of economic aid to Indochina (including Cambodia}: 
'in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to 
pursue their peaceful and democratic development' (US Department of 
State, 1950:370}. Nonetheless, it was not until independence that Cambodia 
saw the sustained influx of aid and its associated structures, institutions and 
power relations.
Cambodia achieved independence from France in 1953. The period 1953 to 
1970 is often referred to as a 'golden age' in Cambodia's recent history 
(Osborne 2008:129}. Sihanouk was in power, Cambodia was at peace and 
the country was doing relatively well economically (Osborne 2008}. The 
French influence was still strong, as Osborne (2008:129) says: 'In Phnom
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Penh the French seemed to be everywhere, their presence symbolized by 
the fact that Sihanouk's doctor was a French army colonel.' He goes on to say 
that the French trained the Cambodian military, they educated the 
Cambodian elite, they presided over the large rubber plantations and they 
dominated Cambodia's cultural institutions. However, this period was also 
the height of the Cold War and a time of increasing tension and conflict in 
the region between the United States, China and Vietnam. The geopolitics of 
the period influenced the volume, structure and culture of aid. During the 
first few decades of independence, large volumes of aid were being received 
by Cambodia from the West, from China and from the Soviet Union as 
Cambodia, despite asserting its neutrality, became increasingly involved in 
the wider geopolitics of the Cold War.
One of the largest donors to Cambodia at this time was the United States. A 
US mission to Cambodia was set up in 1954 (Vachon 2004). The initial US 
aid program consisted of development aid, but also a large proportion of 
military aid (Ross, 1987). By the early 1960s, 'US aid accounted for about 
30% of Cambodia's police and military budget, about $12 million a year' 
(Rinaldo 1997). Marsot (1969) says that US aid to Cambodia between 1955 
and 1963 was up to $340 million. Other countries, such as France and Japan 
were also disbursing aid during this period but the amounts they were 
pledging were small compared to the US pledges (OECD 2010). Osborne 
(2008) says that the US drove much of Phnom Penh's economy from 
independence to the early 1960s.
In 1963, however, US aid was halted at the request of the Cambodian 
government. Osborne (1984) says that Sihanouk stopped this aid in order to 
avoid making Cambodia a 'client of the US' (as had happened in Laos and 
Southern Vietnam). Nonetheless Cambodia continued to receive aid during 
this period from other western nations. Cambodia received around $85 
million in aid between 1963 and 1969, with France being one of the largest 
donors (OECD-DAC 2010). According to Ross (1987) the aid structure 
during the 1960s was usually that of a joint enterprise between foreign 
interests and local participation:
to avoid the appearance of undue dependence upon foreign aid, 
Cambodia insisted upon 'project sharing', that is, participation of its 
own in specific enterprises, such as the French-sponsored oil refinery 
and truck assembly plant at Sihanoukville. This stipulation imposed 
by Phnom Penh also had the effect of holding down the scale of many 
aid projects and the amounts of loans extended to the Cambodian 
government.
In 1970, Sihanouk was deposed from power by Lon Nol. Lon Nol abandoned 
Sihanouk's supposed neutral policy and sided with the United States against 
North Vietnam. This led to a dramatic increase in aid as Cambodia became 
embroiled in the Vietnam War. In fact between 1970 and 1975, $649 million 
in western aid came into Cambodia -  the majority of this was directly from 
the US, as opposed to other western donors -  although Japan also
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contributed around $36 million and France $25 million during this time 
(OECD-DAC, 2010). Cambodia also joined the World Bank in 1970, becoming 
its 115th member (although Cambodia's first funding from the World Bank 
was not received until 1993). US aid to Cambodia peaked, as the United 
States began bombing Cambodia and Cambodia thus became a battlefield of 
the Vietnam War. According to Chandler (1993:220): 'From the beginning of 
1971 until April 1973 ... United States aid was the dominant factor in almost 
every aspect of political, economic and military affairs in Cambodia'5.
However, this era of western aid to Cambodia was soon to cease and was not 
to resume until 1991. After the Khmer Rouge seized power in 1975, western 
embassies were closed and diplomatic ties halted. During this period, 
western aid was replaced with Chinese aid (as is discussed in further detail 
in Chapter Six). During the subsequent period of Vietnamese control 
between 1978 and 1989, the US embargoed Cambodia and blocked lending 
from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian 
Development Bank. Bilateral aid from western nations was also ceased, as 
the West refused to recognise the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia. 
Instead Cambodia relied on aid from the Soviet Bloc. The United Nations did 
provide some humanitarian relief through UNBRO -  the United Nation's 
Border Relief Operation - but this was largely aimed at border camps in 
Thailand, although some did go directly to Cambodia, particularly between 
1979 and 1981 when it was estimated that $700 million in western 
humanitarian/emergency aid flowed to Cambodia (Hourn, 1998).
A limited number of UN agencies (UNICEF, WFP, FAO and UNHCD) and 
international NGOs (including Oxfam, World Vision and the American 
Friends Service Committee) maintained a small presence in Cambodia 
during the period of Vietnamese control. In fact, according to the UN, 
western NGOs came to acquire a greater comparative significance in 
Cambodia between 1979 and 1989 in the absence of major UN and western 
bilateral aid. International NGOs were involved not just in traditional 
development work such as grassroots or community based development 
activities, but also large-scale infrastructure and local and international 
advocacy activities (OSRSG-UN 1992; NGO Forum 1996; Mysliwiec, 1988). 
The enhanced role of western NGOs, and the isolation of Cambodia from 
western aid were to end in the early 1990s with the Paris Peace Accords and 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) peacekeeping 
operation. It is this era that has shaped the present day aid landscape in 
Cambodia and which is discussed in detail in the following sections.
The UNTAC period: 1992-1993
After the withdrawal of Vietnam, and the Paris Peace Accords of 1991 
(which gave the UN full authority to order a ceasefire in Cambodia), the UN 
mounted its biggest ever (at the time) operation towards peace building and
s For a more detailed account of the nature of American aid in the region at the time see Phraxayavong (2009) 
History o f Aid to Laos: Motivations and Impacts. This book focuses on aid to Laos, but there are several parallels 
with Cambodia, in particular the use of US aid to influence the politics and military strategy of the day.
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democracy in a single country. This was called the UNTAC peacekeeping 
mission and took place between 1992 and 1993. This mission was endorsed 
by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council 
(France, China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States) 
in 1990. The UNTAC operation saw the United Nations, for the first time 
ever, take over the administration of an independent member state and 
organise and run an election. It also had a mandate over military 
arrangements, civil administration, maintenance of law and order and 
repatriation and resettlement of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons. 
At its peak, UNTAC numbered over 21,000 military and civilian personnel 
from more than 100 countries. The UNTAC operation cost $1.6 billion, saw 
the election of a supposedly democratic government and the opening up of 
Cambodia onto the global stage (United Nations, 2003).
Whilst the UNTAC mission was considered a success in that it achieved its 
goal of holding democratic elections, there were also several critiques aimed 
at the operation. For instance, even though local elections were held and 
over 90 per cent of the populace voted, the actual election results were not 
upheld by the United Nations. Hun Sen (the former and current Prime 
Minister) was allowed by the UN to ignore the will of the voters in 1993 
when he refused to give up power (Osborne, 2008). UNTAC has also been 
criticised for promoting pro-western alternatives with little thought or 
consideration for the local context. For example, UNTAC could be seen as 
responsible for the dollarisation of Cambodia and the promotion of neo­
liberal economic policies such as the privatisation and reduction of state 
responsibility over basic goods and services in Cambodia (Ghosh, 2003a). 
The whole UNTAC mission itself could be seen as promoting western ideas 
around democracy and 'western assumptions regarding political conflict 
resolution’ (Roberts, 2007: 28; Hughes, 2007a) rather than allowing for local 
or alternative narratives.
Certainly the UNTAC period provided the pre-conditions for western donors 
to enter the country and to instil a certain aid culture. Cambodia went 
almost overnight from international isolation to a nation with many bilateral 
donors, multilateral donors, and international NGOs. The number of donors 
and volume of aid was disproportionate to the tiny population. Of course 
this was also a nation that had been devastated by war. In 1991 the country 
could not produce enough rice to feed itself, 80% of road bridges had been 
destroyed, only one third of Phnom Penh's water requirements could be 
met, and farmers had only 12% of the fertilizer required to grow rice 
(Hiebert, 1991a). It therefore was a nation in need of aid. However, the 
legacy of the western aid culture which began with the UNTAC period did, 
and has, extended far beyond its initial mandate:
Cambodia represented virgin territory for players of the 'aid game'. 
Unsullied by previous developmental mistakes (at least at the hands 
of Western aid practitioners), Cambodia was wide open to new 
projects, programs, and development experiments ... Aid markets are 
dynamic; the ready availability of financial resources tended to draw
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new agencies to undertake new activities or to implement the 
programs of others. Careers were to be made in Cambodia (Curtis, 
1998: 72)
Aid as a culture
This section goes on to talk about the 'aid culture' that has been created in 
Cambodia by the western donors since the UNATC period. An aid culture can 
be seen as the set of shared attitudes, values, goals and practices created by 
structures, mechanisms and policies through which aid flows. In the case of 
Cambodia, this is the shared language, committees, principles, structures, 
procedures and philosophies that the western donors have put in place 
around aid and development. For example, the western ideas and systems 
put in place to coordinate aid, the western paradigms of sustainable or 
participatory development that influence Cambodian government 
development policy, and the setting of aid agendas by western donors to 
determine how, why and where aid money should be spent. These all 
combine to form a particular aid culture. This section analyses this aid 
culture by looking at aid figures, aid coordination, development policy and 
critiques of western aid in Cambodia.
Aid figures6
There are at least thirty-three bilateral and multilateral donors providing 
aid to Cambodia. Most OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
member countries are represented in Cambodia as are the big multilateral 
agencies including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and UN 
agencies. Around 70% of Cambodia's aid comes through bilateral donors, 
the rest through multilateral donors; two thirds of this aid is in the form of 
grants as opposed to one third which is loans (Cambodian Rehabilitation 
and Development Board, 2010a). Cambodia is a member of a majority of the 
large western aid, development, trade and monetary bodies, including the 
United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian 
Development Bank, ASEAN and the World Trade Organisation.
Most of the traditional multilateral and bilateral donors not only provide 
direct aid to Cambodia, but also channel portions of their aid money through 
local and international non-government organisations. Since the UNTAC 
period, hundreds of NGOs have set up in Cambodia with the Cambodia NGO 
database (Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board, 2010b) listing 
265 international NGOs and seventy-two local NGOs as having current 
projects in Cambodia. Large international non-government organisations in 
Cambodia include Oxfam, Médecins sans Frontières, Care International and
6 The statistics used in this section have come primarily from two sources - OECD international development 
statistics online database; and the Cambodia ODA database, overseen by the Cambodian Rehabilitation and 
Development Board of the Council for the Development of Cambodia. The OECD statistics are o f higher quality, but 
report only on DAC donors. The Cambodia ODA database reports on all donors to Cambodia, but may have 
problems with accuracy relating to lack of staff training, lack of data input from donors and problems with data 
validation (Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board, 2008). All statistics in this section should be read 
keeping this in mind.
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World Vision International. Local NGOs which receive foreign aid funding 
include: NGO Forum, Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) and the 
Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC), amongst 
others. According to the Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2008  (Cambodian 
Rehabilitation and Development Board, 2008), between 1992 and 2007, 
NGOs provided around 8% of the total aid to Cambodia.
From the UNTAC period, aid disbursements to Cambodia from the 
traditional donors have been large, both in volume and per capita. In 1991, 
net disbursements from DAC donors totalled US$49.93 million; this had 
risen to $342.23 million by 1995. In 1998 many donors halted or lowered 
their aid to Cambodia as a result of the 1997 coup instigated by Hun Sen 
which was seen by members of the western aid community as a threat to the 
democratization process put in place by UNTAC (as is discussed further in 
Chapter Six) (Hughes, 2007a). However despite some drop off in the total 
levels of aid, by 2000 aid was back at around $395 million per year and by 
2009 net aid disbursements from traditional donors (both bilateral and 
multilateral) had topped $700 million (Figure 5.1). Whilst DAC aid has been 
increasing globally in recent years, as seen in Cambodia, what makes the 
Cambodian case particularly interesting is the per capita aid. In terms of aid 
as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) in Cambodia in 2006 DAC 
aid was 7.5% of GNI. This compares to an average of 3.1% for low income 
countries in general. In terms of aid per capita, in 2006 DAC aid amongst 
Asian aid receiving countries was $4.81, in Cambodia the average net aid 
receipt in 2006 was $37.26 (World Resources Institute, 2007).
Japan has been the largest bilateral aid donor to Cambodia for years, 
followed by the United States and Australia (see Figure 5.2). In fact, between 
1992 and 2007, Japan provided 20% of all aid to Cambodia according to the 
Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2008  (Cambodian Rehabilitation and 
Development Board, 2008). The Cambodia ODA database says Japan 
currently has 227 aid projects running in Cambodia. In 2008, Japan's net aid 
to Cambodia was $114.77 million, the United States was $69.78 million and 
the European Community was $37.46 million (OECD-DAC, 2010). Other 
large DAC donors to Cambodia include the Asian Development Fund (AsDF), 
the soft loans arm of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (OECD-DAC, 2010). It is important to 
note, however, in the context of this thesis, that in the last few years, China 
has become one of the biggest donors to Cambodia -  and it looks set to 
overtake Japan as the largest donor within the next few years, as is 
discussed in the following chapter.
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Figure 5.1: Total DAC aid disbursements to Cambodia 1991-2009
Figure 5.2: Overview of DAC aid to Cambodia 2006-2008
Cambodia
Receipts 2006 2007 2008
Net ODA (USD million) 529 675 743
Bilateral share (gross ODA) 72% 70% 62%
Net ODA GNI 76% 84% 8 1%
Net Private flows (USD million) 190 693 451
For reference 2006 2007 2008
Population (million) 142 144 147
GNI per capita (Atlas USD) 500 550 600
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From 1992 to 2007, the main sectors to have received aid in Cambodia 
were: governance and administration (17.5%), health (12.9%), 
transportation (11.8%) and rural development (11.3%) (see Figure 5.2). 
The four largest donors to Cambodia tend to focus on specific sectors, for 
instance, a third of US aid goes to health, the largest proportion of Japanese 
aid goes to agriculture, and the ADB focuses on education, and water and 
sanitation. The majority of NGO aid goes to health (25%), followed by 
governance (16%) and education (12%) (Cambodian Rehabilitation and 
Development Board, 2008). Technical cooperation usually represents 
around half the total aid to Cambodia (Chanboreth and Hach, 2008), 
although in the last couple of years this figure has been technically revised 
downwards as the US re-categorised its technical cooperation as 
'investment assistance'. Nonetheless, the level of technical assistance is still 
relatively high at 39% (Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board, 
2008).
It is important to note, at this point, that Cambodia also receives aid from 
non-western or non-DAC donors (as mentioned briefly above). For example, 
Cambodia receives aid from countries such as China, South Korea (a DAC 
donor only from 2009), Thailand, Kuwait and Qatar (Cambodian 
Rehabilitation and Development Board, 2010). These donors are of 
increasing importance in Cambodia not only in terms of their aid but also in 
terms of how their aid fits in with the existing aid culture in Cambodia. The 
next chapter goes on to look at one of these non-DAC donors in detail -  
China, the focus of this thesis -  and outline the history, structure and culture 
of Chinese aid to Cambodia.
Aid coordination
Aid coordination refers to the planning and procurement of aid by the 
government of the recipient nation, and the integration of this aid into 
national development goals and strategies. Aid coordination is particularly 
significant in Cambodia due to the large numbers of donors in Cambodia and 
the central role aid plays in the Cambodian economy. Since the UNTAC 
period, aid coordination mechanisms in Cambodia have been dominated by 
the traditional donors. The following section looks at aid coordination 
mechanisms in Cambodia since the UNTAC period, and the degree to which 
an aid culture has been created based on western discourse and practice 
around aid coordination.
The largest and most important aid coordination mechanism in Cambodia 
today is the annual donor/government meeting7. These meetings began in 
1992, and provide a forum for the donors and Cambodian government to 
come together to request aid, to make aid pledges, and to discuss 
development agendas. Whilst today these meetings are nominally run by the 
RGC, they have a long history of being both run and structured by western 
donors (Figure 5.3). For example, the first annual donor/government
7 I refer to these meetings as 'annual', although they are sometimes held bi-annually
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meeting was held in 1992 in Tokyo and was named the Ministerial 
Conference on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia (MCRRC). It 
ran under the co-chairmanship of Japan and UNDP and was concerned, not 
surprisingly, with achieving the mandate of the UNTAC operation, i.e. peace 
and democracy (Curtis, 1993). Between 1993 and 1995, these meetings 
were re-named the International Committee on Reconstruction of Cambodia 
(ICORC) and were held alternatively in Tokyo and Paris and chaired 
exclusively by Japan and France respectively (Hourn, 1998).
Table 5.3: Donor/Government meetings
Year Name Location Chair
1992 Ministerial Conference on 
Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction of Cambodia
Tokyo Japan/UNDP
1993-1995 International Committee on 
Reconstruction of Cambodia
Tokyo/Paris Japan/France
1996-2001 Consultative Group Tokyo/Paris World Bank
2002-2006 Consultative Group Phnom Penh World Bank/RGC
2007-2010 Cambodia Development 
Cooperation Forum
Phnom Penh RGC
Source: Author
From 1996 these meeting became known as Consultative Group Meetings. 
Consultative Group Meetings are not unique to Cambodia, but rather a 
standard format used by the World Bank in a number of aid recipient 
countries as a forum to bring together governments and donors to discuss 
such DAC-OECD policy as macroeconomic policy, good governance/anti- 
corruption and ODA effectiveness (e.g. see Vietnam Consultative Group 
meeting; Yemen Consultative Group meeting and Philippines Consultative 
Group meeting). In 2002 the location of Consultative Group meetings was 
moved from Tokyo/Paris to Phnom Penh and the meetings became co­
chaired by the World Bank and the Royal Government of Cambodia in a 
move to give 'ownership' to the RGC. After 2006, the Consultative Group 
meetings were reformatted once again to become the Cambodia 
Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF), although in practice these 
meetings are not much different to the Consultative Group meetings. Like 
previous donor/government meetings, CDCF meetings are attended by 
government, donors, NGO representatives and private sector 
representatives. The CDCF is officially chaired solely by the RGC, but the 
World Bank is still the lead donor facilitator, and is responsible, along with 
the RGC, for opening and closing remarks.
Whilst these donor/government meetings are a useful aid coordination tool 
necessary in an aid dependent country such as Cambodia, they can also be 
seen, however, to foster a culture of aid dominated by traditional models. 
For example, Consultative Group meetings are a model developed by the 
World Bank and used in numerous countries without taking into
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consideration local context. Whilst these meetings have now been 
reformatted to give the RGC more ownership, the agenda of these meetings 
is still based on traditional 'best practice' as to what 'good' development is 
i.e. good governance, anti-corruption and neo-liberal economic reform. 
Whilst non-DAC donors are invited to these meetings, to date they are not 
usually asked to contribute in terms of the agenda or speaking to agenda 
items (see CDCF agendas 2007, 2008, 2010 [Cambodian Rehabilitation and 
Development Board, 2011]): thus an aid culture based on western 
development values and practices is created and maintained.
Annual donor-government meetings can be seen as the most high profile aid 
coordination mechanism in Cambodia, however another important aid 
coordination mechanism and one which also reflects a particular aid culture 
in Cambodia are the sectoral and thematic Technical Working Groups 
(TWG). These working groups were initially set up by traditional donors 
after the 1999 Consultative Group meeting as a means to create a dialogue 
with the RGC (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2006a). They were 
significantly revised and adjusted in 2004 by the RGC following the 2003 
Rome Declaration on Harmonization. There are currently 19 Technical 
Working Groups all led by the RGC but co-lead by traditional donors (Figure 
5.4). According to the Government's Guideline on the Role and Functioning o f  
Technical Working Groups (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2007):
TWGs are intended to serve primarily as coordinating and supporting 
bodies; they are not intended to substitute for or to duplicate the 
functions of ministries and agencies. TWGs are accountable to their 
host ministries and agencies, and the TWG Chair, as the 
Government's lead representative in a TWG, is therefore the sole 
decision-making authority in the TWG.
The development sectors the working groups focus on include 'partnership 
and harmonization', 'public administrative reform' and HIV/AIDS.
Coordinating the TWGs is the Government Donor Coordination Committee 
(GDCC). This Committee was first set up in 2004, and is responsible for 
strengthening and improving aid coordination mechanisms and aid 
effectiveness. This Committee meets two to three times per year and is led 
by the RGC with support from the World Bank.
The whole GDCC-TWG mechanism, is based on DAC 'best practice' around 
aid, as can be seen through its basis in the Rome Declaration on 
Harmonisation and the following statement from the Cambodian 
Government:
Although the GDCC-TWG mechanism pre-dates the Paris Declaration 
and the OECD-DAC Guidelines, the overarching objectives of the 
mechanism are entirely consistent with these global initiatives 
(Royal Government of Cambodia, 2006a:2).
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Table 5.4: Technical Working Groups, Cambodia
T W G C h a ir /C o -C h a ir L e a d /C o - le a d  D P  f a c i l i t a t o r
A g r ic u l tu r e  a n d  w a t e r H .E. M r C h a n  T o n g  T v e s
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
H.E. M r V e n g  S a k h o n
Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology
M s M itc h e ll  K a t h e r in e
AusAID
M r le a n  R u s s e l l
FAO
D e c e n tr a l i s a t io n  a n d  d é ­
c o n c e n t r a t i o n
H.E. M r. P ru m  S o k h a
Ministry of Interior
M s. J a n e l le  P lu m m e r
World Bank 
M r. R ic h a r d  B r id le
UNICEF
E d u c a t io n H.E. Im  S e th y
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports
M r. R ic h a r d  B r id le
UNICEF
F is h e r ie s H.E. M r. N a o T h u o k
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
M r. J a c o b  K a h l J e p s e n
Royal Danish 
Embassy/DANIDA
F o o d  s e c u r i t y  a n d  n u tr i t io n H.E. M r. R a th  V ir a k
Council for Agriculture & Rural Development 
H.E. M r. N u th  C h a n s o k h a
Ministry of Planning
M r. J e a n - P i e r r e  d e  M a r g e r ie
WFP
F o r e s t r y  a n d  e n v ir o n m e n t H.E. C h h e n g  K im s u n
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
M r. Ja c o b  K a h l J e p s e n
Royal Danish 
Embassy/DANIDA
G e n d e r H.E. D r. In g  K a n th a  P h a v i
Ministry of Women's Affairs
M s. S o p h ie  B a r a n e s
UNDP
M r. Y u k ih a r u  K o b a y a s h i
JICA Cambodia Office
H e a lth H.E. M r. M am  B u n h e n g
Ministry of Health
D r. P i e t e r  JM  v a n  M a a r e n
WHO
H IV /A 1D S H.E. N u th  S o k h o m
Chair of National AIDs Authority
D r. M s. D o ra  W a r r e n
US Embassy
I n f r a s t r u c t u r e  a n d  r e g io n a l  
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Non-DAC donors do not play a role in the TWGs or GDCC. As Fitzgerald and 
Strange (2004:6] say: The practice of many donors ... is to source their 
models and expertise for Cambodia in Europe, North America or Oceania. 
[However] this may not always be the best practice, or the most cost- 
effective ....'
The government body responsible for coordinating aid in Cambodia is the 
Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC). The CDC was set up in 
1994 and consists of two operational bodies: the Cambodian Rehabilitation 
and Development Board (CRDB) and the Cambodia Investment Board (CIB). 
The Cambodian Rehabilitation Development Board is the focal point for the 
mobilisation of aid, for coordination of aid with all development partners 
(multilateral, bilateral and NGOs], and for coordination with and between 
Royal Government ministries and agencies on aid allocation and utilisation 
issues. The CRBD acts as secretariat for CDCF, GDCC and TWG meetings and 
is also responsible for the Cambodia ODA database and annual Cambodia Aid 
Effectiveness Report. The CRDB performs an important function in terms of 
coordinating aid, however rather than leading aid coordination, the CRDB 
follows the lead of the western donors. For example, following on from the 
Rome Declaration on Harmonization in 2003 at which traditional donors 
decided harmonization and alignment of aid activities was a priority, the 
CRBD was entrusted with expanding aid management information systems 
within government and becoming the secretariat to the newly formed 
Government Donor Coordination; and following on from the outcomes of the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 the CRDB was assigned the 
task of producing an annual aid effectiveness report, which is now tabled at 
all Cambodia Development Cooperation Forums.
Development policy
Whilst aid coordination contributes to creating an aid culture, so too does 
development policy. In Cambodia, official development policy is very much 
based on western development paradigms of sustainable or participatory 
development. Policy is written and endorsed by the government, but donors 
drive the policy agenda, and as such ensure a culture that is based on 
western notions of development, as seen below in the analysis of Cambodian 
development since the UNTAC period.
Prior to 1995, Cambodia's development policy was based on the idea of a 
socialist/centrally-planned economy, as summed up by the 2nd 
Socioeconomic Rehabilitation and Development Program 1991-1995. 
However, following on from the UNTAC period in Cambodia and the 
subsequent influx of DAC donors into Cambodia, new development plans 
were required that could supplement a market-led economy, as espoused by 
the western donors in both discourse and practice. Thus in 1996, the 1st 
Socio-Economic Development Plan 1996-2000 was published which set out to 
define the Government's development priorities. Whilst the plan was 
prepared by the Royal Government of Cambodia, it was done so with 
considerable assistance from the Asian Development Bank (ADB]. The plan
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identified three pillars of development: sustainable economic growth; 
sustainable human development; and sustainable management and use of 
natural resources. It also emphasised social development and direct 
targeting of vulnerable groups with a focus on 'bottom up participatory 
rural development and an outwards looking labour-intensive industrial 
development strategy, aimed at encouraging domestic and foreign 
investment in the sector' (Livingstone, 1998:207]. The emphasis of the 1st 
Socio-Economic Development Plan was very much in line with the outcomes 
of the UN-sponsored Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development in 1996 
which placed social development and social justice at the forefront of the 
global development consensus. According to Livingstone [1998] much of 
this plan also appeared to represent UNICEF influence in its emphasis on 
poverty. In 2001, the RGC introduced its 2nd Socio-Economic Development 
Plan 2001-2005. Whilst supposedly a Government-led planning document, 
this plan was funded by the Asian Development Bank and was written by an 
ADB consultant (Greenhill and Watt, 2005).
In 2003, the National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005 was introduced 
by the RGC as a requirement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This 
strategy was funded by the World Bank in Cambodia; and partly written by 
one of the World Bank's own consultants (Greenhill and Watt, 2005]. The 
International Monetary Fund requires a country to have a national poverty 
reduction strategy to ensure continued funding. According to the IMF 
website (International Monetary Fund, 2010]:
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs] are prepared by member 
countries in broad consultation with stakeholders and development 
partners, including the staffs [sic] of the World Bank and the IMF. 
Updated every three years with annual progress reports, they 
describe the country's macroeconomic, structural, and social policies 
in support of growth and poverty reduction, as well as associated 
external financing needs and major sources of financing.
However, according to Greenhill and Watt (2005:45], PRSPs are donor- 
driven and relate little to the needs or wants of individual countries:
In some cases such as Cambodia, PRSPs have even been written by 
aid-financed foreign consultants, making 'ownership' little more than 
a donor fiction.... In short, donors own reluctance to relinquish 
ownership of their programmes has restricted the space in which 
countries can pursue their own priorities and governments can 
become more downwardly accountable to citizens.
In 2006, a new national development framework was implemented by the 
RGC - the National Strategic Development Plan 2006-20108. This replaced 
both the 2nd Socio-Economic Development Plan 2002-2005 and the National 
Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005, to become the 'single all-
8 This plan was subsequently updated to become the National Strategic Development Plan 2009-2013 after the 
2008 elections.
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encompassing RGC document for the next five years' (RGC 2005:ii). The 
introduction of this plan was an attempt by the RGC to limit the number of 
development plans it was working to. As Greenhill and Watt (2005:26] say, 
multiple development plans imposed by the traditional donors in Cambodia 
has led to a problematic aid culture of time and resource wastage and lack of 
ownership on behalf of the Cambodian government:
In Cambodia,... [there are] three separate strategic plans, all 
supposedly 'country owned': the 2nd Socio-Economic Development 
Plan (SEDPII), funded by the Asian Development Bank and written by 
one of their own consultants; the National Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (NPRS), funded by the World Bank and largely written by a 
World Bank consultant; and the UN's MDG strategy for the country. 
While the government of Cambodia is now making efforts to develop 
its own plan, amalgamating all three, the result has been a diversion 
of time and resources in a country that can scarcely afford either, and 
widespread confusion as to which document is the Cambodian 
government's guiding strategy
The new plan draws heavily on the Cambodian Millennium Development 
Goals (CMDG) implemented in 2003, which followed on from the 2000 
United Nations Millennium Declaration. Whilst goals such as ending poverty 
and hunger, and universal education and health care are useful and 
necessary for a nation such as Cambodia, the means to achieve these goals 
are imposed by traditional donors. There is little room for real input from 
the Cambodian government or consideration of alternative development 
practices.
Critiques
The following section goes on to look at some of the specific critiques of the 
aid culture in Cambodia including its donor driven nature, the fragmentation 
of aid, the reliance on technical assistance and the lack of aid effectiveness in 
areas such as good governance and anti-corruption measures. This is not to 
say that traditional aid has not achieved successes in Cambodia -  it has -  but 
rather that the specific aid culture created in Cambodia as a result of 
western discourse and practice is itself problematic.
Perhaps one of the most consistent critiques of the aid culture in Cambodia 
is that is it donor-driven. That is, western donors set the agenda and 
determine how, why and where aid money should be spent. As seen in the 
sections above, donors have a lot of influence in coordination of aid and in 
the writing and implementation of government development policy. Donors 
themselves usually acknowledge that this is the case (Hughes, 2009b). For 
example, there are few demand-driven projects in Cambodia most being 
donor-driven in both identification and design with RGC having a minimal 
say in selection of projects (Godfrey, 2002). In a specific example of the 
donor-driven agenda in Cambodia, Ear (2009a) talks of the influence donors 
have had on a public health issue in Cambodia -  that of avian influenza. In
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2008, $35 million was pledged by traditional donors to fighting avian flu. 
This was despite the fact that the threat of avian influenza in 2008 in 
Cambodia was low:
Except for a human case in December 2008, there had not been a 
single outbreak in either animals or humans since April 2007 ... 
Cambodia's epidemic waves were mild and the number of human 
cases were few compared to neighbouring countries (Ear, 2009a: 16).
Of far greater concern in Cambodia at the time in terms of public health 
were malaria and dengue fever outbreaks. Combating avian flu was a donor- 
driven agenda, motivated by donors' own concerns:
In the context of avian influenza, donors are too often motivated by 
concerns other than protecting livelihoods, just as traditional aid 
activities are often dominated by the need to tie aid to donor 
countries, avian influenza activities have been overtly focused on 
detecting and preventing pandemic as a threat to the donor countries 
themselves (Ear, 2009a:l).
This donor-driven agenda can also be seen when analysing donor 
disbursements against the RGCs own development priorities. Aid 
disbursements received from donors do not match up with the RGC's stated 
development priorities. Transportation, education and rural development 
are all rather underfunded when it comes to aid disbursements, whilst 
governance and administration; community and social; and agriculture and 
food all receive more funding than requested (Cambodian Rehabilitation 
and Development Board, 2008).
Another consequence of a donor-driven aid culture is that a high proportion 
of the best-educated local people either work for donor agencies or 
international non-government organisations; or have been assigned to 
donors' projects as counterparts. In western countries those who want to 
earn high salaries usually look to the financial services or similar industries, 
however, in Cambodia, these same people look to NGOs and aid agencies. 
This raises the price of educated labour; hinders the development of skill­
intensive production and exports; and creates a donor-driven workforce 
more beholden to the donor's agenda than anything else. Donor funding also 
eases pressure on the RGC both to increase collection of revenue and to 
raise the salaries of government employees (estimated to currently be at 45 
cents per day in Cambodia), as so many senior officials receive salary 
supplements for working as project counterparts on donor driven projects 
(Godfrey et al, 2002; Ear, 2007).
Fragmentation and lack of coordination amongst donors is also a problem 
with the traditional donor-driven aid culture in Cambodia, despite the 
supposed emphasis on aid coordination as outlined in the previous section. 
Problems with aid fragmentation include government time being taken up 
with donor meetings and reporting; proliferation of forms and formats to be
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adhered to; setting up of parallel systems; and emphasis on reporting to 
donors rather than government:
The costs of aid fragmentation in Cambodia include the 
establishment of about 100 parallel project implementation units, the 
existence of 400 donor missions, reviews, and studies per year, and 
the provision of duplicated technical cooperation and funding 
(Chanboreth and Hach, 2008:2).
As Hughes (2009b:137) points out, setting up individual monitoring systems 
and individual projects units makes it easier for donors to monitor their aid 
investment, but this makes it much harder for 'the government to link up 
various types of assistance into long term developmental strategies.'
Another critique of the aid culture in Cambodia is the high reliance on 
technical assistance. Technical assistance (or 'technical cooperation’) can be 
defined in various ways, but here it is used to refer primarily to payments to 
foreign consultants and advisors. During and immediately following the 
UNTAC period, many foreign consultants were brought into the country. The 
Khmer Rouge period in Cambodia had meant that there were very few 
professionals left in the country. However, this legacy of bringing in foreign 
consultants and thus reliance on external direction, rather than reliance on 
local experts or consideration of local conditions, has continued until today. 
In general, according to Chanboreth and Hach (2008:11), technical 
assistance does not positively impact upon development results in 
Cambodia:
Recent evidence has highlighted that TC has failed to yield the 
intended result and, in some cases, has had an undesirable impact on 
sustainable capacity development in Cambodia. In general, TC is 
poorly coordinated and supply-driven.
Greenhill and Watt (2005:22) go on to note that not only are there 
numerous overseas consultants in Cambodia, but that they are paid far more 
than their Cambodian counterparts, creating a false economy:
... in Cambodia the aid spent by donors on 700 international 
consultants in 2002 was estimated to be between US$50 and US$70m 
-  roughly equivalent to the wage bill for 160,000 Cambodian civil 
servants. In other words, donor-financed consultants working in the 
Cambodian government are paid upwards of 200 times what their 
Cambodian counterparts receive (Greenhill and Watt 2005:22).
There are also questions as to how much of this money actually stays in 
Cambodia. Godfrey et al (2002) note that at least 20% of technical assistance 
is paid to personnel not even in Cambodia and Dodd (2006) estimates that 
up to 80% of aid paid to international aid organisations in Cambodia goes 
straight out again in the form of expatriate salary packages and running 
costs.
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Aid effectiveness is also problematic in Cambodia. Since 1992, Cambodia has 
received more than $7 billion in aid money (Hughes, 2009a), mostly from 
western donors. However, Cambodia is still one of the poorest countries in 
the world, it is still aid dependent and is one of the most corrupt countries in 
the world. According to Global Witness:
Cambodia's international donor community has consistently failed to 
bring the government to book for blatant violations of its 
commitments to protect the human rights of Cambodians, fight 
corruption, and to ensure the protection of land and natural 
resources (Global Witness, 2009:54).
Corruption in Cambodia is well documented. Global Witness, in its 2009 
report Country fo r Sale outlined the high level of corruption and nepotism 
affecting allocation and management of critical public assets in Cambodia, 
whilst Ear (2007) suggests that corruption may consume as much as the 
entire aid budget each year. Gillison and Kimsong (2007) note that since 
2000, Consultative Group and Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum 
meetings have set firm benchmarks that are supposed to be met by the RGC, 
not just in relation to corruption, but also good governance clauses, judicial 
reform and land reform. Yet these benchmarks are rarely, if ever, met. 
Nonetheless, the total amount of aid from donors tends to increase each 
year, not decrease. Hughes (2009:32) points out that this lack of action on 
behalf of traditional donors when their benchmarks are not met, might suit 
both donors and the RGC alike: 'a necessary prop to neoliberal policy, in a 
context where possible alternative forms of development and politics are 
not discussed, in a conspiracy of silence that benefits elites and donors 
alike.’ Hughes goes on to talk about the western aid culture in Cambodia and 
says that:
the essential problem is not addiction on the part of recipients [to 
aid], but ideological attachment on the part of the donors to rigid and 
doctrinaire templates that cannot work in a post-conflict state on the 
periphery of the global economy (2009:8).
Lempert (2006) is rather more blunt in an article about Cambodia entitled 
Foreign Aid - Creating conditions for the next civil war saying that 'The 
international community has substituted a different kind of planning that is 
closer to treating the country like a colony or a business, in place of 
sustainable development.'
Summary
This chapter has provided a background to the existing aid culture in 
Cambodia though an historical analysis and an overview of aid coordination, 
development and critiques in Cambodia. Since the UNTAC period, when 
Cambodia moved out of international isolation, traditional donors have 
flowed into the country. They have imposed their own aid culture on the
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country -  one which involves meeting international development goals but 
one which often does not take into account local context or alternative 
development paths. A dominant aid culture has thus been created, one 
which is entrenched in the policies, institutions and structures of aid in 
Cambodia today.
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Chapter Six: Chinese 
aid to Cambodia
This chapter analyses Chinese aid to Cambodia paying particular attention 
to geopolitics and representation. It starts with an historical analysis of 
Chinese aid before moving on to look at Chinese aid today, including the 
structure of Chinese aid to Cambodia; a case study of one Chinese aid project 
-  the Kamchay dam in Kampot in Cambodia's southeast; and the 
participation of China in the existing aid structures in Cambodia.
History
The first ever disbursements of Chinese aid were in 1953. These went to the 
communist countries of North Vietnam, North Korea and Mongolia. 
However, after the Bandung Conference of 1955, China began to disburse 
aid to some of the neutral countries of Southeast Asia, including Cambodia 
(Marsot, 1969). The Bandung Conference, held in Indonesia and attended by 
both China and Cambodia, was a meeting of Asian and African nations to 
promote economic and cultural cooperation and oppose colonialism and 
neo-colonialism. China's presence at the Bandung conference was seen as 
important as it was considered, at the time, an ally of the Soviet Bloc yet its 
attendance reinforced its willingness to take a neutral stance and support 
others who also took this stance. The conference led to the rise of the 'Non- 
Aligned Movement' -  a collection of nations not formally aligned with, and 
opposed to, any major power bloc (i.e. United States or Soviet Union). 
Cambodia was part of this non-aligned movement. The first instalment of 
Chinese aid to Cambodia was thus in 1956, only three years after China's 
official aid program began: 'In June 1956, the Chinese provided Phnom Penh 
with US$22.4 million in equipment as part of an ongoing program of 
industrial economic assistance' (Ross, 1987).
According to Cooper (1976), early Chinese aid to Cambodia and other Asian 
countries, also reflected the ancient tribute relationship: 'thus he [Mao] 
looked to Southeast Asia, which had been a traditional area of Chinese 
control ...' (Cooper, 1976: 121). Historically, China's world order was based 
on the tribute system (as outlined in Chapter Three) which placed China at 
the centre of its world. The tribute system was characterised by foreign 
nations giving gifts to China in return for sovereignty and trading rights. 
This tribute system was at its peak between the mid-fourteenth and mid­
nineteenth centuries. Cooper (1976) points out that the Chinese aid system 
between 1956 and 1975 had many parallels with the ancient tribute system.
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For example, most aid agreements were signed in Peking, rather than the aid 
recipient country, signalling the importance of China in these agreements; 
important diplomatic business was carried out by Chinese officials during 
aid missions overseas, as had been the case with the tribute system; the 
granting of aid involved considerable fanfare and ritual, as had tribute 
missions; and aid missions represented exchanges of loyalty and friendship 
enhancing the prestige of ruling groups on both sides, as did ancient tribute 
missions.
Between 1956 and 1973, China disbursed $69.4 million in aid to Cambodia. 
This was 2% of China's overall aid program and was in the form of grants as 
opposed to loans (Bartke, 1975). In relative terms (the amount of aid 
compared to the population), Cambodia received more Chinese aid prior to 
1968 than any other country (Marsot, 1969). Marsot (1969) goes on to 
explain why China was so interested in disbursing aid with favourable 
conditions to Cambodia during this time. After the Bandung conference of 
1955, Sihanouk had adopted a neutralist policy for Cambodia -  that is, he 
assumed a position of non-alignment with either the western or Soviet 
blocs:
In light of subsequent events what matters is that the policy followed 
was the only sensible one and the only one capable of preventing 
Cambodia from being drawn into hot war, unlike Laos and above all 
Vietnam. Had Cambodia aligned herself completely, or even partially, 
with the Western camp under the influence of the United States, she 
would without any doubt have drawn on herself the fury and hostility 
of the Communist camp, and the flames of civil war would not have 
spared her, especially when at that time the United States was not 
ready to undertake definite commitments in Cambodia. She would 
certainly not have been given adequate protection against her two 
intimidating neighbours (Marsot, 1969:191).
According to Marsot (1969), Cambodia's neutral stance made Cambodia 
useful to China for various reasons. For example, Cambodia remaining 
neutral was an embarrassment to the US and her allies. Moreover, China also 
saw this neutralist policy as a useful example for other countries to follow - 
Cambodia could be used as a spokesperson by China as it was one of the rare 
non-Communist countries to follow such a policy and one of the few non- 
aligned countries to accept China's aid. This was particularly helpful to 
China in light of the growing discontent between China and the Soviet Union. 
As Bartke (1975:20) says:
Again we clearly see China's endeavours to befriend the non-aligned 
countries, whose advocate she aspires to be. That she is pursuing this 
course with great effect may be seen, inter alia, from the fact that the 
establishment of diplomatic relations was in many cases promptly 
followed by agreements on economic and technical cooperation 
involving aid loans.
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Finally, as Cambodia was such a small country, Chinese aid took on more 
relative importance 'nourishing Chinese propaganda and her prestige on the 
outside' (Marsot, 1969: 193). Meanwhile, on the part of Sihanouk and 
Cambodia: 'by establishing friendly relations with China without at the same 
time breaking links with the West, Sihanouk in some measure was taking 
out an insurance both for the present and the future’ (Marsot, 1969:191).
The aid China disbursed to Cambodia between 1956 and 1973 was used 
primarily for projects to aid industrialisation (namely factories), although 
substantial amounts of Chinese aid were also disbursed for other economic 
and social interests (Marsot, 1969). Bartke (1975) says, more specifically, 
that Chinese aid to Cambodia was disbursed for: factories (textile mills, glass 
plants, paper and plywood plants etc); new buildings (e.g. hospitals, Siem 
Reap airport, a teacher training college, a broadcast station etc); technical 
experts in the fields of agriculture, light industry, communications and 
transport, social institutions and the power industry; development of 
commercial plantations; and planning Cambodia's railways (Bartke, 1975). 
This compares to US non-military aid which prior to 1962 was invested 
mostly in the areas of public health, education, and agricultural 
development, although some also went to infrastructure, for example the 
United States constructed a highway linking the port of Sihanoukville to 
Phnom Penh (Ross, 1987).
The arrangements around the giving and receiving of Chinese aid to 
Cambodia, were that:
The commission in Phnom Penh is to specify the aid projects, arrange 
the preliminaries, and deal with further problems. The commission in 
Peking is to arrange substantially the preconditions for the deliveries 
(Bartke, 1975:36).
According to Marsot (1969:195) 'In the absence of a coherent and concerted 
[development] plan, China allowed the Cambodian government a free hand 
in the distribution of the sums credited to it amongst the various sectors'
Between 1970 and 1974 the nature of China's aid to Cambodia changed. 
Sihanouk was deposed as Head of State in 1970 by Lon Nol. Lon Nol became 
President of the new Khmer Republic and immediately sided with the 
United States. However, China was still on friendly terms with Sihanouk who 
fled to Beijing where he formed, in alliance with Pol Pot and the Khmer 
Rouge, a Cambodian government-in-exile - the Royal Government of 
National Union of Kampuchea (GRUNK). GRUNK was supported by China 
who gave 30 million in aid in two instalments in 1972 and 1973 (Bartke, 
1975). China had an interest in supporting Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge 
as an ally against communist Vietnam as China and the Soviet Union had 
split in 1960 when Mao 'denounced the leaders of the USSR as revisionists 
seeking to impose their domination over the rest of the bloc' (Tully, 
2005:191).
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In 1975, the Khmer Rouge seized power in Cambodia with the full backing of 
China. At this time, China, was in the last throes of the Cultural Revolution 
with the Gang of Four dominating foreign policy in China (Richardson, 
2010]9. Pol Pot, with his ultra-Maoist ideals, thus complemented ideological 
thinking in China at the time and received China's support as a result. When 
the Khmer Rouge seized power in Phnom Penh, the western donors were 
expelled from Cambodia and China became Cambodia’s only link to the rest 
of the world:
Beijing soon became its [Cambodia's] only link to the outside world 
after landing rights were re-established ... on the surface, the 
relationship seemed to proceed along familiar lines of economic and 
military aid, diplomatic niceties, and trade (Richardson, 2010:91].
China between 1975 and 1979 provided aid both in the form of military 
assistance and advisors to Cambodia. According to Chanda (2002:4], China 
offered an aid package of $1 billion to Cambodia: 'tanks, armoured 
personnel carriers, patrol boats, jet fighters, guns and thousands of Chinese 
advisers were poured into Cambodia.' Jackson (1975] also mentions an aid 
agreement of about $1 billion signed by both China and Cambodia over 
several years, although the exact amount is a mystery. Estimates of the 
number of Chinese experts in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge period 
range from 500 to 2,000 (Ross, 1975].
Whilst Richardson (2010:100] notes some unease in Beijing towards China's 
assistance to Cambodia as evidence of the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge 
became known, she also points out that for China to 'abandon the DK was 
simply not an option' as 'to leave Cambodia vulnerable to incursions - after 
two decades of trying to prevent that -  was simply inconceivable.' Chanda 
(2002:3], however, is more blunt in stating that China supported the Khmer 
Rouge primarily in an effort to maintain the independence of Cambodia 
against Vietnam:
For the next fifteen years, Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia 
was aimed at the single objective of expelling Soviet influence and 
presence from its southern border ... The principal locus of the 
struggle was Vietnam and the principal tool: China's Cambodian 
allies.
Nonetheless, despite China's support for the Khmer Rouge regime in 
Cambodia, China immediately ceased aid to Cambodia in 1979 when 
Vietnam invaded. However, China continued its support of the exiled Khmer 
Rouge in an attempt to undermine the Vietnamese government. This 
support for the Khmer Rouge meant China was now in alliance with the 
United States, who also supported the coalition of which the Khmer Rouge 
was a part in a bid to undermine communist Vietnam. In 1972, US President 
Nixon had visited China -  the first ever visit by the US to China. This visit
9 The Gang of Four were a leftist political faction of the Chinese Communist Party who came to prominence during 
the Cultural Revolution. They are often blamed for the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution.
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had begun to thaw relations between China and the West, as did the end of 
the Cultural Revolution whose political, economic, and educational reforms 
were abandoned by 1978 as China moved towards a more 'conventional' or 
western path of development.
Between 1979 and 1990, Cambodia received no aid from China or the West. 
Instead the Vietnamese-installed government in Phnom Penh was propped 
up by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)10 which 
provided up to $100 million per year in aid 'it is widely believed that the 
Soviet's fund more than 75% of Phnom Penh’s operating budget' (Hiebert, 
1991b:45). A large proportion of this aid money went to defence, although 
money was also put into rice production, rubber production, timber 
production and factory restoration (Hiebert, 1991b). China and the West 
continued to support the Khmer Rouge throughout the 1980s:
China maintained its support for the Khmer Rouge both throughout 
the entire period of the Pol Pot regime, and afterwards through the 
1980s as its remnants fought a guerrilla war against the new 
Vietnamese-supported regime in Phnom Penh (Osborne, 2008:145).
However, in 1989, with the Soviet Union on the brink of collapse, the 
Vietnamese pulled out of Cambodia, and with it went COMECON aid. At this 
time, Cambodia was in danger of economic collapse. This led to the Paris 
Peace Accords of 1991, as both China and the West quickly went to fill the 
vacuum left behind by Vietnam's withdrawal.
Chinese aid post-1991
In 1991, China, along with eighteen other parties, was signatory to the Paris 
Peace Accords which brought peace to Cambodia. This agreement also 
signified the end of economic sanctions against Cambodia by both China and 
the West. Highlighting China’s re-engagement with Cambodia was the fact 
that in 1992, the Chinese State Councillor and foreign minister visited 
Phnom Penh. A team of Chinese army engineers also joined the UNTAC 
peacekeeping force in Cambodia (Chanda, 2002). According to Chanda 
(2002:5), by the early 1990s, China in relation to Cambodia, had 'returned to 
the policies of the late 1950s, seeking to gain friendship and influence 
through political support and economic cooperation in Southeast Asia.'
However, it was not until 1997 that the modern Cambodia/China aid 
relationship was truly re-established. Prior to this point (i.e. 1992-1997), 
China was disbursing small amounts of aid to Cambodia but 1997 was a 
catalyst year in the China/Cambodia aid relationship. In July 1997, Hun Sen 
sent tanks against co-premier Prince Norodom Ranariddh in a coup attempt. 
In light of this action, western donors suspended most of their aid to 
Cambodia as a sign that they would not tolerate coups and other 
undemocratic actions. However, China did not take the same stance and in
10 COMECON was an alliance of eastern bloc nations set up by the Soviets to function like the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation (OECD). It was in existence from 1949-1991.
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August 1997, China granted $6 million in assistance to Cambodia to build 
wells, which they followed up in December 1997 by offering another $2.8 
million in military aid for jeeps and cargo trucks. At the time, China's 
Premier Li Peng told Hun Sen that China would 'never interfere in 
Cambodia’s politics' and that 'Cambodia's problems must be resolved by the 
Cambodian people [as opposed to outside nations]' [Chanda, 2002; Marks, 
2000). This was significant as traditional aid at the time [and indeed today) 
comes with many strings attached [e.g. anti-corruption clauses etc) which 
Chinese aid, superficially at least, does not.
1997 was also the year of the Asian Financial Crisis. The crisis, which began 
in July 1997, saw sharp reductions in the value of currencies and stocks 
across most of Asia, including Japan and South Korea. Whilst China was 
affected by the crisis it did not suffer as much as other Asian economies. 
Instead China played a role in assisting its Asian neighbours by providing 
over $4 billion dollars in aid, channelled both though the framework of the 
IMF and through bilateral channels [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People's Republic of China, 2000). While Cambodia was also less affected 
than other Asian nations by the Asian financial crisis due to being less 
integrated into the global economy, China's aid to Cambodia at this time 
could be viewed as part and parcel of China's commitment to provide more 
aid to the Asian region in general.
Aid figures: fact and fiction
Today China is still pledging large amounts of aid to Cambodia, with aid 
disbursements having increased steadily since 1997. However, the aid that 
China is disbursing to Cambodia is often reported by both the Cambodian 
government and western media and policy makers as being far greater than 
it actually is. This section explores China's stated aid figures to Cambodia 
and the figures as represented by the Cambodian government and western 
interests.
It is often difficult to acquire exact figures regarding China's aid program. 
This task is made difficult for several reasons: China historically does not 
release its aid figures, regarding these as a state secret; China does not 
follow ODA 'rules' around aid definitions; and, the dividing line between aid, 
trade and investment is often difficult to clarify [see Chapter Three). 
However, when it comes to Chinese aid to Cambodia, there is, conversely, 
quite a large degree of transparency. For example China has made aid 
pledges at the last three Cambodia Development Cooperation Forums and 
enters [some) of its aid projects into the Cambodia ODA database, which 
forms the basis for the Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report. These figures are 
publically available on the Cambodia Development and Rehabilitation ODA 
website as run by the Royal Government of Cambodia.
The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2010  states China is the second 
largest donor. China's average aid disbursements to Cambodia between 
2006 and 2009 averaged $89 million per year. This compares with the
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largest donor, Japan, whose average disbursements over the same period 
were $124 million per year. In recent years, China has increased its aid 
significantly with 85% of China's total aid to Cambodia being disbursed 
since 2004. Figure 6.1 shows China's disbursements to Cambodia between 
1992 and 2009 as compared to other donors. Figure 6.2 shows China's 
disbursements since 2002 as compared to DAC aid disbursements. Figure 
6.3 shows China's aid projects since 2002 as listed by China itself on the 
Cambodia ODA database. From these figures it is clear that China's aid is on 
the increase but that this is in line with that of other donors to Cambodia. It 
is also clear that China is a reasonably significant donor to Cambodia when 
looking at the period 1992 to 2010, however it is by no means the most 
significant donor, even taking into account recent increases in aid.
The figures presented above, however, differ substantially from the aid 
figures relating to China as publically announced by the Cambodian 
government or as outlined in western media and research reports. For 
example, in 2006, the western media reported that China had, in fact, 
matched the entire western aid pledge for that year, by pledging $600 
million versus $601 million pledged by the DAC donors at the Consultative 
Group Meeting (e.g. see BBC News 2006; Fullbrook 2006; Perlez 2006]. In 
2009 it was suggested by various media sources (e.g. Strangio 2010; Keating 
2009] that China had pledged $1.2 billion in aid to Cambodia. Flowever 
neither of these large sums are reflected in the sums China pledges at the 
CDCF meetings, nor in the Cambodia ODA database. For example, the aid 
disbursement reported by China for 2006 was only $52.3 million and for 
2007 $92.4 million according to the Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2008. 
Even combined this is nowhere near the $600 million reported by the 
media. These differences in China's own reporting of its aid figures versus 
media reports may partly be a problem of definitions, particularly 
distinguishing between aid and investment, but also one of representation 
both on the part of the Cambodian government and of western sources.
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Source: Author, adapted from Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2010 (Cambodia Development and 
Rehabilitation Board)
Figure 6.2: China and DAC aid disbursements to Cambodia 2004-2010
DAC donors
(including
multilaterals)
......China
Year
Source: Author, adapted from Aid Effectiveness Report 2008, 2010 (Cambodia Development and Rehabilitation 
Board)
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Table 6.3: Chinese aid projects in Cambodia 2002-2010
T it le
S t a r t
D a te
C o m p le t io n
D a te B u d g e t G r a n t/ L o a n *
9 0  P u m p in g  M a c h in e s 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 5 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
CN Y
G
P r e s e n t  K r o m  S a m d e c h  E u v  w ith  c o n s t r u c t io n  
m a c h in e r y
2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 1 2 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0  U SD G
P r o v id e  1 5 0 0  e x t e n s io n  m e t e r s  o f  Z B 2 0 0  b e r e t  
s t e e l  b r id g e s
2 0 0 2 2 0 0 5 7 5 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
CN Y
G
P r o v id e  g o o d s  s u p p ly  to  t h e  K r o m  S a m d e c h  E u v 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
CN Y
G
1 5  U n its  o f  E q u ip m e n t  fo r  R o a d  R e h a b i l i t a t io n  a n d  
M a in te n a n c e
2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 6 , 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
CN Y
G
2 0  u n its  o f  e x c a v a t o r s 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 1 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
CN Y
G
4 0 0  s e t s  o f  P o l ic e  M o to r  C y c le 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 3 , 9 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
CN Y
G
P r o je c t  o f  C a m b o d ia n  H u m a n  R e s o u r c e s  T r a in in g 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 4 5 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0  U SD G
P r o v id e  t h e  R o y a l G o v e r n m e n t  o f  C a m b o d ia  w ith  a  
g r a n t  o f  U SD  5 0 , 0 0 0
2 0 0 4 2 0 0 4 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0  U SD G
R e h a b i l i t a t io n  p r o je c t  o f  t h e  N a tio n a l  R o a d  N o .7 o f  
C a m b o d ia  f r o m  K r a t ie  to  T r a p e a n g  K r ie l
2 0 0 4 2 0 0 7 6 0 , 9 8 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
U SD
L ( 2 % )
R e h a b i l i t a t io n  p r o je c t  o f  t h e  N a tio n a l  R o a d  N o .7 o f  
C a m b o d ia  f r o m  K r a t ie  to  T r a p e a n g  K r ie l
2 0 0 4 2 0 0 7 2 , 4 3 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
U SD
G
S u r v e y  o f  R e h a b i l i t a t io n  o f  O ff ic e  B u ild in g s  a n d  
L ib r a r y  o f  S e n a t e  o f  C a m b o d ia
2 0 0 4 2 0 0 4 4 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0  U SD G
S u r v e y  o n  t h e  p r o je c t  o f  m in e r a l  e x p lo r a t io n  in  
C a m b o d ia
2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0  CN Y G
S u r v e y  o n  t h e  p r o je c t  o f  N ew  C o u n c il  o f  M in is te r s  
B u ild in g  o f  t h e  K in g d o m  o f  C a m b o d ia
2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0  CN Y G
H u m a n  R e s o u r c e  D e v e lo p m e n t 2 0 0 5 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
CN Y
G
P r o je c t  o f  N e w  C o u n c il  o f  M in is te r s  B u ild in g  o f  t h e  
K in g d o m  o f  C a m b o d ia
2 0 0 5 2 0 0 8 2 2 5 , 0 7 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
CN Y
L (N / S )
P r o je c t  o f  P u r c h a s in g  S u p p r e s s in g  S m u g g lin g  a n d  
D ru g  T r a f f i c k in g  E q u ip m e n t
2 0 0 5 2 0 0 7 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
CN Y
L ( 1 . 7 5 % )
2 0 0  P u m p in g  M a c h in e s 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 6 7 2 , 9 1 7 . 0 0  U SD G
3 0  F ir e  T r u c k s 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 6 2 0 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
CN Y
G
O n e  u n it  o f  T H SC A N  M o b ile  C o n t a in e r  S y s te m 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 6 2 0 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
CN Y
G
P r o je c t  o f  t h e  C o n s tr u c t io n  o f  G r e a t e r  M e k o n g  S u b -  
r e g io n  I n f o r m a t io n  S u p e r h ig h w a y  C a m b o d ia  
S e c t io n
2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 1 3 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
CN Y
L ( 2 % )
P r o je c t  R e h a b i l i t a t in g  th e  C h a u  S a y  T e v o d a  T e m p le  
o f  A n g k o r  in  C a m b o d ia
2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 4 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
CN Y
G
P r o v id e  G o o d s  s u p p ly  to  t h e  K r o m  S a m d e c h  E u v , 
Y e a r  2 0 0 6
2 0 0 6 2 0 0 6 2 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
CN Y
G
P r o v id e  M a t e r ia ls  fo r  E le c t io n 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 6 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
CN Y
G
P r o v is io n  o f  P r e v e n t in g  a n d  C u r in g  M a la r ia l  
M e d ic in e
2 0 0 6 2 0 0 6 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
CN Y
G
S u r v e y  o n  t h e  P r o je c t  o f  N a tio n a l  B o ta n ic a l  G a rd e n  
o f  t h e  K in g d o m  o f  C a m b o d ia
2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 3 0 ,0 0 0 . 0 0  CN Y G
C o n s t r u c t io n  o f  t h e  P r e k  K d a m  B r i d g e ( 9 7 5 m ) 2 0 0 7 2 0 1 0 2 8 , 7 8 3 , 6 6 4 . 0 0
U SD
L ( 2 % )
C o n s tr u c t io n  o f  t h e  P r e k  T a m a k  B r i d g e ( 1 0 6 0 m ) 2 0 0 7 2 0 1 0 4 3 ,5 0 3 , 6 1 9 . 0 0
U SD
L ( 2 % )
P r o je c t  R e h a b i l i t a t in g  t h e  N a tio n a l  R o a d  N o .8  f r o m  
K s a c h  k a n d a l  to  V ie tn a m  B o r d e r  ( 1 0 9  k m )
2 0 0 7 2 0 1 0 7 1 ,5 1 2 , 7 1 7 . 0 0
U SD
L ( 2 % )
P r o je c t  R e h a b i l i t a t in g  th e  N a tio n a l R o a d  N o 7 6  
J u n c t io n  o f  t h e  N R N o .7  a t  S n u o l to  S e n m o n o r o m  
M o n d o lk ir i  ( 1 2 7  k m )
2 0 0 7 2 0 1 0 5 1 ,9 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
U SD
L ( 2 % )
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Title
Start
Date
Completion
Date Budget Grant/Loan*
Design & Construction Project of the National Road 
No. 62 of Cambodia from Tbeng Meanchey to 
Prasat Preah Vihear & Road No. 210 from Thanl 
Bek Village, the Junction of NR No. 62 to Srayang- 
Koh Ker
2008 2011 57,800,000.00
USD
L (2%)
Feasibility Study Project on the Missing Link 
Section of Trans-Asia Railway in Cambodia
2008 2009 2,898,500.00
USD
G
Provide Office Equipment and Vehicle to the 
Senate of the Kingdom of Cambodia
2008 2008 145,000.00 USD G
Provide Office Equipment and Vehicles to the 
Ministry of Parliamentary Relations and Inspection
2008 2008 72,500.00 USD G
The Rehabilitation of National Road No. 57 Project, 
144km, from Battambang to Pailin [Cambodia and 
Thailand Border)
2008 2011 41,880,000.00
USD
L (2%)
Kanghot irrigation development project in 
Battambang Province
2010 2014 49,911,971.13
USD
L (2%)
Construction Project of New Office Building of the 
Senate of the Kingdom of Cambodia
N/S N/S N/S N/S
Rehabilitation Project of 4 Office Building and 
Library of the Senate of the Kingdom of Cambodia
N/S N/S N/S N/S
* Interest rate for the loan is written in brackets. All loans are fixed. 
Source: Author, adapted from Cambodia ODA database.
When it comes to distinguishing between Chinese aid and investment to 
Cambodia, Brautigam (2010b) says:
The Chinese practice is to sign a number of different official 
agreements concerning aid, export credits, and even investment 
together. Agreements are usually negotiated separately, and well 
beforehand, but then held off until a high-level Chinese official is 
visiting, so that they can be signed together in a big ceremony.
This practice of signing both aid and investment packages together may 
cause some ambiguity over what part of the package is actually aid, and 
what part is in fact investment. This is then made more complicated by the 
fact that China itself does not clearly define aid versus investment. For 
example, whilst not explicitly stated by China, it has been widely reported in 
the media and academic papers, that of the $600 million in aid pledged to 
Cambodia in 2006, $280 million went towards the Kamchay Dam in Kampot; 
$12.4 million was a loan for construction of Cambodia’s new Council of 
Ministers building (Fullbrook, 2006); and $200 million was for the 
construction of two bridges across the Mekong and Tonle Sap rivers 
(Coghlan, 2007). However, of these pledges, only the two bridges and the 
Council of Ministers building is listed on the Cambodian ODA database 
(albeit at a total cost of $100.2 million, rather than $212 million as stated by 
the media) (see Figure 6.3). The Kamchay Dam is not reported, suggesting 
that it is perhaps not aid but rather investment - yet this has not been 
expressly stated at any point by China, fuelling ambiguity over what is aid 
and what is investment.
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There is evidence that the Cambodian government uses this ambiguity over 
what constitutes Chinese aid and what constitutes Chinese investment for 
its own political purposes. Most announcements of China's aid packages as 
reported in the media come not from China itself, but rather from the 
Cambodian government. For instance Brautigam (2010b) in relation to the 
figure of $1.2 billion in aid to Cambodia in 2009 says: 'In fact this news about 
Chinese commitments came from the Cambodians, not the Chinese, who 
rarely have press releases containing aid or loan figures.' She goes on to 
state that it is 'unlikely' that the amount of Chinese aid would have been $1.2 
billion based on the overall figures for Chinese aid.
The political nature of announcements by the Cambodian government 
regarding China's aid can also be seen by the fact the Cambodian 
government is quick to praise China, often at the expense of western donors, 
suggesting that it has an agenda in reporting inflated aid figures and 
possibly playing China off against traditional donors. For example, Prime 
Minister Hun Sen praised China for its supposed $600 million aid package 
and famously said: 'China talks less but does a lot' and that China is 
'Cambodia’s most trustworthy friend’ (quoted in Storey, 2006). Cambodia's 
Minister of Finance Keat Chhon also recently said: ‘China is more than just a 
good rich neighbour ... China knows what Cambodia needs' (quoted in 
Baumuller, 2009). By contrast, western interests are often criticised by the 
Cambodian government. For example, Hun Sen has recently threatened to 
close the UN Rights Office in Phnom Penh, accusing the Head of the Rights 
Office of 'acting as a spokesman for opposition groups' (quoted in Cheang 
and Strangio 2010). The western media picks up on the inflated figures put 
forward by the Cambodian government regarding Chinese aid and publishes 
these figures as 'fact' thus fuelling the 'China as threat' discourse outlined in 
Chapter Three.
Aid structure: Is China's aid different?
China's aid is often portrayed by the western media, policy makers and 
researchers as being quite different to western aid -  however this may not 
always be the case. This section explores this idea by looking at the 
structure of China's aid (including bilateral/multilateral aid, grants/loans 
and project design and management) as compared to western aid, before 
moving on to look at a specific Chinese 'aid' project -  that of the Kamchay 
dam in Kampot, Cambodia.
Most Chinese aid to Cambodia is bilateral, meaning it is disbursed from the 
Chinese government to the Cambodian government and generally not 
channelled through other agencies. However, like traditional donors, China 
does also give some multilateral aid to Cambodia. This multilateral aid 
comes through the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and, more recently, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China has donated US$50 
million to the ADB for projects in Asia since it joined the ADB in 1996 
[People's Daily Online, 2007). Of this, $20 million is targeted towards the 
current Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) PRC Regional Cooperation and
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Poverty Reduction Fund of which one of the recipients is Cambodia. 
According to the ADB, this is the first such fund financed by China through 
an international institution [ADB 2005). China is both a donor and recipient 
of ADB funds, and is currently the second largest shareholder amongst 
regional members [ADB nd). China also pledges money through ASEAN. For 
example, at a meeting of ASEAN envoys in April 2009, China pledged $39.7 
million in aid to Cambodia, Laos and Burma to meet 'urgent needs' arising in 
light of the global financial crisis [McCartan, 2009). Also pledged by China at 
this time was 300,000 tons of rice to the poorer ASEAN nations, and 2,200 
scholarships to students from the region. China also gave $1.7 billion in 
loans with preferential terms for aid cooperation projects in ASEAN nations 
to assist with the economic crisis [China Daily 2009a).
Unlike the traditional donors, however, China does not usually pledge 
money through non-government organisations. In Cambodia non­
government organisations are often the preferred channel for aid from 
western donors, concerned about corruption in the Cambodian government. 
Nonetheless, whilst official aid is not disbursed through NGOs, China does 
provide some humanitarian aid through the Chinese Red Cross Society. 
Whilst this is not government money [the Red Cross is funded through 
public and private donation), the Chinese Red Cross Society is endorsed by 
the Chinese Government. The Chinese Red Cross Society has existed for over 
100 years, and is, according to Reeves [2008), 'one of China's most enduring 
social welfare institutions, outlasting diverse governments, changing 
conceptions of social welfare and dramatic policy swings on international 
involvement.’ The Chinese Red Cross Society aims to provide humanitarian 
social relief, including relief activities both inside and outside China. There 
have been at least four donations to Cambodia via the Red Cross Society of 
China in the last ten years. In 2000, $30,000 was disbursed to assist with 
flooding, in 2007 another $30,000 was disbursed to assist with a dengue 
fever outbreak, in 2009 a further $30,000 was disbursed to help with 
another flooding emergency caused by a typhoon [MOFCOM 2007; China 
Daily 2009b) and in 2010, $50,000 was disbursed to assist with the victims 
of the Water Festival stampede [Xinhua, 2010d).
In terms of the types of funding of China's aid to Cambodia - there are many 
similarities with western aid. China's aid comes in the form of both grants 
and concessional loans. Loans are provided for costly infrastructure projects 
such as bridges and roads whilst grants are provided for smaller projects 
such as the purchase of equipment; education, training and human 
resources projects; and project surveys. For example, according to Figure 
6.3, China has provided loans to Cambodia for projects such as the 
rehabilitation of National Road no. 7, the construction of the Prek Kdam and 
Prek Tamak bridges, and the Kanghot irrigation project. Grants have been 
provided for malaria prevention and cure, a feasibility study on the missing 
section of the Trans-Asia railway in Cambodia and to buy police vehicles and 
fire trucks. Concessional loans are usually fixed, with interest repayments of 
around 2% and the length of the loan varies depending on the project [see 
Figure 6.3).
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Like traditional aid, particularly in the past, many of the loans and grants 
China provides to Cambodia are tied, meaning that Chinese companies carry 
out the project. For example: 'Interest free loans to reconstruct National Rd 
No. 7 linking Cambodia to Laos and eventually China brought an $80 million 
deal for China's Shanghai Construction to undertake the construction work' 
(Baumuller 2009). One problem with Chinese tied aid in Cambodia 
according to two Cambodian officials interviewed for this thesis, however, is 
that the quality of the aid project depends on the company to which the 
project has gone and can differ quite substantially from project to project. 
Whilst traditional aid has been moving towards untying aid, western aid to 
Cambodia still focuses strongly on technical cooperation (at least half of 
western aid is technical cooperation) which has similarities with tied aid 
(and thus China's aid), in that much of the aid money actually ends up 
leaving the country.
In terms of sectoral targeting of aid, China does disburse more aid towards 
the infrastructure and transport sectors than the traditional donors. For 
example, according to Figure 6.3, up to 85 percent of China's aid goes to 
infrastructure/transport related projects. Whilst most of this aid goes 
towards projects such as the construction of roads and bridges, some also 
goes towards the construction of buildings. Perhaps the most notable of this 
building aid is the aid pledged for the Council of Ministers building in Phnom 
Penh which serves as the administrative nerve centre of the Cambodian 
government and which was built with Chinese aid money and using Chinese 
architectural designs. This building was completed in 2010 and is arguably a 
project traditional aid would not fund due to the overt links to government 
and power in Cambodia. Nonetheless, this focus on infrastructure is similar 
to the practices of other Asian donors in Cambodia such as Japan and South 
Korea, with the majority of both japan and Korea’s aid going to transport in 
2008 according to the Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2010. Data from the 
Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2010  says that all of China's aid either 
went to transport or government/administration in 2008.
One of the main differences, however, between Chinese and traditional aid 
in Cambodia, is the way in which aid projects are decided upon and the in­
country management of these projects. China, unlike western donors, tends 
to fund aid projects on a request system. That is, the Cambodian government 
requests the types of projects it would like funded and negotiations then 
take place between China and Cambodia as to what China will fund. This 
'request system' is particularly the case when it comes to large 
infrastructure projects such as dams or roads according to two Cambodian 
officials interviewed for this thesis. Smaller projects, on the other hand, may 
be suggested by China and agreed upon by Cambodia. For example, the Siem 
Reap National Botanical Gardens was an idea suggested to the Cambodian 
government by China as a project that they would fund if Cambodia was 
agreeable to the idea (Cambodian government official, 2009). Coghlan 
(2007) sums up the project decision process saying: China specifies the 
amount of aid available, the Chinese government and the Cambodian 
government then negotiate which projects will be funded. At this point, the
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Chinese government begins a tendering process for Chinese contractors to 
undertake the job. Once the job has been awarded, China and the Cambodian 
government jointly monitor the project implementation. Thus China's aid to 
Cambodia differs from traditional aid in the way decisions are made about 
what projects to fund: the decision as to what projects to fund is not shaped 
by the Washington Consensus, but rather by the maxim of 'mutual benefit' 
(Brautigam, 2010a) whereby aid becomes a 'gift' similar to tribute in the 
days of the tributary system (see Chapter Three).
The in-house management of aid is also different to the western or 
traditional donors. China, rather than funnelling money through the 
equivalent of, say, AusAID or DFID, channels aid money instead through the 
Chinese Embassy in Phnom Penh. China’s aid pledges are then made directly 
between the Chinese Embassy and Ministries within the Royal Government 
of Cambodia (Brautigam, 2010b). There is no specific aid agency dedicated 
simply to aid. The result of this management practice is that aid becomes 
more opaque and political than traditional aid which is, at least in practice, 
separated out from the other functions of foreign relations such as 
investment, defence and humanitarian issues.
Case study: Kamchay Dam
Like much Chinese aid, it is difficult to determine whether the Kamchay Dam 
is in fact an aid project. It has variously been described as aid by both the 
media and the Cambodian government. It is being funded by Sinohydro, a 
Chinese state owned energy company (the same company responsible for 
the Three Gorges Dam), and backed by the China Export-Import Bank 
(EXIM) (through which most of China's development aid is channelled). 
Nonetheless, it is not included on the Cambodian ODA database. However, 
merely the ambiguity over whether this project is aid or investment makes it 
a typical Chinese 'aid' project in Cambodia and therefore a useful case study 
for this thesis.
Cambodia pays one of the highest prices for electricity in the world. 
Currently, only 20% of the population has access to reliable sources of 
electricity, mainly in urban areas, while domestic demand for electricity is 
estimated to be growing at around 20% per year (Nette, 2008). Thus there is 
a genuine need for greater electricity generation in Cambodia. However, it 
appears that not only does the Cambodian Government want to meet rising 
domestic demand for electricity, but, according to the Asia Times Online 
(Nette 2008), 'Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong told a donor's 
meeting last year that his government plans to make Cambodia into the 
"battery of Southeast Asia".' The Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy 
(MIME), in its most recent Power Development Plan (1999 to 2016) has 
earmarked 14 potential sites in Cambodia for hydropower development by 
2018 (Vong and Strangio, 2008). The building of hydropower dams in 
Cambodia is controversial. Local and international NGOs cite lack of 
transparency around the dam building agenda, and social and
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environmental consequences as issues that need to be considered (e.g. 
Chanty, 2007; Middleton, 2008).
The site of the Kamchay dam (Figure 6.4) had been mooted as a potential 
hydropower location since the 1960s. In fact in the 1990s the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) looked into building a dam at the 
site and even enlisted Experco International to undertake a feasibility study. 
The feasibility study was completed in 2002, however, CIDA subsequently 
pulled out of the project, after pressure from local and international NGOs 
concerned about social and environmental impacts (Middleton, 2008b). 
Initial bidding for the Kamchay dam was held at the end of 2004, with at 
least 17 companies from Cambodia, Korea, China, and Japan bidding. The 
final contract was given to Sinohydro -  a Chinese state-owned enterprise 
who were to work in conjunction with the Ministry of Industry, Mines and 
Energy (MIME). It was speculated by NGOs, however, that despite the 
supposedly open bidding process, the Cambodian Government had already 
agreed with the Chinese government to award this contract to Sinohydro 
(NGO Program Officer, 2009):
Figure 6.4: Map of Kamchay Dam, Cambodia
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In April 2005, the Cambodian government awarded Sinohydro 
Corporation a contract to develop the Kamchay hydropower scheme. 
High-level Cambodian and Chinese government officials pushed 
forward the Kamchay dam in closed-door negotiations that largely 
left other stakeholders, including local authorities and the public, out 
of the process (Middleton, 2008b:58).
In 2006, the Cambodian government announced that China had pledged 
$600 million in aid money to Cambodia, of which $280 million was for a 
proposed hydropower dam at Kamchay in southeast Cambodia. At the time, 
this was to be the single biggest Chinese investment in Cambodia and 
Cambodia's first major hydropower project. Both the fact that this project 
was a Chinese project and that it was the first major hydropower project in 
Cambodia caused a degree of controversy, particularly in the media (both 
local and regional) and amongst civil society. Headlines at the time included 
those such as 'Chinese hydro concessions generate controversy in 
Cambodia' (Ryder, 2008); and 'Cambodia's biggest hydropower dams 
serious threats to people' (Khundee, 2008).
The Kamchay Dam site is located in Kampot province, south of Phnom Penh, 
in the Bokor National Park. Kampot province is home to around half a 
million people. The Bokor National Park was established in 1993 and covers 
approximately 140,000 ha. There are thirty-eight rare plant species and at 
least nine critically endangered animal species in the Park (Chanty, 2007). 
The exact site of the dam is the Mak Prang Commune which is 3km 
upstream from the Tek Chhu waterfall, a popular tourist attraction for both 
locals and foreign visitors. Sinohydro has built 70% of China’s hydropower 
capacity including the Three Gorges Project in China. The terms of the 
contract are a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme. This means that 
Sinohydro will manage the power plant for thirty years after completion of 
the project. The Cambodian government will compensate Sinohydro if the 
project underperforms during this time. The dam will be 110 metres high 
and produce 488 GWH of energy every year when it is finished. Work began 
in 2006 and the dam is expected to be finished in 2011 (Chanty, 2007).
Civil society and the western media have been critical of the project from the 
start. This would be the case with any new dam project in Southeast Asia, 
however the critiques appear to be even louder because China is behind the 
dam particularly as it is considered that China has a poor record of 
environmental and social standards when it comes to large infrastructure 
projects. Critiques of the proposed Kamchay hydropower dam put forward 
by local NGOs (e.g. NGO Forum, Culture and Environment Preservation 
Association [CEPA]) and international (e.g. International Rivers Network, 
Probe International), include the fact that the dam will flood 2000 hectares 
of Bokor National Park threatening endangered species and local 
livelihoods; that there has been a lack of consultation and transparency 
surrounding the dam with Cambodian and Chinese officials conducting 
negotiations 'behind closed doors'; and that Sinohydro and Chinese aid 
projects in general have poor environmental and social standards therefore
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posing a threat to local peoples and environments (Chanty, 2007). The 
English language press in Cambodia and the wider Southeast Asian region, 
along with NGOs, have also been fairly critical of the Kamchay dam project 
(e.g. Khundee, 2008), repeatedly publishing criticisms put forward by local 
and international NGOS, and pointing out China's controversial dam building 
record, particularly with reference to the Three Gorges project in China 
itself, (e.g. Ryder, 2009). Rarely, however, are links made with similarly 
controversial dams built by western interests in their home countries.
By contrast, traditional bilateral and multilateral donors have been 
(publicly) fairly quiet on the Kamchay Dam. The western donor community 
recognises the controversial impacts of large dam projects on local 
environments and livelihoods11, however these donors have chosen not to 
publically raise these criticisms in regard to the Kamchay Dam. It is worth 
noting that today traditional donors continue to support controversial 
hydropower projects across Asia despite the social and environmental 
impacts:
Under the GMS Power Grid plan, numerous controversial 
hydropower projects in Burma, Yunnan, and Laos -  where 
independent civil society participation and open debate are stifled -  
will provide power to the energy-hungry cities of Thailand and 
Vietnam. ADB dams in Laos, such as Theun-Hinboun, Nam Leuk and 
Nam Song, have negatively affected approximately 40,000 people, 
many of whom are still waiting for adequate compensation. And the 
ADB has neglected better renewable energy solutions and planning 
processes that would avoid this destructive path (International 
Rivers Network, nd)
In January 2008 I visited Kampot in order to take a closer look at the dam 
and seek local information and opinions about the dam. Local villagers at Ou 
Touch and Tvi Khang Cheung villages were interviewed as were vendors at 
the Tek Chhu waterfall and a local labourer who worked at the dam site. I 
also talked to the provincial departments of Environment; and Water 
Resources Management and Meteorology. The overall picture gained from 
this visit pointed to the fact that a) there was little consultation or 
transparency about the project with either local people or local government; 
b) a complete environmental and social impact statement had not been 
completed; c) local livelihoods were not overly negatively affected at this 
stage by the dam and d) Sinohydro had made some attempts to create local 
jobs and employ local labourers.
In terms of consultation and transparency, most local people had little to no 
knowledge of the dam's construction or potential effects. Villagers were
11 In 1997, The World Bank and IUCN worked together to establish the World Commission on Dams to review the 
development effectiveness of large dams and to establish international criteria, standards and guidelines for dams 
in light of their inherent social and environmental impacts. The final report was released in 2000. It stated the 
importance of recognising equity, efficiency, participatory decision-making, sustainability and accountability in 
dam development (World Commission on Dams, 2000).
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worried that the dam would collapse and flood their houses and farmlands. 
However they also hoped it would bring cheaper electricity. Villagers 
currently buy their electricity through middlemen who purchase electricity 
from neighbouring Vietnam and then on-sell it in Cambodia at exorbitant 
prices. Villagers who relied on the forest to collect non-timber forest 
products for their livelihoods had experienced short periods of time when 
they were stoped by roadblocks from going into the forest by the dam 
construction. These villagers collect rattan from the forest which they then 
weave into baskets and other products for sale. This is the only source of 
income for some villagers, and missing even one day's collection may mean 
they have no income for food. The Commune Chief requested, and was 
granted, an interview with Sinohydro to discuss access to the forest being 
blocked during construction of the dam. He was told the road blockages 
would only be temporary, which to date they have been, and were in place 
as the construction was dangerous. Perhaps most indicative of the general 
lack of communication with the local people, however, is the sign at the 
entrance to the dam site, which states in English and Chinese the purpose, 
nature and statistics about the dam. There is no equivalent sign in Khmer 
(Figure 6.5).
Figure 6.5: Kamchay hydropower dam -  Entrance sign
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Local officials in Kampot showed varying degrees of interest in talking to a 
foreigner about the dam. The Provincial Department of Environment told 
me that most negotiations around the dam were taking place between 
Sinohydro, the Royal Cambodian government and the Manager of Bokor 
National Park. Nonetheless, the provincial Department of Environment had 
some knowledge of the dam, and staff members from PDOE had been to visit 
the construction site. For example, there had been a problem with waste 
disposal at the dam. The PDOE had been called in to assess the problem. 
They had recommended some changes to waste management practices, 
which were subsequently implemented by Sinohydro. Nonetheless, the 
PDOE claimed that Sinohydro was talking almost exclusively with the 
Manager of the Bokor National Park where the dam is located. The Manager 
of the Bokor National Park refused to talk to me without written permission 
from the Department of Environment. Interestingly it was the Provincial 
Department of Environment who told me that there had only ever been an 
initial environmental impact statement (EIS) completed for the dam and 
that the final EIA was yet to be completed: yet the Provincial DOE believed 
that Sinohydro were 'respecting the rules' when it came to the dam 
construction.
The Provincial Department of Water Resources Management and 
Meteorology (PDOWRAM) professed to know very little about the dam, as all 
discussions were taking place at 'the central level’. As far as PDOWRAM 
were concerned, the dam was a good idea but had nothing to do with their 
remit (i.e. ensuring water for agricultural purposes) as the dam was purely 
for hydroelectricity purposes. However, the blurb about the dam that is 
posted at the guarded entrance to the construction site clearly states that 
the dam will contribute towards irrigation in the area. The provincial 
department of Industry, Mines and Energy also seem to be closely involved 
with the construction of the Kamchay Dam. At the time of my visit, the 
Deputy Director of the PMIME was in fact in China on a study tour of dams, 
thus precluding an interview with him.
According to a local labourer who worked at the dam, working conditions 
were reasonable. He stated that there were 800-1000 Cambodian workers 
working on the dam and around 100 Chinese workers. He got paid around 
$140-$150 per month as a mechanic. He worked an eight hour day from 
8am to 5pm, but was paid for 10 hour days as a result of 'health and 
sanitation' laws. The Cambodian workers at the dam came from all over 
Cambodia and most rented rooms in Kampot to live in during construction. 
The 100 or so Chinese workers at the dam lived in company housing on-site. 
According to local villagers, not so many local villagers had been hired to 
work on the dam as the dam paid workers monthly, and local villagers did 
not have enough money to pay for transport, food and accommodation 
whilst waiting to be paid.
In the case of the Kamchay dam, therefore, it appears that China is perhaps 
not behaving in a way that is completely different from the way a western 
donor, say the World Bank or Asian Development Bank, has acted (e.g.
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Gunning-Stevenson, 2001; AMRC, 2006]. Certainly transparency appears to 
be an issue, as does the completion of a proper environmental and social 
impact studies. However, this is often also the case with western funded 
hydropower projects, for example, the Theun Hinboun hydropower project 
in Laos which was funded by the ADB was critiqued internationally for the 
poor quality of the Environmental Impact Statement, lack of compensation 
to affected communities and poor pre-planning (AMRC, 2006]. It might be 
apt to look at Peter Bosshard's work on Chinese dams and his summation 
that:
Like any long-term investor, Chinese companies have an interest in 
avoiding human rights abuses and environmental destruction in their 
host countries. The Chinese government has issued guidelines for 
Chinese companies to protect the rights of workers, local 
communities and the environment. Chinese companies have started 
to adopt environmental standards, but have yet to effectively 
implement them (Bosshard 2008].
Bosshard [2008] points out that China has a long way to go to satisfy social 
and environmental concerns when it comes to dam building, but then so do 
traditional donors. It is in China's interest to remain friendly with the 
country it is providing aid to and thus to ensure its aid projects provide 
some benefit to the country receiving them.
China and the existing aid culture
As explored in Chapter Four, the existing aid culture in Cambodia is one that 
is dominated by the traditional donors and their practices, institutions and 
policies. Whilst China is not part of this aid culture, it does take part in some 
of the structures that contribute to the traditional aid culture in Cambodia. 
For example, China was party to the Paris Peace Accords of 1991 and 
participated in the subsequent UNTAC period by sending police personnel. 
China was also participant to the first Ministerial Conference on the 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia held in Tokyo in 1992.
Since the UNTAC period, China has shown further willingness to engage in 
traditional aid structures by cooperating with multilateral institutions and 
donors such as the IMF, ADB and ASEAN, as outlined in the sections above. 
Recently, China has also attended the last three Cambodian Development 
Cooperation Forums held in 2007, 2008 and 2010. At the last CDCF meeting 
in 2010, China sent four representatives including the Ambassador, and 
Economic and Commercial Counsellor. Whilst these meetings are chaired by 
the Royal Government of Cambodia, they are very much dominated by the 
traditional aid model (see Chapter Five]. China does not actively participate 
in the meetings in terms of speaking to the agenda items, however China 
does attend and, like DAC donors, gives an indication of what its aid pledges 
to Cambodia for the next three years will be.
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China also provides details about its aid program through the government- 
run Cambodia ODA database (see Figure 6.3]. Whilst this is a RGC owned 
and managed database, the database was created in order to fulfil the aid 
effectiveness structures put in place by the western donors in accordance 
with the Paris Declaration. On this database, each aid project is listed by the 
donor and information provided as to what the project is for, whether it is a 
grant or loan, the length of the project, and whether the project fulfils 
certain criteria associated with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 
China, just like the western donors, keeps this database (somewhat] 
updated.
China also engages in a less formal manner with the traditional aid donors in 
Cambodia. For example, China occasionally attends informal monthly lunch 
meetings held between western bilateral and multilateral donors in 
Cambodia. These meetings are arranged by the World Bank and provide a 
less formal forum to discuss aid and development. The Country Manager of 
the World Bank in Cambodia is Mr Qimiao Fan, himself Chinese, although 
western-educated. At his request, China sometimes attends these meetings 
but to date has not actively participated in debate. According to the western 
donors interviewed for this thesis, it is Qimiao who takes the lead in 
engaging with China in the Cambodian aid context. This is discussed at 
greater length in Chapter Seven.
Nonetheless, despite these examples of engagement by China with some of 
the traditional aid structures in Cambodia, there are also many examples of 
when China does not engage with these structures. For example, China does 
not to date participate in the Technical Working Group structure, nor does 
China contribute to aid forums initiated by civil society such as NGO Forum's 
occasional aid effectiveness conferences. China is also often reluctant to 
meet with traditional donors on a one-to-one basis. Several traditional 
donors when interviewed for this thesis said they had approached China 
regarding a closer engagement on aid, but without success. Similarly China 
does not participate in aid projects run by traditional donors, preferring to 
run its own projects on its own terms.
Summary
This chapter has explored Chinese aid to Cambodia through the framework 
of geopolitics and representation. It highlighted the fact that China has been 
disbursing aid to Cambodia for much the same length of time as the West. 
Prior to the end of the Cold War, much of China's aid (like the West’s] was 
pledged according to ideological or geopolitical reasoning. Since 1991, 
however, China's aid to Cambodia has been less about ideology and more 
about 'mutual benefit'. Since 1991, and particularly since the early 2000s, 
the Cambodian government and western media, academics and policy 
makers have often represented China’s aid to Cambodia as being far larger 
than it is, and as being different to the West's own aid. However, this chapter 
has pointed out, that China's aid to Cambodia, whilst on the increase, is not 
any larger than other bilateral donor aid programs to Cambodia (e.g. Japan]
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and that China's aid in practice is not radically different from that of the 
West's aid practice. China has even shown some willingness to engage with 
traditional aid structures.
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Chapter Seven: 
Aid, Cambodia and the 
Cultural Encounter
The previous two chapters have analysed both western aid and Chinese aid 
to Cambodia to give us an understanding of how aid works in the context of 
Cambodia. This chapter goes on to look at the cultural encounter between 
western donors and China in Cambodia. The chapter is broken into two 
sections. The first section analyses the encounter between western donors 
and China in Cambodia, whilst the second section relates this encounter 
back to the literature, particularly the literature around development, aid, 
representation and encounter. Both sections address the research topic 
through an examination of the following questions: how do those with 
different cultural sets come together in certain contexts, namely aid; what 
cultural encounters do we see in this mix between traditional donors and 
new donors?; and how do discourses around 'the other' play into aid 
dialogues in Cambodia?
The Aid Encounter in Cambodia
What is the encounter?
As we have seen from the previous chapters, there are numerous aid actors 
in Cambodia from bilateral donors to multilateral donors to NGOs. 
According to one NGO official in Cambodia: ‘Aid is an industry in Cambodia: 
the whole gamut of aid actors exist in Cambodia, from bilaterals to 
multilaterals to INGO, to local NGOs' (program manager, NGO, 2009). It has 
predominately been the western, or 'traditional' donors that have created 
and dominated the aid culture in Cambodia to date. The western donors 
have set the aid agendas and dominated the aid structures. However, 
recently, as has been explored in previous chapters, China has become one 
of the largest donors to Cambodia, which implicitly challenges the existing 
western-dominated aid culture in Cambodia. This section looks at how the 
traditional donors in Cambodia have encountered China as a 'new' donor 
and the impact this has had upon the existing aid culture.
There are three main types of aid actor in Cambodia: bilateral donors, 
multilateral donors and non-government organisations (of which there are 
both local and international NGOs). In the course of this thesis, analysis was 
made of these three types of traditional aid actors and their encounters with 
China. This analysis was undertaken by conducting interviews with aid
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actors, attending meetings and conferences, and analysing policy papers and 
other written material such as media reports [as discussed in Chapter One). 
It was concluded that the three main types of aid actors in Cambodia have 
three types of broad encounter with China as an aid donor. These 
encounters are outlined below.
Bilateral donors
Many bilateral donors were interviewed for this thesis. These donors 
included AusAID, USAID, DFID, JICA and SIDA. It became apparent during 
the course of the interviews that the bilateral donors in Cambodia 
'encounter' China in three main ways: concern/threat, disinterest, and/or 
engagement. Bilateral donors express concern at China's lack of 
transparency and lack of interest in poverty reduction; a disinterest along 
the lines of'we don’t care what China is doing, we will simply continue with 
our own programs’; and an interest in cooperating with China and 
incorporating China into the existing aid structures in Cambodia. Bilateral 
donors do not outwardly criticise China's aid program in the manner of the 
media or civil society, instead preferring to talk about 'engagement' or 
'cooperation' with China and incorporating China into existing aid dialogues.
One of the first points many bilateral donors raise when questioned about 
China and its role as a donor in Cambodia, is a lack of knowledge regarding 
China as a donor; and the apparent lack of transparency surrounding China's 
aid program: 7 have never seen reliable data from China and/or / can't say 
much about the Chinese program other than what's in the papers. You should 
check the local news agency [Xinhua] for more information' [senior official, 
bilateral donor, 2009). Nonetheless, many of these same donors then point 
to the publically accessible Cambodia ODA Database and/or Cambodia Aid 
Effectiveness Report citing these sources as repositories of China's aid 
figures. Several donors also point to the fact that China does in fact attend 
the Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum, although ‘they [China] don't 
say anything' [senior official, bilateral donor, 2009); and that China 
participates in informal monthly donor lunches. Flowever, this did not stop 
China being described as ‘the invisible donor' [senior official, bilateral donor, 
2009) by at least one of the traditional bilateral donors. This appears to 
highlight the fact that there is not, in fact, a complete lack of transparency 
around China as a donor but that this is the narrative that bilateral donors 
are interested in putting forward in Cambodia, as is discussed further later 
in this chapter.
The lack of focus of Chinese aid on poverty reduction was another aspect of 
Chinese aid which western bilateral donors were quick to use to 
differentiate China from themselves as donors. In terms of poverty 
reduction, most donors pointed to the fact that China is involved with 
infrastructure development: ‘bilateral aid from China is in the form of soft 
loans for roads, dams etc; China appears to give very large loans at fairly 
decent rates for large infrastructure projects implemented by Chinese 
companies. Some small grants are provided for superficial projects' [senior
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official, multilateral donor, 2009]. However, China is 'not so concerned with 
poverty reduction' (senior official, bilateral donor, 2009]. It is interesting to 
note that several bilateral donors felt that they could comment with 
accuracy on this aspect of Chinese aid, but at the same time claimed not to 
know much about China's aid. This narrative of portraying China’s aid as 
somehow less ethical than traditional aid as it is seemingly about 
investment not poverty reduction, is a common discourse amongst the West 
when discussing China's aid, whether it be in reference to Africa, Asia or 
South America:
By setting the standards, monitoring, evaluating, and ranking the aid 
programmes of member states, the DAC has assumed the new role of 
'moral bookkeeper', authenticating and encouraging foreign aid as a 
virtuous practice' (Hattori, 2003:244]
This notion is discussed further later in this chapter.
Another frequent response from the bilateral donors in Cambodia towards 
China's aid was along the lines of ‘they can do what they want, that does not 
change our program.’ Donors pointed out that their programs had not 
changed despite China's increasing prominence in the aid landscape in 
Cambodia, and that they (the traditional donors] were still entirely focused 
on the Millennium Development Goals, aid effectiveness, climate change and 
the other main tenets of the western aid discourse. This lack of apparent 
interest in alternative development paths is borne out by annual reports and 
strategy papers from western donors which rarely if ever mention China or 
an alternative development path to that which is already in place (e.g. 
AusAID's strategic plan for Cambodia 2010-2015 (AusAID, 2010]; 
Cambodian-European Community Strategy Paper 2007-2013 (EC, 2007]]. 
When it was mentioned that traditional aid to Cambodia had increased 
considerably since China's reported $600 million in 2006, several donors 
claimed that any increases in aid have merely been a result of overall trends 
in aid and/or donor country priorities and that any increases which have 
occurred in have been quite apart from China and what China was doing in 
Cambodia: ‘China being present in Cambodia has no influences on us [bilateral 
donors]' (senior official, bilateral donor, 2009]. This narrative appears to 
concur with that being espoused at the global level by the western donors. 
For example, the DAC Development Cooperation Report 2010 (OECD-DAC, 
2010] makes no explicit mention of China or other 'new ’ donors, instead it 
says that DAC should be 'much more inclusive and proactive in working with 
others, for example by expanding DAC membership' but at the same time 
'must maintain a clear and consistent focus on the principles of effective aid 
set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda 
for Action.’
However, the most common response of bilateral donors when questioned 
about China's role in Cambodia, was that there needed to be enhanced 
cooperation between China and the other donors: ‘all development partners 
want China to be part o f the aid structure in Cambodia. They would like to
Aid, Cambodia and the cultural encounter| 99
draw China into existing structures around a id ’ (senior official, bilateral 
donor, 2009]. Several of the larger bilateral donors pointed out the work 
they were already doing in the region with China to try and engage China 
and draw it into existing aid dialogues. For example, in 2009, the USAID 
office in Bangkok had a representative in China for the first time ever. One of 
the objectives of this position was to open a dialogue and coordinate with 
China, not to just give aid per se: 'we want to g et China much more involved. 
China will cooperate when they're good  and ready’ (senior official, bilateral 
donor, 2009J. This again is in line with the views of the OECD-DAC donors at 
a global scale. For example, Bernard Petit, Deputy Director-General at the 
European Commission in 2008 when speaking of China's role in Africa said: 
‘Our position is that confrontation with China is not the answer. We hope that 
i f  Japan has the sam e way o f  thinking . . .  we can convince China to be in the 
fram ew ork o f  the rest o f  the international community ... and respect the 
agenda o f  aid effectiveness' (Inagaki, 2008]. A House of Commons report 
(2009:49] stated in regard to DFID's engagement with China that:
Working from Beijing would help to provide DFID with accurate and 
up-to-date information about China's engagement with African and 
other countries, and ensure that it better understands China's 
approaches. This can only assist the process of moving from dialogue 
to practical collaboration in third countries. It is also likely to help 
DFID promote greater Chinese participation in multilateral 
development frameworks.
Certainly in terms of the material encounter, it appears that the bilateral 
donors are encouraging engagement with China in Cambodia -  this is borne 
out by the fact that China is invited to informal donor monthly lunch 
meetings.
The one possible exception to these broad bilateral narratives around 
encounters with China, is the Japanese Agency for International 
Development (JICA]. JICA was much more open to talking about China to me 
than the other bilateral agencies, and suggested that it is important that 
'culture' be considered when it comes to the encounter between China and 
the traditional donors. In particular, that western culture is different to 
Asian culture and therefore Japan is better placed to understand and engage 
with China than the other western donors. For example, according to JICA, 
lack of dialogue on China's behalf is simply the 'Asian way' and something 
that western donors need to understand. JICA also expressed the view that 
western discourses around aid are not narratives that Asian donors 
automatically feel comfortable with: ‘Grass roots level dem ocracy is totally 
opposite to the "the Asian way’’. Most Asian countries are autocratic. Japan is 
sceptical about ‘governance' [for example] but Washington doesn’t listen' 
(senior official, bilateral donor 2009]. However, despite this attempt by JICA 
to try and draw a line between Asian and non-Asian donors in Cambodia, 
JICA still expressed the same views as other donors when it came to 
engagement with China (‘we would like to m ake friends with China'], and the 
notion that its own aid program would not be influenced or changed by
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China. A publication from 2006 sponsored by the Japanese government 
supports the notion that Japan as an aid donor is more interested in 
conforming with the traditional aid discourse than diverging from it, despite 
the apparent 'cultural differences':
Interestingly, this historical divergence between Japanese ODA and 
the rest of the world has begun to diminish in recent years. We are 
now starting to witness in contemporary thinking about aid and 
development a global convergence of philosophies and practices 
(RIAP, 2006:xix)
Multilateral donors
It appears that the encounter between multilateral donors and China is 
similar to that of bilateral donors, with a focus on cooperation, yet also an 
outward narrative that existing aid programs will not change as a result of 
China's growing role in the aid landscape in Cambodia. However, the 
international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank, were far less inclined to discuss the encounter with 
China than the other multilateral or bilateral donors. The Asian 
Development Bank refused outright to be interviewed for this thesis and the 
World Bank in Cambodia originally agreed and then pulled out. This 
indicates that the encounter between China and the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) in Cambodia is a sensitive issue -  and one that neither 
party is willing to speak about openly. This could be a result of China being a 
large investor both to Cambodia, and increasingly within the ADB and World 
Bank. The material encounter is based on investment and profit and is not 
something that either side is willing to jeopardise.
Nonetheless, the World Bank in Cambodia appears to take the lead for both 
the bilateral and multilateral donors when it comes to engaging China in aid 
dialogues:
The World Bank (through Qimiao) are attempting to involve China in 
this dialogue, Qimiao is reaching out to China. The World Bank takes  
the lead on donor coordination with Qimiao hosting informal monthly 
donor meeting which Chinese representatives are som etim es present at 
(senior official, bilateral donor 2009).
The Country Manager of the World Bank in Cambodia, Mr Qimiao Fan, has 
previously worked as a senior executive in the private sector in China and is 
also teaching China research at the World Bank Institute (WBI) in 
Washington. The WBI is the Bank's learning centre where seminars and 
training are provided for those in the South on key Bank issues and topics. 
According to one donor (senior official, bilateral donor, 2009), the World 
Bank is trying to motivate the Chinese Ambassador to participate in the 
existing aid structures in Cambodia. This increased dialogue with and about 
China from the World Bank seems consistent with the World Bank's global 
moves towards China. For example, in early 2010, China became the third
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largest shareholder in the World Bank at the global level, after its voting 
power was increased from three percent to four percent by the World Bank 
Development Committee. This makes China the third biggest World Bank 
member after the United States and Japan (Ickes, 2010). The ADB also 
reinforces at a global level the need to engage China, with the Director 
General of the ADB saying in 2008
China is playing a very important role as an emerging donor. It i s ... 
important that we bring them into the donor community, as it were, 
because then you g et som e principles o f  various safeguards to be 
applied, be it on social safeguards, be it on the environment (AFP,
2008).
The multilateral donors in Cambodia, also emphasised along with the 
bilateral donors, that China's presence has not affected traditional aid: 'flows 
are on an upward trajectory anyway due to the Monterrey Consensus; there is 
m ore potential impact from  the econom ic crisis in terms o f  aid flow s to 
Cambodia [than from China]' (senior officer, multilateral donor, 2009). This 
is emphasised again by looking at the annual reports and websites of major 
multilateral donors in Cambodia such as the UNDP. On the UNDP Cambodia 
website there is reference to continuing to work towards supporting the 
Cambodian Development Millennium Goals 'in close collaboration with the 
Government, other UN agencies and development stakeholders. 
Partnerships with the United Kingdom, Sweden, Australia, the European 
Union, Japan, and Canada are vital for achieving results' (UNDP-Cambodia, 
2010). There is no mention of alternative development paths, or of 'new' 
donors such as China. This signals the outward intention on the part of 
multilateral donors to continue on the same development path that they are 
currently on with no room for alternative discussions around development.
Non-government organisations
The encounter between civil society and China in Cambodia, in contrast to 
the bilateral and multilateral donors, is largely one of critique. This is 
illuminated though the many research reports in the public domain written 
by NGOs critiquing Chinese aid and investment in Cambodia. These reports 
include: China's poverty footprint in Cambodia (Coghlan, 2007); In Search o f  
Aluminium: China's role in the Mekong (Lazarus, 2009); Rethinking 
Investments in Natural Resources: China's Emerging Role in the Mekong 
Region (Rutherford et al, 2008) and Cambodia's hydropower development 
and China’s involvement (Middleton, 2008a) which in particular criticise 
China's environmental record and focus on investment over poverty 
reduction. Nonetheless, according to at least one multilateral donor, civil 
society critique of Chinese aid in Cambodia has not been particularly strong 
compared to that found in Africa or elsewhere where Chinese aid has a 
presence:
Reactions to Chinese aid in Africa have been negative. African people 
see Chinese aid as neo-colonialism. In Cambodia it is different, however.
Aid, Cambodia and the cultural encounter| 102
The population is not engaged with the debate on foreign aid. Just a 
few NGOs in Phnom Penh pay any attention. This is different to Africa 
where civil society is very involved (senior officer, multilateral donor, 
2009)
One of the major critiques by NGOs of China in Cambodia is that Chinese aid 
will undermine environmental and social standards, particularly when it 
comes to infrastructure development:
There has been increasing Chinese investment in hydropower in 
Cambodia, however the process is not participatory. The projects are 
discussed and agreed at the top level and then pushed through at the 
ground level. There are no social impact assessments (Deputy-Director, 
NGO, 2009).
Civil society claims that dams in particular will create social and 
environmental impacts which will be exacerbated by the fact that China 
does not employ the traditional safeguards used by western donors when 
building large infrastructure projects: ‘China appears to be a potential 
catalyst for environmental destruction. They do not care about social and 
environmental issues' (program manager, NGO, 2009). These issues are 
expanded upon in the International Rivers Network (IRN) 2008 report 
Cambodia's hydropower development and China's involvement.
NGOs also critique China for not advocating poverty reduction through its 
aid programs:
The main focus of China's aid policy is not poverty reduction, for 
example the Kamchay Dam is being supported through a loan from 
China's EXIM bank. The purpose of this loan is not to support 
development (in terms of poverty reduction), but rather to boost 
Chinese imports/exports and to promote investment (program 
manager, NGO, 2009).
NGOs point out the difference between China and traditional donors both in 
terms of environmental and social standards, and poverty reduction:
The difference between Chinese and traditional aid, is that most 
Chinese companies do not actively pursue safeguards. This is 
particularly the case in Cambodia, as the RGC neither requests it, nor 
enforces it. China is also not monitoring its own external players. China 
could force its aid providers to abide by its own domestic laws, or that 
of the third country, but it doesn't (program manager, NGO, 2009).
Another critique by NGOs in regard to China is that China is less responsive 
to civil society than the traditional donors: ‘at least with western companies 
such as BHP, there are channels for advocacy' (program manager, NGO, 
2009). For example, ‘the World Bank was allowing forest concessions in 
Cambodia but civil society had concerns about this, and so they complained.
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The World Bank investigated and decided to stop granting forest concessions' 
(program manager, NGO, 2009). However, China does not engage with civil 
society in the same way the western donors do. This is exemplified through 
the material encounter between NGOs and China in Cambodia. The Chinese 
Embassy is invited to aid dialogues organised by civil society (e.g. NGO 
Forum's Aid Dialogue on Aid Effectiveness), but they rarely respond to the 
request, let alone participate. This has led to a diminished sense of influence 
on the part of NGOs: 'there has not been a reduction of space for civil society 
in Cambodia as a result of China's influence, but there has been a reduction in 
influence' (program manager, NGO, 2009). China is also blamed by civil 
society for 'destroying' some of the previous cooperation between donors, 
government and civil society:
In the last decade when China was not dominant in Cambodia, there 
was good cooperation and little conflict between NGOs, government, 
and donors. There was good governance. People talked to each other. 
However, now the situation is becoming worse. New ideology from 
China is the problem (program manager, NGO, 2009)
Why this encounter?
Many of the reasons behind the encounters between western donors and 
China in Cambodia relate to the global encounter between the traditional 
donors and China. Bilateral and multilateral donors are keen not be seen to 
be outwardly criticising China; to incorporate China into the existing aid 
structures; and to make sure that their existing aid programs are not 
threatened or challenged by China. NGOs in Cambodia also follow 
international discourses on China, speaking out on China's environmental 
and social record and questioning the space that civil society will have in 
development if China begins to dominate development circles.
However, the particular aid encounter in Cambodia is not just related to 
global discourses but also to the local context. Traditional donors have had a 
long history of involvement in Cambodia. The Cambodian government, 
despite nearly twenty years of traditional aid, is still dependent on donors 
with nearly half of all GDP coming from aid. The public sector is also aid 
dependent:
Cambodia had been isolated for a long time, and suddenly there was a 
lot o f aid coming in ... It created a public sector dependent on aid. 
Ministries were formed based on donor priorities and this still exists. 
Donors provide salary supplements which is the norm in Cambodia 
(although it is the exception elsewhere] (senior official, multilateral 
donor, 2009).
Cambodia could therefore be seen, as a 'site of knowledge' for traditional 
aid. Hughes (2009:5) writes in regard to Cambodia as a site of knowledge for 
the neoliberal economics of western donors that:
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Timor and Cambodia were merely extreme examples of a 
phenomenon that was widespread in the 1990s - the international 
pursuit of projects of "state-building" and "good governance" as a 
means to facilitate the spread of neoliberal economics across the 
globe in the aftermath of the Cold War.
Certainly the traditional donors have had a disproportionate influence on 
government policy in Cambodia, as discussed in Chapter Five. This could 
explain why donors in Cambodia seem particularly keen to incorporate 
China into the existing aid structures. They do not want to see their 'site of 
knowledge' challenged or disrupted.
Since colonial times, the West has also occupied a position of 'trustee' in 
Cambodia which confers a sense of moral obligation as to what is 'right' for 
Cambodia. As Li (2007:4] says in regards to parties sharing in the 'the will to 
improve' [2007:4]: 'They occupy the position of trustees, a position defined 
by the claim to know how others should live, to know what is best for them, 
to know what they need.' Rowlands (2008:5] goes on to explain the western 
sense of moral obligation towards the South:
Despite the consistent evidence that aid allocation tends to be 
dominated by ... political and strategic interests in many DAC 
members, there remains within the development community as a 
whole a sense that the true objective and motivation of development 
assistance is the moral one of assisting the less fortunate (Rowlands, 
2008:5]
In Cambodia, the western donors do not want this position of'trustee' to be 
usurped by China. There is also evidence that the western donors simply 
enjoy Cambodia as a site in which to 'do good' and do not want this to 
change:
Lives of expatriates in Cambodia are not just pleasant but typically 
delightful, with a little discount for some inevitable inconveniences of 
living in a poor country. Not only can resident foreigners have lavish 
lifestyles with all the consumption goods that are now international, but 
they live in a country where labour is cheap and generally obedient. 
Unlike in some other recipient countries, aid givers and other foreign do 
gooders are treated with great respect, hospitality and generosity, and 
are easily allowed to persuade themselves of their usefulness and 
importance. It is little wonder that very few people leave this paradise 
(Ghosh, 2003b]
Another reason for traditional donors encountering China the way they do 
in Cambodia, is because the western donors are concerned about losing 
their political leverage in Cambodia to China. Cambodia and China have a 
long history of foreign relations going back to the earliest days of ancient 
Funan, as outlined in Chapter Three. This relationship has historically been 
based on a client-patron relationship -  a relationship which is common
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throughout Asia but which is not always synonymous with western ideas 
around aid and development. China and Cambodia also have a long history 
of social relations. The Chinese form one of the largest ethnic groups in 
Cambodia and many Cambodians claim Chinese heritage. In recent years, the 
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen has openly praised China and Chinese 
aid and investment to Cambodia. Hun Sen has also allowed the opening up of 
Chinese schools, newspapers and community groups in Cambodia. All this 
could be seen as a tightening of the historically close relationship between 
Cambodia and China. Yet the West considers Cambodia as 'theirs' as 
explained in Chapter Four. They do not want to lose the political leverage 
they have enjoyed since the UNTAC period, nor are they keen to see 
Cambodia descend into a 'failed state’ after all the traditional aid that has 
flowed into it, one in which democracy is not adhered to such as Burma. 
Thus the western donors are keen to incorporate China into existing aid 
discourses to ensure that these are not threatened and that the Cambodian 
government does not continue to favour China at the expense of the 
traditional donors.
Finally, it could be said that the traditional donors do not want their own 
failings shown up by new donors coming into the country. Despite the large 
amounts of aid that have come into Cambodia from the traditional donors 
since 1991; and the immense effort of the UNTAC period and the push 
towards democracy, Cambodia is still one of the poorest countries in the 
world. Corruption abounds as does inequality and issues around 
sustainability and governance. Whilst poverty has been relieved somewhat 
and, on paper at least, Cambodia is a democracy, the overall objectives of the 
traditional aid discourse have not been met to date in Cambodia. The 
western donors espouse the benefits of development such as poverty 
alleviation, good governance, sustainable development and community 
engagement, however, it is questionable whether in practice these 
objectives have been met. Traditional donors do not necessarily have a good 
record in Cambodia, as seen by the World Bank and its forestry record12. In 
this sense, there may be no difference between traditional donors and China, 
other than the fact China is less subtle in its discourse than the traditional 
donors: ‘We [traditional donors] are better at hiding it' (program manager, 
NGO, 2009]. It is also possible that donors in Cambodia deliberately use 
China as an excuse for their own behaviour and/or lack of achievement in 
Cambodia. For example, citing the lack of conditionalities around China's aid 
as the reason that the western donors cannot implement governance 
reforms. Therefore it could be said that the traditional donors in Cambodia 
are trying to subsume China within their own discourse in order to hide any 
failings within the existing discourse, however, at the same time are issuing 
veiled critiques against China as a means to hide their own aid 
shortcomings.
12 In the early 2000s, the World Bank continued to provide structural adjustment loans to Cambodia for forestry 
reform despite the fact that Cambodia was clearly flouting the conditions imposed by these loans (e.g. illegal 
logging concessions); o f which the Bank was well aware yet it did nothing to fix the problem until pressure was 
brought to bear by civil society (Global Witness, 2007).
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Theoretical insights - Development, Aid, Representation and Encounter
The above section has highlighted the encounter between western donors 
and China in Cambodia and contextual reasons for this encounter. This 
section goes on to look at how this encounter relates to the theory. It 
explores the aid encounter in Cambodia between traditional donors and 
China in regards to development and aid, and representation and encounter 
(drawing on critical geopolitics and cultural geography)
Development
As noted earlier in this thesis, 'development' in the context of international 
assistance is a western construct that arose at the end of World War Two. 
The discourse of development is dominated by western narratives around 
issues such as good governance, sustainability and aid effectiveness. The 
delivery of development has been institutionalised through multilateral 
organisations such as the World Bank and bilateral donors such as USAID, 
AusAID and DFID. Traditionally within this discourse there is little room for 
alternative paths towards development. Whilst different bilateral donors 
may focus on different aspects of development e.g. Japan on infrastructure, 
Sweden on poverty alleviation and the United States on anti-corruption and 
good governance, the overall discourse is still the same:
Much of this tradition is embedded within the official coordinating 
bodies and institutional arrangements of the traditional donors: 
Although these agencies are far from absolute in their power to direct 
donor activity, and are not necessarily homogeneous in their views 
on development, they are instrumental in defining terms and 
concepts in development assistance, identifying best practices, and 
providing a framework within which bilateral donors can interact 
with a higher degree of synergy than if they had been left to their 
own devices (Rowlands, 2008:4)
Challenges to this development discourse have arisen over time both in 
practice - most notably during the Cold War with the Soviet Union and China 
(Hurrell, 2007), and theoretically -  for example the dependency theorists. 
However the dominance of the western development discourse with its 
focus on economic development and democracy has never truly been 
challenged. That is until today, as 'new' donors such as China, India and 
Brazil come to the fore with increasingly large amounts of money targeted 
towards the South and 'development'. This implicit challenge to existing 
development discourses has caused disquiet in western media, policy and 
academic circles; this has been particularly the case in regard to China which 
is not just potentially challenging the existing development discourse but 
indeed the whole global order with its rapid economic growth and 
population might.
Much of the debate in western research and policy circles regarding China 
and its outward development path, centres around whether China is
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promoting 'development' as the West avowedly does, or merely serving its 
own interests in terms of resources, security and sourcing potential 
economic markets. However very little actual research has been undertaken 
on China's development discourses either from the West, or by China's own 
academics in a western context. This means that many perspectives coming 
from the West regarding China are based less on rigorous study and more 
on hearsay or representation. This thesis argues, according to the 
information that can be gleaned regarding China’s development discourse, 
that China's development discourse is analogous with its foreign policy 
narratives, encapsulated by policies such as a Harmonious World and the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Nordtveit (2008:257) claims that 'the 
China-proposed development and education models are very similar to the 
western growth-based development paradigm, although the discourse is 
different', thereby implying that China's current modernist approach to aid 
is, in fact, very similar to earlier western approaches.
China's growing role in development on a global scale, however, could 
potentially provide a catalyst for discussion and engagement around 
approaches to development, much as the post-development theorists would 
argue has been necessary for some time. The existing western discourse 
around development has indeed been critiqued for many years by many 
different actors - for being Eurocentric; for functioning primarily to maintain 
existing power structures rather than poverty reduction and economic 
growth pre se; and for not listening to voices from the South regarding their 
own aims and aspirations regarding development (as outlined in Chapter 
Two). Certainly those from the South appear welcoming of a potential new 
development paradigm: ‘African leaders have welcomed what they see as a 
new approach to development and increased potential for meaningful 
South-South cooperation' (Sarny, 2010:75). Moyo (2009) in her book Dead 
Aid which argues for the end of traditional aid, also sees a place for Chinese 
'aid' as a business-oriented engagement model.
However, this thesis argues that rather than opening up a space for 
discussion around development, the West is trying its best to maintain the 
status quo around development. This is seen through the fact that China's 
overseas development approach is critiqued by those in the West as being 
somehow less ethical than that which the West espouses. For example, in 
regard to Africa: 'The more extreme criticism of Chinese aid projects in 
Africa could be seen as an attempt to advance the 'West' as a model of'moral 
and correct' practices, in particular in the fields of global development 
policies, global humanitarianism and aid procedures (Tan-Mullins et al, 
2010:874). This can also be seen occurring in Cambodia where Chinese aid 
is critiqued for being more about investment than poverty reduction. The 
implication is that western aid is noble as it is about assisting those less 
fortunate, whereas investment couched in the language of aid (i.e China's 
aid) is less self-interested and therefore 'less good’. This maintenance of the 
status quo is also reflected through attempts by the West to subsume China 
into existing development discourses, rather than allow for any alternative 
paths which may challenge the existing development discourse. This thesis
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argues that the West's position regarding development and China's implicit 
challenge to this discourse is in line with Said's (1995:7) notion that the 
West will do whatever it can to retain its position of power in relation to the 
Orient: 'In a quite constant way, Orientalism depends for its strategy on this 
flexible positional superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of 
possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative 
upper hand.’
Aid
Aid in the western sense is the means by which 'development' is achieved. 
Western countries give money to those in the South for poverty alleviation 
and economic development. However, it is not just those in the West who 
have a monopoly on aid -  many countries including China, India and Brazil 
also give aid, albeit outside the framework of the DAC. China, for example, 
has, and does, give aid to countries all over the world, including those in 
Asia, Africa and the Pacific. However, it is only recently that the West has 
begun to take notice of China as an aid donor, as China's role on the global 
stage increases and, in unison, its aid program increases both in size and 
geographical spread. In fact, Mawdsley (2010:362) argues that emerging 
donors other than China are almost ignored by the traditional donors, 
despite the rhetoric at the OECD-DAC level about engaging all 'emerging' 
donors. It appears that China is the only emerging donor that the West is 
concerned with:
given perceptions of its [China's] potential challenge to the status 
quo, the vast weight of interest and analysis, whether in terms of its 
'development' activities or the closely related arena of trade, 
investment and diplomatic relations, is directed towards China.
This is certainly the case in Cambodia, where donors such as Thailand or 
Korea are given very little outward attention by western media, policy 
makers or donors, this attention instead being reserved for China.
China is not a member of the OECD-DAC which since the 1950s has been the 
'club' to which most of the traditional donors belong. With the exception of 
Japan, and most recently South Korea, all the donors are western. It is DAC, 
based in Paris, who determine the standards and norms around traditional 
aid:
Current standards and norms of donor behavior and activity are 
generally derived from traditional donors. These standards and 
norms include the quantity, distribution, and type of aid, levels of 
collaboration and cooperation, and guidelines to improve efficiency 
(Rowlands, 2008:2).
This thesis argues that it is China's operation outside this western-led aid 
structure that implicitly challenges the West. By being outside 'the club', 
China is not embedded within the current standards and norms that emerge
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from the western aid tradition and therefore not under any obligation to 
follow these standards and norms. Whilst China ostensibly has principles 
upon which its aid is based (i.e. Eight Principles fo r  China's Aid to Third 
World Countries), its overall aid policies, aid figures and aid structures are 
not transparent. This lack of transparency regarding China’s aid program, 
and the fact China does not belong to DAC, and therefore is not bound by its 
codes, challenges the West in terms of potentially undermining the West's 
own aid programs, and by extension its position of power in the South: 
'Some US policy makers and others have expressed frustration that because 
of China's policy of providing foreign assistance without conditions, they are 
losing the ability to influence the behavior of aid recipients regarding human 
rights and economic reforms' (Lum et al, 2009: 1).
The 'solution' for the West appears to be to try and incorporate China into 
the existing aid dialogue, rather than to allow it to take its own path or to sit 
outside this dialogue. Once embedded within the existing discourse the West 
can much more easily 'keep tabs' on China and stymie potential challenges 
from China to this discourse. Much as with the overall development 
discourse, the West appears unwilling to either look critically at its aid 
program, or to consider alternative approaches to aid. This is despite the 
fact that traditional aid has had a long history of critique as to whether it 
'works' or not (see Chapter Two). For example, in Cambodia western donors 
have continued on the same path since the UNTAC period, despite evidence 
that western aid is not necessarily achieving its stated goals. As Mawdsley 
(2008:525) points out: 'cooperation and dialogue between China, African 
and Western nations, is more likely to arise and have positive outcomes, if 
the West were to take a more critical look at its own record, and cast a more 
careful eye over some of China's foreign policy positions.’
This encounter of attempting to incorporate China can be seen to be similar 
to the approach taken by the West towards Japan when it began its aid 
program back in the 1960s. At this time, Japan was seen as somewhat of a 
'rogue' donor, much as China is today (Katada, 2005). Japan had a rapidly 
expanding aid program which went hand-in-hand with its rapid global 
economic expansion. Japanese aid was criticised for being 'different' to 
traditional aid in that most of Japan's aid was tied; Japan had a 'non­
interference' policy in foreign countries, therefore gave aid to 'dubious' 
nations; Japan used a 'request based' system whereby officials from other 
countries requested aid, rather than Japan suggesting aid program; and the 
focus of Japanese aid was on infrastructure and economic development 
rather than poverty reduction (Katada, 2005). Kondo (2007:17), the 
Japanese Ambassador to UNESCO, sums up how the West reacted to Japan as 
a donor at this time:
It is clear that the international community, under the leadership of the
Western powers tried to have an 'engagement policy' to make sure that
Japan would not be heading in the direction that they did not want.
This was evidenced by the invitation of Japan to the OECD in 1964 and
to the G7 Summit as an original member in 1975. But still concerns
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about Japan's possible hidden agenda were repeatedly expressed in 
the Western media throughout the 80's.
Thus is appears that in regards to China's aid, the West is following long 
established patterns with regard to 'new' donors: that is to attempt to 
incorporate 'new' donors into existing aid dialogues and structures. By 
behaving as such, the West prevents any alternative aid dialogues to its own 
and it preserves its own position of power.
Representation
This thesis argues that crucial to the aid encounter between traditional 
donors and China are not just development and aid discourses, but also 
representations of these discourses. At the start of this thesis the link was 
made between cultural geography, critical geopolitics and representation. 
Cultural geography highlights the fact that representations occur and how 
they are created; critical geopolitics show us how these representations are 
used to create imaginations about the world in terms of place and power.
Said (1995:4) highlights, in regards to the Orient, how places (or discourses) 
are created:
the Orient is not an inert fact of nature. It is not merely there, just as 
the Occident itself is not just there either ... as both geographical and 
cultural entities - to say nothing of historical entities - such locales, 
regions, geographical sectors as 'Orient' and 'Occident' are man­
made. Therefore as much as the West itself, the Orient is an idea that 
has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery and vocabulary that 
have given it reality and presence in and for the West. The two 
geographical entities thus support and to an extent reflect each other, 
[emphasis is original]
China is often represented by the West as 'the other'. An entity that is 
somehow the opposite of 'the West', yet in its construction reflects the 
realities of the West. Mawdsley (2008:523) highlights this dichotomy in a 
study of the way China is represented in UK broadsheets:
although most UK broadsheet newspaper reports set out a range of 
potential problems and benefits, representations of Chinese 
investment and interactions ... are problematically partial. They tend 
towards a rather simplistic binary between the sometimes mistaken 
or frustrated but essentially well-intentioned West (Dr Livingstone), 
and the amoral, greedy and coldly indifferent Chinese (Fu Manchu) 
battling over a corrupt and/or helpless Africa (the Dark Continent).
This media representation of China as amoral and the West as well- 
intentioned is also seen in the Cambodian context, for example, in an article 
entitled 'China's billions reap rewards in Cambodia' in The Washington Post 
(2010). This article maligns China's aid and investment to Cambodia, talking
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of China 'barging' into Cambodia and quoting a reporter from a Chinese 
language Cambodian newspaper as saying 'the takeover [by China] is 
inevitable' (Pomfret, 2010). At the same time, however, the article implies 
that American support is both benign and welcomed.
Mawdsley (2008) goes on to say that media images and representations play 
an important role in shaping public understandings, debates and political 
pressures. These representations of China then play out in the way China's 
changing global role is portrayed and thus power assigned or denied it by 
the West:
The West tends to see emerging power as a potential threat, and tries 
to decide if it is a friend or foe. This dichotomous approach often lets 
western people pick up bits and pieces of information as examples 
that represent the whole and decide if they are black or white, 
thereby overlooking the real issue (Kondo, 2007:17).
This thesis argues that China, due to its increasing role as an aid donor, is 
seen by the West to be threatening existing development discourses. The 
West wants to ensure that it maintains its existing dominance in this world 
order and that it does not 'lose out' to China, hence the west represents 
China as 'the other'. For example Tan-Mullins et al (2010:864) in regards to 
Chinese aid to Africa say: 'we would like to point out that rather than being 
motivated by any deep concern about the rights of Africans, ''China bashing" 
serves to bolster Western interests.'
Another narrative used by the West to represent China as 'the other', is that 
which positions the West's development discourse as morally superior to 
that provided by those outside of DAC:
Normative liberal discourse criticizes the Chinese for disbursing 
'rogue aid' and undermining good governance in the African 
continent. These criticisms not only ignore the longer-term 
motivations and modalities of Chinese aid and the historical diversity 
of Chinese relations with Africa, but also uncritically assume 
'Western' aid to be morally 'superior' and 'more effective' in terms of 
development outcomes (Tan-Mullins et al, 2010).
This becomes perhaps even clearer when we look at representations from a 
critical geopolitics viewpoint. Since the end of World War Two, the United 
States and her allies have dominated the world order. This has been 
especially the case since the end of the Cold War:
One of the most important characteristics of the international system 
in the second half of the twentieth century was the emergence of a 
US-led order built around the institutional and multilateral 
structures created in the wake of the Second World War (the UN, 
GATT, the international financial institutions) and the extraordinarily
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dense set of transatlantic and trans- Pacific relations and alliance 
systems (Hurrell, 2007:11).
However today, it could be said that a new world order is emerging, one in 
which the BRIC nations (China, India, Brazil and Russia) play a much larger 
role. Nonetheless, as Kondo (2007:11) suggests:
what we are discussing here is not a new issue. This is déjà-vu. The 
questions, such as "for what purpose will China and India use their 
economic might?" or "what kind of world order are they going to 
shape with their new power?" are exactly the questions many 
Western countries asked about Japan during the 1970s and 80s when 
Japan was ascending as a new economic power.
And it could be argued that the response from the West towards a supposed 
new world order is also the same. Western donors do not want to lose their 
leading position in this 'new' world order, therefore make use of 
representation to ensure that their discourse and position of power remain 
dominant. For example, in Cambodia the traditional donors do not want to 
lose their dominance to China, so represent China's aid as being far larger 
and much different to western aid than it actually is.
Encounter
Finally we come to the crux of this thesis -  the cultural encounter. As 
outlined in Chapter Two, the encounter in this case, is the way in which the 
West and China come together in a third locale in the context of aid. Often 
the encounter in terms of development is theorised as that of one between 
coloniser and colonised. Indeed there is a whole body of research that looks 
at this postcolonial encounter in these terms. This thesis, however, takes the 
coloniser to be the West (as would be the case in any standard postcolonial 
paradigm), but rather than exploring the colonised as Cambodia, it takes 
China as 'the other' and Cambodia itself as the context for which this 
encounter takes place.
When it comes to the aid encounter between western donors and China, it 
appears that the local context is less important, at least in the case of the 
western donors, than the global discourse: 'The wider debate on aid 
effectiveness and conditionalities is to a large extent the result of 
confrontations between global players seeking to delegitimize the other 
whilst at the same time asserting the (moral) superiority of their approach' 
(Tan-Mullins et al, 2010:874). Thus the local context, and indeed the aid and 
development outcomes, appear to be of less significance than the power 
struggle between the West and China. For example, in Cambodia ‘at the 
moment, there seems to be a race to see who can give the most money, than a 
real consideration o f  poverty reduction and so on' (Program Manager, NGO, 
2009). Baumüller (2009) elaborates on this point by saying:
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Indeed, one could be forgiven for thinking that the economic crisis 
was just a myth when looking at aid pledges to Cambodia at the 
annual CDCF in December 2008, at a time when the impacts of the 
economic crisis were already spreading around the world. The 
Cambodian government had asked for around $600 million in 
support and received a staggering $950 million in pledges.
Cambodia, caught in the midst of this aid encounter, appears to be doing its 
best to play off the donors against each other in order to receive the most 
mileage out of an encounter originating outside the local context: ‘Hun Sen 
continues to run circles around the donors, making the same empty promises 
every year and laughing all the way to the bank' (Brad Adam, Human Rights 
Watch Director, cited in Cock, 2010:262). This puts Cambodia in much the 
same position it has historically been in, for example during the Vietnam 
War when it asserted its independence in the face of increasing conflict 
between the democratic versus communist forces seeking to use Cambodia 
as a battleground; or in the colonial period when Cambodia turned to France 
to protect it from its more powerful neighbours of Thailand and Vietnam 
and France in turn used Cambodia as a buffer against the British. Today, the 
(relatively weak) civil society in Cambodia follows the line of the western 
discourse, criticising China; by contrast, the Cambodian government praises 
China and the aid and investment it brings to the country. The local 
Cambodian actors therefore, far from being powerless, are using the global 
aid encounter between the western donors and China which is playing out 
on their doorstep, to their advantage.
Thus is would appear that in Cambodia there is an encounter of conquest, or 
even colonisation, but it is not an encounter with Cambodia, but rather an 
encounter between China and the West. And that this is an encounter not 
only occurring in Cambodia, but is playing out throughout the world. In this 
encounter both representation and discourse are used to make the western 
aid narrative appear 'better' than China's. This can be contextualised within 
the postcolonial framework of Orientalism:
Orientalism can be discussed and analysed as the corporate 
institution for dealing with the Orient -  dealing with it by making 
statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching 
it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style 
for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient 
(Said, 1995:3).
Taking this framework, the aid encounter between the West and China in 
Cambodia becomes one of the West trying to 'colonise' China, through 
representation and incorporation. The West in a bid to retain its power, 
represents China as 'the other' in order to 'dominate, restructure and have 
authority' over it (Said, 1995).
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Summary
This chapter has outlined the aid encounter between western donors and 
China in Cambodia. It has highlighted how different actors -  bilateral, 
multilateral and non-government organisations -  'encounter' Chinese aid in 
Cambodia. It has then linked this encounter to the local context, to analyse 
the degree to which it is based in the local context or indeed resonates from 
global discourses. Finally this chapter has undertaken an analysis of the aid 
encounter in Cambodia in terms of theory relating to development, aid, 
representation and encounter. It concludes that the current aid encounter in 
Cambodia reflects global discourses on aid, development and China. The 
West in an attempt to hold onto its traditional power when it comes to aid 
and development, represents China as 'the other', yet rather than allowing 
for any alternative discourses when it comes to aid, the West is attempting 
to subsume China within its own aid discourse in an attempt to retain its 
own position of power.
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Chapter Eight: 
Conclusion
This chapter provides a summary of the thesis, it begins by presenting an 
overview of the main findings of the thesis before moving on to the overall 
conclusions of the thesis. It then looks at some of the theoretical 
implications before assessing the limitations of the study and possibilities 
for further research.
Summary of findings
This thesis has looked at three main aspects of the aid culture in Cambodia - 
that of traditional aid to Cambodia, Chinese aid to Cambodia and the 
encounter between western and Chinese aid in Cambodia. This investigation 
of aid as a 'culture' is an innovative approach that has not, to date, 
previously been undertaken in the context of Cambodia.
Western aid to Cambodia has dominated the aid culture in Cambodia since 
the UNTAC period, when Cambodia stepped out of 15 years of international 
isolation. From the UNTAC period western aid actors have flowed into 
Cambodia bringing with them western notions of development centred 
around ideas such as democracy, good governance and sustainability. These 
philosophies are encapsulated in development policies such as the 
Cambodian Millennium Development Goals and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia's Rectangular Strategy. This thesis has argued that this monopoly 
of western aid donors in Cambodia has created a particular aid culture, one 
which is entrenched in the policies, institutions and structures of aid in 
Cambodia such as the Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum and/or 
the Technical Working Groups. This aid culture traditionally leaves little 
room for alternative development paths, or for donors who sit outside the 
DAC 'donors club'.
However, recently this aid culture has faced a challenge in the form of 'new' 
donor China. China is not a member of the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee yet it pledges considerable amounts of aid to Cambodia, this 
being particularly the case since 2006. China's aid to Cambodia is often 
represented by various actors (including the western media, non­
government organisations and the Cambodian government) in ways that 
serve to further their own interests rather than represent the 'reality' of 
China's aid. For example, the total amount of China’s aid to Cambodia is 
usually represented by the western media as being far larger than it actually 
is; China's aid to Cambodia is also represented as being quite different to
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western aid in both theory and practice. However, this thesis has highlighted 
that China's aid to Cambodia, whilst on the increase, is not any larger than 
other bilateral donor aid programs to Cambodia (e.g. japan) and that China's 
aid in practice is not radically different to that of the West's aid practice with 
indications that China is becoming more willing to engage with the West and 
with western notions of aid and development
When it comes to the encounter between the traditional donors and China in 
Cambodia, this thesis concludes that the current aid encounter in Cambodia 
reflects global discourses on aid, development and China. The West in an 
attempt to hold onto its traditional power when it comes to aid and 
development, represents China as 'the other', yet rather than allowing for 
any alternative discourses when it comes to aid, the West is attempting to 
subsume China within its own aid discourse in an attempt to retain its own 
position of power. The West takes the upper hand in what Said claims is a 
constant power play between the West and the Orient: one in which the 
West will represent itself and that of the other in whatever way reflects and 
maintains its own position of superiority. In the context of Cambodia, 
however it is important to remember that this is not just an encounter 
between the traditional donors and China, but that the local context also 
plays a role. The Cambodian government is not a passive player in the 
encounter - rather it also represents the West and China in certain ways in 
order to play them off against each other and subsequently fulfil its own 
goals.
Theoretical implications: China, representation and 'the other'
This thesis has highlighted several theoretical implications, in particular the 
need to consider the critical geopolitics of aid, including encounter and 
representation in aid; and the need to consider 'the other' or non-western 
viewpoints in aid and development.
Many academics have used geopolitics and international relations to 
understand the relationship between China and the West when it comes to 
aid. This work tends to look at the theory and practice of Chinese aid (e.g. 
Brautigam, 2009) and/or how China 'threatens' the West (e.g. Kurlantzick, 
2007). However the question of critical geopolitics and cultural geography 
has been largely ignored when it comes to China as a new donor - 
particularly the idea of representation and power. This thesis argues that 
China is represented in a certain manner in order to maintain the West's 
existing global position of power. However this theoretical basis for analysis 
is missing from most literature on Chinese aid (with a few notable 
exceptions, namely Mawdsley, 2008; Mohan & Power, 2010). Further 
research on China's aid and development could benefit from taking a more 
critical position based on representation rather than approaching China's 
aid simply from an economic or foreign relations point of view.
Another theoretical implication highlighted by this work, is the need to de­
centre the West in studies of China as an aid donor. Most of the literature
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around China and aid/development starts from the viewpoint of 
'development' in the western sense of the word. The western notion of 
development tends to be one of poverty reduction and altruism as opposed 
to, say, profit however this is a western notion of development and not 
necessarily one that others subscribe to. Development is not necessarily a 
concept that is in use outside of western discourses and can therefore be 
problematic when imposed. As Mohan and Power (2010:462) say:
Chinese practice is uncomfortable and unfamiliar with the notion of 
'development' as an independent policy field of the kind that 
emerged among Western nations in the course of the 1950s ... meta­
narratives about aid, or references to the establishment of Xiaokang 
societies elsewhere in the world, do not appear to exist.
Following on from the need to look at China's aid from different 
perspectives, the idea of 'de-centering' the West in studies of China and its 
aid also needs to be taken into account. As Mohan and Power (2010:468) 
state in relation to China in Africa:
There are other ways of approaching the development/international 
politics nexus and that China-Africa relations offer the opportunity 
for de-centering the West from'accounts of global politics and looking 
more closely at the 'entwining'' of knowledges (as many post-colonial 
theorists have urged).
Winter (2009: 21) in his work on tourism studies and the place of Asian 
tourists in tourism studies (including extensive work on Asian tourists at 
Angkor Wat in Cambodia) also highlights the need to re-focus away from the 
West in order to understand Asia:
In both its focus and conception, much of the research on tourism 
remains Anglo-Western centric ... Our understandings of'the tourist', 
'the modern tourism industry’ and the conceptual paraphernalia, 
which surrounds these two, are all firmly rooted in the empirical 
histories of Western Europe and North America. English language 
scholarship on tourism rarely rips up these 'Western' roots to 
interpret 'Non-Western' practices and industries.
This de-centering of the West needs to apply not only to studies of China as 
an aid donor, but also in looking at the role of the aid-receiving country. 
Many studies assume that the host country is a passive player when it comes 
to aid. However this is often not the case. For example, in the case of Chinese 
aid to Cambodia the Cambodian government is playing off the western 
donors against the Chinese donors in a deliberate move to gain power and 
funding. By taking a postcolonial stance such as that espoused above, a more 
rounded picture of Chinese aid may be gained.
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Limitations: Chinese voice, timeframe and gender
There were some limitations within this thesis which must be 
acknowledged.
Firstly, I did not speak to the Chinese Embassy in Phnom Penh. I made 
several approaches but no request for an interview was granted. This means 
that any supposition regarding Chinese aid and development discourse 
comes from the existing literature (including academic texts, media and 
Cambodian sources), rather than from the Chinese themselves. This is a 
limitation in that it denies China a voice in this thesis, instead necessitating 
the construction of such a voice through secondary sources.
Secondly, this thesis was limited by the timeframe of a Masters degree. This 
meant the fieldwork was restricted to a total of around three months. This 
short timeframe did not allow for any in-depth study of Chinese aid projects 
(beyond the Kamchay Dam study) nor a comparative study between a 
traditional donor aid project in Cambodia and a similar Chinese aid project. 
By not undertaking such fieldwork, the opportunity to comment on 
differences between Chinese aid and traditional aid in practice is limited.
Thirdly, all interviewees with the exception of one were men. This was not 
by design, but men occupied most of the positions interviewed. It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to look into why this was the case, but it may have 
caused some discrepancies within the information obtained. Gender is an 
important factor to consider when looking at the role of the researcher in 
data collection:
Gender is important because we often ascribe characteristics to 
people on the basis of gender. Furthermore, personal interactions 
vary with the gender of participants; we tend to react differently to 
men and women. Therefore gender is a factor that can influence data 
collection (Dowling, 2005: 26).
Further research
There is certainly scope for further research on what is a rapidly growing 
and changing field.
This thesis only looked at one 'new' donor in relation to Cambodia -  that of 
China - however an area of further research could be to look at South Korea 
as another new donor to Cambodia. Korea is one of the largest investors in 
Cambodia and is considered an 'emerging' donor with its aid increasing 
rapidly over the last few years from a small baseline. Korea now gives more 
aid to Cambodia than Australia, the UK or France (Cambodian Rehabilitation 
and Development Board, 2010). It is an Asian donor which, like China, has 
also been an aid recipient. Like China, Korea’s aid tends towards 
concessional loans rather than grants, and it favours tied aid: 'The Korean 
development model prioritises economic growth over social welfare ... and
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is based on the "selection and concentration” principle, with a centralised 
decision making process to ensure efficiency' (Chun et al, 2010:799). 
However Korea's aid to Cambodia, unlike China's aid, rarely makes a news 
headline or is explored in academic papers. Further research could look at 
why Korean aid, which is on the surface apparently similar to Chinese aid, 
appears, by contrast, to be little discussed in the context of Cambodia; and 
the relationship this may or may not have to Korea’s entry to the OECD-DAC 
in late 2009.
Another avenue of further research might be to expand the context of this 
study to include other Southeast nations, particularly Laos. Since the mid- 
2000s Chinese aid to Laos has increased considerably, although, as is the 
case for Cambodia, the figures are rather vague. For example, Cain (2008b) 
reports that in 2006, Chinese aid to Laos was $45 million compared to the 
4.5 million in aid disbursed by the US between 2005 and 2007. Jansen 
(2007) by contrast reports that Chinese aid to Laos 'now amounts to more 
than 280 million dollars' but does not give a time frame over which this aid 
has been given. China, as is the case in Cambodia, is also one of the biggest 
investors and traders with Laos. There is particular concern amongst 
English-language media and policy papers regarding Chinese built dams in 
Laos (e.g. see Rutherford et al, 2008), the influx of Chinese workers to Laos 
(e.g. McCarten, 2008) and natural resource degradation (e.g. Allen, 2009). 
Further research could investigate the encounter between traditional 
donors and China in Laos and compare this with the encounter in Cambodia.
Finally, further research could 'reverse' this thesis and investigate the aid 
encounter between China and the West from the perspective of a Chinese 
researcher, rather than a western researcher. This approach would add to 
the theoretical body of (post)development and cultural geography by 
providing insights into how 'the other’ constructs and represents both aid 
and development. For example, an investigation could be undertaken of 
China's 'development' discourses; how China views and represents its aid 
and for whom; and how China constructs the West and its aid and how this 
influences the encounter between Chinese and western aid, as a 
counterpoint to the research of this thesis.
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